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All articles and features are printed in English. If a contribution is written in another language, the original and an English translation are requested. Should the author be unable to provide a translation, the editors will endeavor to do so.

The system of transliteration of foreign terms and names should be consistent within each article and, as far as possible, should conform with generally accepted practice, such as the Wade system for Chinese. Diacritical marks must be used except in contemporary personal names.

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## *Editor's Note*

THE FOUR ARTICLES in this issue are papers which were presented at the Fourth East-West Philosophers' Conference held at the University of Hawaii during the summer of 1964. The theme of the Conference was "The World and the Individual in East and West," the status of the individual in reality, thought, and culture.

In six one-week sections, members of the Conference studied the status of the individual in metaphysics, in methodology, in religion, in ethics, in social thought and practices, and in legal and political thought and institutions—in Asia and the West. The present papers report the work of the second week of the Conference, during which the problem was the status of the individual in methodology in East and West. "Comment and Discussion" reactions to these papers are encouraged.

The collected Conference papers, plus some of the discussions at formal Conference meetings and some of the public lectures given during the Conference, are being published by the University of Hawaii Press. The volume will be entitled *The Status of the Individual in East and West.*

T'ANG CHÜN-I[a]

# *The Individual and the World in Chinese Methodology*[*]

## Introduction

I SHALL LIMIT this paper to the four important typical ways of thinking about the individual and the world in Chinese epistemology:

1. To think of the individual as objectively existing as a part of the world.
2. To think of the world as a part of, or the content of, or identical with, the being of the individual subject.
3. To think that both the individual and world must be transcended, and that there is then in reality neither individual nor world.
4. To think that both the individual subject and the objective world are to be asserted positively as existing, yet neither is asserted as a part of, or the content of, or identical with, the other; nor are they asserted as mutually exclusive, because their mutual transcendence and mutual immanence are both accepted.

## I. The individual known as objectively existing and as a part of the world through class names, pointing, spatio-temporal location, and relational thinking

First, the way of thinking of the individual as objectively existing and as part of the world is that way of thinking which *starts* from the world as the objective side of our knowledge (through the temporary forgetting of the individual as a unique knowing or acting subject and the conscious—though not self-conscious—activity of the objectivation of the subject as one of the individual things in the world) and *ends* in the assertion that I, as an individual, and all other individual things co-exist as parts of the world. The problem here—how I as an individual person can be objectively known or conceptually determined as an individual—is included in the general problem as to how any individual thing is objectively known or conceptually determined

* Editor's note: in this article and in the one by Nakamura, the order of Oriental names preferred by the authors is retained.

as an individual. Since individual things are usually thought of objectively by general concepts or class terms, which are universal in meaning, the problems as to how the individuality of a particular individual can be conceptually determined and how the individual can be thought of objectively have been complicated and delicate problems from Plato to the present in Western thought. However, Chinese philosophers have not taken the problem so seriously as has the West, though they are not lacking in answers to the problem. These answers are represented by the Moists,[b] the Logicians,[c] Hsün Tzu[d] (313-238 B.C.), and the Yin-Yang[e] school in classical Chinese thought.

(a) Moists think of the individual objectively merely as a member of a class. They stress the idea of class (*lei*[f]) earlier than Mencius[g] (372-289 B.C.) and Hsün Tzu. Mo Tzu[h] (468-376 B.C.) teaches universal love as based upon the idea that all human beings are of the same kind. He teaches also that one should love the father of another man as he does his own. Thus, Mo Tzu takes my father merely as one member of the class of fathers. So, when Moism is developed into a theory of epistemology and logic in Mo Pien,[i] an individual thing is called an individual or an actuality (*shih*[j]). A *shih* may have its proper name and class names such as species name and genus name. As a proper name is arbitrarily given to a *shih*, conceptual knowledge of a *shih* requires the use of a class name. However, Mo Pien did not discuss the problem as to how an individual can be conceptually determined by the class name, which expresses the universal concept only. In Mo Pien's thought, the use of a class name to denote an individual is a practical matter. If a genus name is not enough to express the peculiarities of an individual, then a species name or sub-species name is required to differentiate one individual from another of the same kind. As the process of using class names with more specified meanings goes on, there is no problem as to how the individual can be conceptually determined and expressed by a class name. Consequently, this problem is not raised and discussed by Moists. However, it has to be raised and discussed, because the process of using names with more specified meanings cannot go on indefinitely, since there is no infirm species or lowest subordinative class-name to use; and, even if there were, it would still be a class name, and we could know the individual only as a member of the class.

(b) Another way to know the individual as existing objectively is represented by Kung-sun Lung[k] (498-? B.C.) of the logician school of Pre-Ch'in (Ch'in, 221-206 B.C.) philosophy. This is the way of knowing an individual by pointing to it. Kung-sun Lung is famous for his insistence on the difference of meanings between species name and genus name. Thus, "White horse is not horse" is his slogan. If genus name is different from species name because it has a wider denotation, it is implied that the lowest class-name still can denote

more than one individual, and so, individuality cannot be expressed by any class-name as such. Thus, the individual can be pointed out or indicated only by names and not conceptually determined by them. These are the topics of his two other treatises, "Chih-wu lun"[l] (On Pointing and Things) and "Ming-shih lun"[m] (On Name and Actuality), which are less mentioned than his theory of the difference of species and genus as expounded in his treatise "Pai-ma lun"[n] (On White Horse). It is quite clear that Kung-sun Lung thinks that the actuality (*shih*) of an individual thing can be pointed to only by names and that the differences between species name and genus name are based upon their different functions in pointing.[1] We use names for pointing out the individual thing, and the individual thing is shown and known to us in the very act of pointing.

It is one thing to use a universal name to point to an individual thing, and another for a person to be understood by others, as when we use a certain universal name to point to a certain individual. If the individuality of an individual is not capable of being determined in some other way, where can one get the guarantee that one shall not be misunderstood? Thus, the third way of knowing the individual, as propounded by Hsün Tzu, needs consideration.

(c) The third way of knowing the individual as existing objectively is that of determining an individual in a spatio-temporal system. When Hsün Tzu discusses how an actuality or an individual thing is determined in his chapter of the *Cheng-ming*[o] (Rectification of Names), he disagrees with the view that an individual is determined by its appearances or attributes, which are usually expressed by universal names. Two things may have the same appearances or attributes but be in different places. Thus, they have to be called two distinct actualities, two individual things. On the other hand, in the process of becoming, "one [individual] thing may have different appearances or attributes [at different times] but must still be called one individual."[2] An actuality, or an individual, is determined by its location in the spatio-temporal system, with emphasis laid on the different spatial locations of different individual things. However, when we differentiate the different things according to their different locations in space and time, we presuppose that the space-time system is already differentiated in its structure prior to the things in it. Here the epistemological problem is: if there are not things related differently to one another in

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[1] He begins his treatise "On Pointing and Things" with the statement that nothing is incapable of being pointed to, but that the pointing (with the names we use for pointing understood) is not being pointed to. *Kung-sun Lung*, 3.

[2] *Hsün Tzu*, 22, "Rectification of Names." For detailed discussion on Hsün Tzu's theory of names, see my paper "Hsün Tzu cheng-ming yü ming-hsüeh san tsung"[ax] (Hsün Tzu's Rectification of Names and Three Schools of Logicians in Pre-Ch'in Philosophy), *New Asia Journal*,[ay] V, No. 2 (August, 1963), 1-22.

space-time, how can space-time, which is simply extended in spatio-temporal dimensions and is thought to be homogeneous everywhere, be differentiated by itself into different locations? If we cannot find any other answer to this problem, we can look for the principle of individuality only in the different things as differently related to each other.

(d) As things which are similar in appearances or attributes and subsumed under a class name do not usually have the same relations, such as causal relations, with other things, so any two individuals can be differentiated according to their different relations with different things. The Yin-Yang school is representative of this way of thinking: the fourth way of knowing the individual, that of relational thinking, the way of knowing the individual in its many-sided relations with other things. This way, expounded first by the Yin-Yang school, was adopted by many Confucianists after the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–A.D. 220).

The meanings of *yin*[p] and *yang*[q] are subtle and complicated.[3] Originally, *"yin"* meant what is concealed and unknown to us, and *"yang"* meant what is manifested and known to us. They were originally concepts of attributes of things based on their status relative to other things, and were not originally concepts of substance or force. According to their derivative meanings, anything which is in front of or before other things is called *yang*, and that which is in back of or after other things is called *yin*. Consequently, what is progressive or active or generative is *yang*, and what is retrogressive or passive or degenerative is *yin*. All these meanings are relative. Therefore, according to the Yin-Yang school, everything takes the role of *yin* or *yang* relatively to other things, and anything of the same class can be differently determined as having different relations of *yin* and *yang* to these other things. Even if we limit the meaning of *"yang"* to "active" and *"yin"* to "passive," it is not difficult to determine the things to which a certain individual thing is peculiarly related, actively and passively, and then to differentiate it from the other individual things of the same class, in order that the uniqueness of a certain individual can be expressed through this kind of relational thinking without confusion.

The way of relational thinking of the Yin-Yang school was originally a way of thinking of an individual thing as existing objectively in the natural world. Yet, it is exactly like the Confucian way of thinking of the status of the individual person through his ethical relations in the human world. When an individual person is seen as existing objectively in the human world, his action

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[3] For the original meaning and the derivative meanings of the words *"yin"* and *"yang,"* consult my book *Che-hsüeh kai-lun*[az] (A Treatise of Philosophy) (Hong Kong: Mencius Educational Foundation, 1961), Vol. II, Part III, chap. 5, sec. 3, and chap. 9, sec. 1.

and personality are regulated and determined by his reciprocal relations with other persons. As there are no two individual persons who have the same ethical relations to the other persons around them, so the unique status of an individual person in the human world can be cognized and conceptually determined through knowledge of his peculiar ethical relations to others.

## II. The individual as a self-conscious moral subject and the world as seen by such a subject

I myself as a subject am a self-conscious subject. When I am self-conscious, what I am conscious of can be known as the content of my consciousness, and comprehended by my self-consciousness, which therefore transcends the world, and can then include it as a part of itself. If we say that only the self-consciousness which immediately reveals itself to me exists, this is extreme individualism or solipsism; and, if we say that there are different worlds belonging to the different self-consciousnesses of different individuals, this is pluralistic idealism or pluralistic spiritualism, and is a kind of individualism, too.

But, how can we know that self-consciousness is itself an individual reality belonging to me exclusively or belonging to each person separately? It is quite possible that self-consciousness, revealed immediately as a self-conscious subject, is simply a subject without being an individual, or a part of, or an expression of, a universal self-conscious subject, which is the only reality, as objective idealism or absolute idealism contends. Nevertheless, we still have reason to call the self-conscious subject an individual, because the self-conscious subject, since it transcends the world, can differentiate itself from the world. Hence, it is a unique being and capable of being defined negatively as different from everything else in the world and from the world as a whole, and can be called an individual, because any individual thing in the ordinary sense is usually defined as that which is different from everything else. Although we may not be able to define the self-conscious subject positively as an individual in the ordinary sense, we should leave open the question as to whether it is a part of or an expression of a universal self-conscious subject. If it is legitimate to call the self-conscious subject an individual, then any thought which thinks the world-being as the content of, or a part of, or identical with, the subject is a process of thinking of the world subjectively.[3a]

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[3a] As for individualism, we have Yang Chu[ba] (400-? B.C.) in the Pre-Ch'in period, who insists on the theory of one self (*wei-wo*[bb]), and who is as influential as the Moist school was in the Mencius age. However, we know nothing clear about all his arguments for individualism. He does not expound any solipsism or subjective idealism in the epistemological sense.

There is no eminent philosophy of pure Chinese origin—other than Buddhist Vijnāna-vāda idealism, which comes from India—which argues for a subjective idealism or for individualism by taking the self-conscious subject as a purely knowing subject and taking the world simply as the object known. However, there is a very important trend of Chinese thought which takes the self-conscious subject as both acting and knowing, and thereupon thinks of the world-being as subjectively included or comprehended as a part of, or the content of, or identical with, the subject.

This trend of thought may be called a kind of ethical idealism. Mencius, Lu Hsiang-shan[r] (1139-1192), and Wang Yang-ming[s] (1472-1528) are the leading philosophers involved. All of them emphasize the self-consciousness of the subject as a moral subject, which is not purely a knowing subject but a subject which knows its moral ideal, acts in conformity with it, and then knows itself self-consciously as a subject of both knowing and acting. There is here the thesis that "the universe (the ten thousand things) is perfectible in myself"[4] and "The universe is my mind, and my mind is the universe"[5] and "Pervading Heaven and Earth, there is just this spiritual light . . . my spiritual light is the master of Heaven, Earth, and deities . . . leaving my spiritual light, there is no Heaven, Earth, deities, or ten thousand things."[6]

It would be quite misleading, however, to interpret this thesis from the point of view of epistemological idealism or ordinary mysticism. Chinese philosophers who have held this thesis have never stated in a strict sense their epistemological arguments for this kind of idealism, nor have they said that the meanings of their thesis are mysterious as beyond the reason of man.

In ethical idealism, we take those things which ought to be as our ideal. This ideal determines what we ought to do to realize the ideal, and then the realization of the ideal is itself a moral ideal and moral action. The way of thinking in ethical idealism begins, in its first step, with seeing the things of the world as what they ought to be as our ideal prescribes, and then they are seen as full of possibilities or potentialities. It then proceeds, in the next step, to seeing things through our moral ideal and moral action. Henceforth, things are seen as gradually transforming themselves and tending to be what they ought to be; and their possibilities, when realized by our moral action, are found as of the nature of what they ought to be and of the ideal; while, on the contrary, what they are in actual fact is thought of as not so in reality. Therefore, if the moral subject has a moral ideal and moral action which are so high and lofty as to

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[4] *Mencius,* VIIA.4.

[5] *Hsiang-shan ch'üan-chi*[bc] (Complete Works of Lu Hsiang-shan) (Shanghai: Chung Hua Co., 1935), Vol. 36, p. 37.

[6] *Yang-ming ch'üan-shu*[bd] (Complete Works of Wang Yang-ming) (Shanghai: Chung Hua Co., 1935), Vol. III, p. 26.

realize the universal *jen* (the utmost goodness in the world) through the self-consciousness of our good nature, or our original mind,[t] or *liang-chih*[u]—as held by Mencius, Lu Hsiang-shan, and Wang Yang-ming—then all things in the world will be seen through this high and lofty ideal and action of the moral subject, and all things and the whole world will be seen as acted upon by the subject's moral action and as tending to realize its moral ideal, and will be thought of as of the same nature as the moral mind. Consequently, it is quite natural for Mencius to think that the ten thousand things are perfectible by me as a moral subject, for Lu Hsiang-shan to think that the universe is my mind, and for Wang Yang-ming to think of *liang-chih* as the spiritual light of Heaven, Earth, deities, and the ten thousand things.

The expression "see the world through the ideal and action of the moral subject" states a way of thinking by a fully self-conscious moral subject as a moral individual. It is not a way of thinking of the world as an object opposite to the subject. It is a way of thinking which begins by withdrawing the light in the ordinary outward-knowing process back to our inner self; and then throws the light out again, along the very line of the extending of our moral ideal and our moral action; and knows the world as mediated by that very ideal and action, and as the realm for the embodiment of that ideal and action. Here, the seeing "eye" of the moral subject is immanent in the extending of the ideal and moral action, being acted upon by the action and transformed by the action. As the world is itself transformed to conform to the ideal, the "eye" will see the world as absorbed into the action and the ideal of the subject, and will experience it as one in being with the subject. When the subject is self-conscious and knows itself as transcending the world as experienced, the "eye" will see the subject as above the world, and the world will be seen as just a part of, or the content of, the subject as an absolute individual or an absolute I. This is the reason Liu Ch'i-shan[v] (1578-1645), a great Neo-Confucianist in the late Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), gives so high a place to the idea of *tu*[w] and *tu-chih*[x]—the awareness of the solitary individual in absolute morality.[7]

### III. The Individual and the World as Transcended in Vacuity and Receptivity of Mind and in Enlightenment and Spirituality

The third typical way of thinking of the individual and the world in Chinese philosophy is to think that both the individual and the world have to be tran-

[7] Liu Ch'i-shan's discussion on the ideas of *tu* and *tu-chih* is available in the last volume of *Ming-ju hsüeh-an*[be] (Anthology and Critical Accounts of the Neo-Confucians of the Ming Dynasty), edited and written by Huang Tsung-hsi[bf] (1610-1695). For a contemporary exposition, see Mou Tsung-san's[bg] article "Liu Ch'i-shan chih ch'eng-i-chih-hsüeh"[bh] (Theory of Authenticity of Will of Liu Ch'i-shan), *Tzu-yu hsüeh-jen*[bi] (Free Thinker), I, No. 3 (October, 1956), 9-24.

scended, such that there is in reality neither world nor the I as an indivdual. This is the same type of thinking as that of Western and Indian mystics and philosophers who think of "before the day of creation," but with different emphasis about the way in which the world and the I, or the self as an individual, are to be transcended.

Chuang Tzu[y] (369-? B.C.), one of the two most important Taoistic philosophers, is representative of this way. He has a spiritual vision which is beyond the sense of self as an individual and of the world as opposite to the self. "Forgetting of myself," "loss of myself," "forgetting the world under Heaven," and "out of the world under Heaven" are pertinent sayings of his. When Chuang Tzu talked about the "upward wandering with the creator [and] downward having friends who are beyond death and life and of no beginning and ending,"[8] he was using a metaphor for the expression of his spiritual vision. His spiritual vision originates from his profound wisdom, aesthetic enjoyment, and inner spiritual cultivation, rather than from his primary belief in the existence of a mystic state.

Chuang Tzu has three ideas about the mind which are closely related to the experience of forgetting the world and the self as an individual. The first idea concerns the nature of mind as *hsü*[z] and *ling*.[aa] *"Hsü"* means to be vacuous and receptive. Confucius and Lao Tzu spoke of *hsü* mainly as a moral teaching. Chuang Tzu, followed by Hsün Tzu and the Neo-Confucianists, takes *hsü* as one fundamental nature of the mind and connects it with the word *"ling,"* which means knowing freely, spontaneously, and without attachment. When the nature of the mind is seen as both vacuous and receptive, the sense of ego or of self as an individual differentiating itself from other things is uprooted in the depth of the mind.

The mind can be receptive without being a positive receiver. When the mind is vacuous and receptive, all things of the world can be received by it, and then pass through it without meeting any barrier. This self-forgetting can be cultivated and continued in principle. Here, the most important thing is that the mind will be revealed to itself as both vacuous and receptive simultaneously. When it knows, it is receptive. But, if it is not simultaneously vacuous, then what is received is attached to the mind, and the mind is in turn attached to things. This is the ordinary way of knowing with attachment. On the contrary, if the mind is revealed to itself as both receptive and vacuous simultaneously, it can know things without attachment.

Secondly, Chuang Tzu uses the idea of *ming*,[ab] which means the lasting actual state of the mind when its nature, as purely vacuous and receptive, is fully realized in its knowing. Literally, *"ming"* means "light." As a state of

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8 *Chuang Tzu*, 33.

mind, it is enlightenment of mind. When Western religious thought talks about enlightenment of mind, it usually means that the mind is enlightened by something above. It is not so in Chinese thought. All Taoists, Confucianists, and Buddhists use the word *"ming"* as self-enlightenment or enlightenment without self. For Chuang Tzu, enlightenment is a state of mind which is purely transparent, and this transparency of mind, which comes from that nature of the mind as both purely vacuous and purely receptive, is fully realized in its knowing. Ordinarily, we know things through concepts and names. When the concepts and names are applied to the things coming to our attention, we meet the things halfway. Here the mind is not purely receptive. The only remedy for such ordinary thinking is to transcend and withdraw our ordinary concepts and names and let the vacuity of mind be realized. Then the mind becomes purely receptive, and is willing to welcome things wholeheartedly, and all the things are thus transparent to us. Here we have enlightenment and also self-forgetting. Nevertheless, the enlightenment of the mind is difficult to achieve, because before things come to attention we already have habits from the past, ready concepts or subconsciousness. These are waiting for our use, and, when things come to us, they pour out like fluids and fill the vacuity of mind and sentence it to death, as it were. Chuang Tzu said that the death of the mind is the greatest lamentation.[9]

According to some philosophies and some religious thought, as, e.g., in Buddhism, we must engage in practice of inner meditation and concentration of mind to enlighten what is dark in our foreconsciousness and subconsciousness. It is not clear whether Chuang Tzu has the same point of view. In Chuang Tzu's philosophy, besides the dialectic thinking used for canceling our presupposed judgments, ready concepts, and names and habits of the past, there is a third important idea about the mind, the idea of *shen*[ac] as the function of mind which is complementary to the idea of *ming*. Meeting things with *shen* is Chuang Tzu's way for attainment of the state of self-forgetting and enlightenment. This is quite different from the way of quiet meditation or serious concentration of mind as generally understood. The word *"shen"* originally meant deity or spirtuality. *Shen* is usually connected with—sometimes synonymous with—the word *"ling,"* as explained above. Chuang Tzu uses it to indicate a function of the mind which is not a definite psychological process such as willing, feeling, perceiving, imagining, conceiving, or reasoning, but one which is pervading, and meets the things in their changing processes with intuitive and sympathetic understanding but without attachment. *Shen* is a function of the mind when the mind is permeated with fully living life. *Shen* is always characterized by freedom and spontaneity and is never contracted

[9] *Chuang Tzu*, 2.

and reflexive. When *shen* is extended and meets things with intuitive and sympathetic understanding, we have self-forgetting immediately, and we transcend any things which fill our mind. Thus, vacuity of mind can be realized, and enlightenment can be attained through the very extending of *shen*.

In view of Chuang Tzu's three ideas of the mind, it is quite clear that self-forgetting is possible of achievement. When such self-forgetting is achieved, the sense of the self as an individual is gone—and, since the world is correlated with the individual self, the sense of the world can thus be forgotten also.

As self-forgetting and world-forgetting are both stressed by Chuang Tzu, we call his way that of transcending the sense of both the individual self and the world as dualistically related, and as thinking that there is, in reality, neither world nor individual. We may interpret this as the way of experiencing the two as one. Chuang Tzu says, "I am living with Heaven and Earth; I am one with the ten thousand things."[10] However, experiencing the two as one is not necessarily to be thought of or talked about. If it is thought of or talked about, the very thinking or talking has to be transcended again. Here we have paradoxical thinking and talking. This is because, when the mind is vacuous, receptive, and knowing without attachment, and enlightenment and spirituality of the mind are realized, the concept "one" cannot be used. It, too, has to be enlightened through and passed by the extending of spirituality, and so the sense of the world and the individual as one has to be transcended, too. Therefore, according to this type of thinking, there is neither world nor individual. The state of mind of this type of thinking is thus neither subjective nor objective. Instead, it resides in the center of subject and object, and, hanging *in vacuo*, escapes from the duality of these two.[11]

When Lin-chi I-hsüan[ad] (785-867?), the Ch'an master, talks about his way of teaching disciples, he says: "Sometimes I cancel the [idea of] 'person' [as subjective], but not [the idea of] 'world' [as objective]; sometimes I cancel the [idea of] 'world' [as objective] but not the [idea of] 'person' [as subjective]; sometimes, I cancel both the 'person' and the 'world'; and sometimes I cancel neither the 'person' nor the 'world.' "[12] His first way of teaching corresponds to the first way of thinking described above, with the difference that the latter positively asserts the individual person as existing in the objective world. His second way of teaching corresponds to the second way of thinking mentioned above, with the difference that the latter asserts positively the being of the objective world as identical with, or part of, or the content of, the being of the

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10 *Ibid.*

11 The second chapter of the *Chuang Tzu* begins with talking about "loss of reason," which can be rightly explained as getting out of the duality of subject and object.

12 *Chih-wu lun*[bj] (Records of the Pointing of the Moon), edited by Chu Ju-chi[bk] (Taipei: Far East Book Co., 1959), Vol. 14, p. 5.

individual as subject. His third way of teaching is more like the third way of thinking, as discussed in this section; it is a synthesis of the earlier two, and rightly represents the spirit of Ch'an. Therefore, the way of thinking of Ch'an also belongs to this type. His fourth way of teaching is the negative of the third way in its logical form, and is actually the same in the spirit of negativity. "I cancel neither the person nor the world" is not the same as "I assert positively both the existence of the subjective person as an individual and the objective world." This will be discussed in the next section.

## IV. The Individual and the World Known as Mutually Transcendent and Immanent through Knowledge of Virtuous Nature and Sense-Knowledge

The fourth way of thinking of the individual and the world—that both exist—is a general tendency of Chinese thought. Even those thinkers who have been classified above as belonging to the other three types never deny this explicitly. However, only the Confucianists take the co-existence of individual and world seriously, and only in Confucianism do we get the philosophical basis of this way of thinking, a view of the mind which is more synthetic than in the other three views.

This fourth view takes the mind as both receptive cognitively and active and creative morally, and insists that, when its nature is realized authentically, enlightenment (*ming*) and spirituality (*shen*) can be included. This view originated with Mencius and was developed in *The Doctrine of the Mean* (*Chung yung*[ae]) and the Commentaries on *The Book of Changes* (*I ching*[af]), which can be supposed to be later than Mencius, and was further developed by Neo-Confucianism in the Sung and Ming dynasties (960-1644). It is sometimes neglected by some Confucian thinkers who are more practically oriented.

In this trend of thought, when the mind knows cognitively and becomes intelligent or wise, it should also be as vacuous as it can be. When the mind is vacuous, it is purely receptive and can become transparent and enlightened. In this respect there is no fundamental difference between Confucianism and Taoism. Yet, on the other side, the mind has its activity and creativity, and it can be self-conscious of itself as an acting subject or a creative subject. When the mind knows the objective world cognitively and has no reflection of itself, or thinks of its knowing subject or itself as a thing existing in the world objectively, then we have the first type of thinking, which neglects the subject as an individual which is incapable of being objectified as one among the other things in the world. When the mind is self-conscious of itself as a knowing and acting subject, and thinks of the world-being as identical with its own being or as the content or a part of itself, we have the second way of thinking, which

neglects the independent and transcendent existence of the objective world. The first way of thinking may lead man to lose the sense of individual dignity and go astray in the myriad things of the world. The second way of thinking may lead man to assert his self as an absolute and in that case may engender the sense of pride, which is contrary to the moral sense of man. The third way of thinking considers the mind as vacuous, and then self-pride is eradicated. The shortcoming of the third way is its neglect of the mind of the individual self as a subject which is active and creative and self-conscious of itself as such. As it is active and creative, it is not simply vacuous as non-being, but is being and existence also. As it is self-conscious of itself, it can know itself as being an existing self-conscious individual self. On the other side, as the mind is receptive and can know things other than itself, the things also can be self-consciously known as existing. As it is possible also for the mind to forget itself as self-conscious, it is not necessary for it to see things existing merely as a part of, or the content of, or identical with, its being, and it is quite possible for the mind in its self-forgetting to assert the existence of the world and to see it as independent existence.

When the existence of the mind of the individual self and the existence of the things of the world are both asserted, we have the fourth way of thinking of the individual and the world. In this fourth way, Confucianists have the idea of enlightenment and spirituality, which are connected with the mind as active and creative more than with the mind as vacuous and receptive.

According to Mencius, the mind is active and creative, because it has moral nature, which is essentially good, with an inner light. When man fully realizes his good nature and has sageliness, which is unfathomable by knowledge, he has spirituality or holiness.[13] As Mencius' thought is developed into the thought of *The Doctrine of the Mean* and the Commentaries on *The Book of Changes*, ideas about enlightenment and spirituality become more important. In the former, the virtue of human nature is called "*ch'eng*,"[ag] which means "creating and accomplishing oneself and all the things of the world."[14] *Ch'eng* is *Tao*, the principle of the world as well as of man. The highest *ch'eng*, as it is realized by the sage, is a way of everlastingly creating and accomplishing, which is the same as everlastingly creating and accomplishing Heaven and Earth. When *ch'eng* is realized and is expressed, there is light or enlightenment, and from enlightenment one can also realize *ch'eng*.[15] Therefore, the "everlastingly

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[13] *Mencius*, VII.

[14] The word "*ch'eng*" is sometimes translated as sincerity. This is quite misleading and does not conform to the text of the *Chung yung*. It is better to define it as "creating and accomplishing oneself and all the things of the world" than to follow a literal translation.

[15] *Chung yung*, 21. (Shanghai: Commercial Press edition, 1937), p. 12.

creating and accomplishing" is not only a process of continuous activity; it is also a process illuminated by light and transparent from beginning to end; it is the same as the way of the deity, which is a way of spirituality.

In *The Doctrine of the Mean,* one's inner self and outer things are harmonized in the idea of *ch'eng* as a universal principle. This is rightly called the way of thinking whereby both the individual and the world exist in one ultimate harmony,[ah] with light illuminated through it. The inner self as subjective and outer things as objective are then mutually reflected, as mutually creating, mutually accomplishing, and interdependent in a common spiritual enlightenment. In the Commentaries on *The Book of Changes,* the principle of Heaven is called "*ch'ien,*"[ai] which is a principle of knowing and creating, and the principle of Earth is called "*k'un,*"[aj] which is a principle of realization and accomplishment.[16] These two principles are embodied in man as his human nature, in which intelligence or wisdom, and *jen,*[ak] generating love, originated. Here intelligence or wisdom is receptive in knowing, and, at the same time, knowing is an act and is creative also. Generating love is creative, and, at the same time, is receptive to what is loved. The mind as receptive may be called its *yin* aspect, and as creative may be called its *yang* aspect.[17] As *yin* and *yang* are two principles or two aspects of the one ultimate *Tao,* and are mutually rooted in each other, therefore the creative aspect and the receptive aspect of mind are mutually rooted in its nature, and the mind, as knowing and acting, or as intelligence or wisdom and generating love (*jen*), are mutually implied in their meanings.

In the Commentaries on *The Book of Changes,* the idea of enlightenment (*ming*) and the idea of spirituality (*shen*) are also emphasized. *Ch'ien,* a universal principle of knowing and creating, is also characterized as a "great enlightenment from beginning to end,"[18] and spirituality is taken as "pervading all things of the world" and "without particular direction."[19] Here enlightenment is not merely a static state of mind; it also resides in a dynamic process of changing life; and spirituality is not only meeting things with intuitive and sympathetic understanding and without attachment, but also "pervading in creating and accomplishing all things according to their particularities without

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16 The best exposition of *ch'ien* as principle of knowing and creating and of *k'un* as principle of realization and accomplishment is available in the *Yü-tan-chih-chüan*[bl] (Looking around the Altar with Straightforward Illustrations) of Lo Chin-ch'i[bm] (1515-1588). See my essay "Lo Chin-ch'i chih li-hsüeh"[bn] (On the Philosophy of Lo Chin-ch'i), Special issue for one hundred issues of *Min-chu p'ing-lun*[bo] (Democratic Review), V, No. 6 (March, 1954), 2-10.

17 See my book *Che-hsüeh kai-lun*[bp] (A Treatise on Philosophy), Vol. II, Part II, chap. 19, sec. 6.

18 See "Ch'ien wen-yen"[bq] (Commentaries on *ch'ien* as a Principle of Heaven), in *The Book of Changes.*

19 Commentaries on *The Book of Changes.*

remainder."[20] As spirituality and enlightenment exist in man, what should be sought is the "preservation of them in silence and the realization of them in virtuous action."[21] Thus, the "human nature of oneself is realized" and "Heaven's decree is attained or fulfilled."[22] This is a way of thinking which puts emphasis on both oneself as an individual subject and other individual things of the world as objects, and all of them are seen as organically related in one ultimate harmony, a universal principle of man or of human nature and of all things in the world, and the co-existence of the world and the individual was thus established in classical Confucianism.

Its development in the Neo-Confucianism of the Sung and Ming dynasties consists in the clearer elucidation of the thoughts of classical Confucianism with some new interpretations. One new idea agreed to by almost all Neo-Confucianists of the Ch'eng-Chu[al] school is the idea of "one principle (or one reason) participated in by different things," which is a metaphysical idea for the synthesis of the one and the many, identity and difference, and the universal and the particular individual. It is also closely related to a new theory of mind and knowledge. As Chang Tsai[am] (1020-1077) and the Ch'eng brothers classify man's kinds of knowledge into sense-knowledge and knowledge of virtuous nature, the latter is always taken as universal, self-identical, and one, and the former is always taken as particular and as differentiated according to the many sensed objects.

As knowledge of virtuous nature can be expressed through sense-knowledge, we have an example of "one principle participated in by different things." According to Chang Tsai and the Ch'eng brothers, "knowledge of virtuous nature"[an] is quite different from "sense-knowledge."[ao] One of the differences is that we can have knowledge of virtuous nature which comprises spirituality and enlightenment,[23] but we cannot attain to spirituality and enlightenment through sense-knowledge alone. The reason knowledge of virtue can comprise enlightenment and spirituality is based upon the fact that knowledge of virtuous nature is not merely knowledge which takes virtuous nature as its object.

Knowledge of virtuous nature is knowledge through the very virtuous practice of the moral mind. More adequately, it is not knowledge about anything else; it is only self-knowledge of the moral mind as such, or of the moral

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20 *Ibid.*

21 *Ibid.*

22 *Ibid.*

23 The ideas of *shen* (spirituality) and *ming* (enlightenment) are two very profound ideas of Neo-Confucianism which are closely related to the knowledge of virtuous nature, but are usually neglected by contemporary scholars of Confucianism. I have given some hints on the significance of these two ideals in Confucianism in Chapter 4 of my book, *Chung-kuo wen-hua chih ching-shen chia-chih*[br] (The Spiritual Worth of Chinese Culture) (Hong Kong: Cheng Chung, 1953). Further study of their meanings in Neo-Confucian thought is needed.

mind self-conscious of itself as such, or the moral mind as transparent to itself as such, and this is self-enlightenment. As the self-conscious moral mind is active, creative, and pervading all things in the world, it knows no limits in its creative and active extending, and it acts like deity and comprises spirituality. However, sense-knowledge is directed to the sense-object, which is opaque by itself, but can, so to speak, absorb the light radiated from our minds. Therefore, when isolated from the knowledge of the virtuous mind, it does not comprise self-enlightenment, and thus we can never attain spirituality through it alone.

Sense-knowledge is distinctly different in kind from self-knowledge of virtuous nature or spiritual enlightenment, but they are not necessarily separated in existence and can co-exist. In fact, they ought to co-exist, and the knowledge of virtuous nature can fully exist only through sense-knowledge. This is because the virtuous nature ought to be realized in moral action, and moral action is purposive in creating and accomplishing objective things, which can be known only through the senses. So far as our knowledge of virtuous nature is realized and expressed in the outer world through sense-knowledge about outer things, the knowledge of virtuous nature is taken as one, and sense-knowledge about outer things varies according to the differences of things. We thus have an actual exemplification of "one principle expressed [and participated in] by different things." Since knowledge about outer things is the necessary condition for the expression of our knowledge of virtuous nature, it ought to be sought and stressed even from the point of view of the knowledge of virtuous nature. Since things known by sense-knowledge are all individuals, "investigation of individual things one by one" is included in the teaching of the "investigation of things" as expounded by Ch'eng I[ap] (1033-1107) and Chu Hsi[aq] (1130-1200).

Furthermore, since these two kinds of knowledge are related and are differentiated only by their directions as outer-oriented and inner-oriented, what is known through them as "I as self-conscious moral subject" and "individual things of the world" should both be posited as really existing. Here we have four points of view about the mutual transcendence and immanence between the world and individual self.

First, when I am known by myself mainly through my sense-knowledge as an individual existence, I then co-exist with other outer things and persons in one objective world, and I as one individual and all other individuals are immanent in one objective world.

Second, if all outer things, including my body and other persons and things known as outer things, are taken as nothing but those known only through my sense and immanent in my world of sense, and if I am convinced also that I

have knowledge of virtuous nature, which belongs to a higher level above my knowledge of outer things, then I, as an individual self-conscious moral subject, can be taken as transcendent to all things of the world as outer, and, similarly, can be looked upon as transcendent to the whole outer world.

Third, from a higher point of view, I know also that I am not the only individual self-conscious moral subject, and that other individual persons whom I know through sense as existing in the outer world are each actually having their knowledge of virtuous nature, and each is an individual self-conscious moral subject as well as I am; and I as an individual am known by others through their sense and by being seen by them as existing in their outer worlds also; therefore, I have to acknowledge their transcendence to me and that I am immanent in their sense of the outer world. Thus, I am immanent in the outer worlds of others, which are transcendent to me.

Fourth, from a still higher point of view, we should have the self-conviction that I know all that has just been said. I know that each person has the same self-conscious moral mind and knowledge of virtuous nature. I know also that I have to act toward them with respect and love. I know all of these through the reasoning of my moral mind (also the rational mind), which is based on the knowledge of my virtuous nature. Consequently, nothing is transcendent to this reasoning of my moral mind, which is based on the knowledge of my virtuous nature. Thus, the reasoning of my moral mind is without doubt mine. However, this reasoning leads me to the acknowledgment of others as having the same moral mind, the same outer world, and the same reasoning as mine. It is, then, a transcendental reasoning which leads me to transcend the "very reasoning as only mine," and such reasoning should be taken as self-transcending reasoning and not only as belonging to me but also as revealed to me. Thus it may be taken as heavenly reasoning, or the heavenly principle, as participated in by me and flowing in my mind. As heavenly, the reasoning or principle is universal and of the world as well as mine. It is revealed to me and participated in by me as an individual, as well as revealed to, and participated in by, any different individual who is a self-conscious mind or moral subject, as I am. Hence, we have an ultimate belief in "one principle" or "one reason" participated in by different individuals, which is closely related to the ideas about the nature of moral mind, the knowledge of virtuous nature, and sense-knowledge.

In conclusion, though the world and the individual are either immanent or transcendent to each other from the different points of view of different levels of thinking, they are ultimately included as moments of one idea of an ultimate harmony of mind and Heaven, or one vision of the ultimate harmony of the

individual and the world which expresses "one principle expressed by (or participated in by) different things," as in the Ch'eng-Chu school.

As the fourth way of thinking about the individual and the world is not denied explicitly by other schools of Chinese thought, the relation of the individual subject and the objective world is usually thought of by Chinese thinkers as in one ultimate harmony.

The Chinese translations of the words "subject" and "object" of Indian and Western philosophy are *"chu"*[ar] and *"pin,"*[as] or *"jen"*[at] and *"ching,"*[au] or *"chien"*[av] and *"hsiang."*[aw] Originally *"chu"* means host, and *"pin"* means guest; *"jen"* means man, and *"ching"* means environment or things in vision; *"chien"* means seeing, and *"hsiang"* means what is seen and taking the role of assisting in the seeing. The three pairs of words are reciprocally complementary as in a harmonious whole or a harmonious experience. Taking the subject as host, the object is the guest who is invited and loved by the host (this symbolizes the object's immanence in the subject), and also respected and sent out by the host (this symbolizes the object's transcendence to the subject). On the other hand, the world can be seen also by the poets and philosophers as host, and then the man (or I as an individual) is guest of the world and is entertained by the hospitality of the world. It is quite clear that there is no dualism between host and guest. This metaphor is the best symbol for Chinese thought about the relation of the subjective individual and the objective world as mutually immanent and transcendent in an ultimate harmony.

[a] 唐君毅
[b] 墨家
[c] 名家
[d] 荀子
[e] 陰陽家
[f] 類
[g] 孟子
[h] 墨子
[i] 墨辯
[j] 實
[k] 公孫龍子
[l] 指物論
[m] 名實論
[n] 白馬論
[o] 正名
[p] 陰
[q] 陽
[r] 陸象山
[s] 王陽明
[t] 本心

u 良知
v 劉蕺山
w 獨
x 獨知
y 莊子
z 虛
aa 靈
ab 明
ac 神
ad 臨濟義玄
ae 中庸
af 易經
ag 誠
ah 太和
ai 乾
aj 坤
ak 仁
al 程朱學派
am 張載
an 德性之知
ao 見聞之知
ap 程頤
aq 朱熹
ar 主
as 賓
at 人
au 境
av 見
aw 相
ax 荀子正名與名學三宗
ay 新亞學報
az 哲學概論
ba 楊朱
bb 為我
bc 象山全集
bd 陽明全書
be 明儒學案
bf 黃宗羲
bg 華宗三
bh 劉蕺山誠意之學
bi 自由學人
bj 指月錄
bk 瞿汝稷
bl 明壇直詮
bm 羅近溪
bn 羅近溪之理學
bo 民主評論
bp 哲學概論
bq 乾文言
br 中國文化之精神價值

P. T. RAJU

# *Indian Epistemology and the World and the Individual*

## I. Introduction

Epistemology[1] can discuss the problem of the world and the individual by answering the two main questions: (1) How are the world and the individual cognized?[2] and (2) Since knowledge is communicated in language, how are the concepts of the world and the individual expressed? Some languages may not have developed a philosophy of themselves, but Sanskrit has its own philosophies, not merely one but many. Of them, the philosophy of the Grammarians is the most pertinent. Our second question has, therefore, to include the question, What place do the world and the individual occupy in the philosophy of language?

## II. The Nature of Epistemology

Indian epistemology is generally divided into three topics: (1) the distinct means (*pramāṇas*) of obtaining valid knowledge; (2) the nature of validity (*prāmāṇya*); and (3) the nature and status of the object of illusion (*khyāti*).

[1] General epistemology has been discussed by many authors. See my *Thought and Reality* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1937); S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, 2 vols. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1931); S. N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, 5 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952-1957); and D. M. Datta, *Six Ways of Knowing* (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1955). D. M. Datta has an article also in the Proceedings of the 1949 Conference, Charles A. Moore, ed., *Essays in East-West Philosophy* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1951).

[2] A word of explanation is necessary here. In Sanskrit, the word *"jñāna"* covers almost all forms of consciousness. Knowledge and cognition are forms of consciousness. I say, "I know the wall" and also "I am conscious of the wall." The word "conscious" has no verb form in English, and hence there may be some difficulty in understanding the Sanskrit term *"jñāna."* Yet, the English term "consciousness" comes nearest to the Sanskrit term and has to be so interpreted by adding other words to it, such as "be conscious of" or "has consciousness of." Knowledge and cognition are forms which consciousness takes.

As India's general epistemology is already known to Western students of Indian thought, I shall not discuss perception, inference, and the other ways of knowing in any detail, except insofar as they are relevant to our present topic. But the philosophy of the Sanskrit Grammarians is not so well known in the West, except to a few Orientalists. Even in India, the Orientalists have given it more attention than the philosophers have. I therefore have to give it more space than the usual epistemology—and more space to Bhartṛhari, the greatest among the Grammarian philosophers, than to the others.

Semantics was from the beginning of the systems a part of epistemology, for the word was recognized as a distinct means of valid knowledge by almost all the schools and classified under means of knowledge. When a word is uttered, we "perceive" only noises—as when we listen to an absolutely foreign language —but not its reference to objects. When I see a book, I see a color and a shape. The color and shape mean[3] the book. But they belong to the book, whereas we do not believe that the word "horse" belongs to the object horse. So, verbal knowledge is a distinct kind of knowledge. The wonder that is the word was therefore recognized by Indian thinkers. In addition, the Veda was orally transmitted and was considered to be sacrosanct. How can the words of the Veda contain the mystery of the universe? Hence, also, the philosophical interest in the word. Also, grammar was prescribed as an indispensable subsidiary study to the Veda; it must therefore lead to what the Veda itself teaches, namely, knowledge of the most important reality. Then the philosophy of grammar must be almost as important as the philosophy of the Veda and has to support it. Hence the importance of the philosophy of grammar. But, as the philosophy of the Veda is differently understood by the different schools, they developed different philosophies of grammar also. Thus, the interest in the nature of language, grammar, and semantics was intense from the very beginning.

Right from the time of Gautama (*ca.* 400 B.C.?) the founder of the Nyāya, or perhaps even from an earlier time, it has been recognized that the knowable (*prameya*) is dependent on the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), i.e., metaphysics is dependent on epistemology. But, first, as often done in the West,[4] we can so interpret the same epistemological processes and criteria as to fit a particular metaphysics. The schools need not accept the same metaphysics even when they accept the same sources of knowledge. Second, Indian thought did not start in the Upaniṣads with epistemology, but with a kind of ontology, to which at least nominally all the orthodox schools owe allegiance. Third, even if a school accepts a number of ways of knowing, that does not mean that whatever is known through those ways is also accepted as unmistakably true. This distinction is often overlooked, but it is important. The question is about the ways by which our consciousness can reveal Being and beings. For instance, consciousness reveals something through imagination also. But is what is so revealed to be taken as real? Perception, inference, postulation, etc., can be mistaken; yet, they are accepted as revealing the existence of objects. Now, if every one of them is a means of valid knowledge, how can invalidity come in?

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[3] Compare Berkeley's theory of signs.

[4] Compare the interpretation of judgment given by Kant and the idealists with that of Russell and other logical analysts. Both groups accept perception and inference, but they interpret them in different ways.

And what is then the nature of invalid knowledge? Fourth, if we have several sources of valid knowledge, what are we to do when there is conflict between any two or three? For instance, if perception tells us that the object at a distance is water, but inference tells us that it is a mirage, what are we to do? Śaṁkara says that in such cases perception has to be ignored and inference is to be accepted. Rāmānuja[5] says that both have to be accepted and somehow reconciled. In any case, Indian philosophers have maintained that, with the help of the different sources of knowledge, we have to build up our knowledge and the known world.

## III. The Sources of Knowledge

The well-known schools of Indian philosophy recognize one or more of the six[5a] ways (means) of knowledge:[6] perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal knowledge (*śabda*), comparison (*upamāna*), postulation (*arthāpatti*), and non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*).[7]

*Perception.* In perception we observe the individual or individuals. All schools accept—the Cārvāka is not clear—the distinction between indeterminate and determinate perceptions. But many, following the Nyāya, treat indeterminate perception as useless, since it presents only "a being" but not the type of being. It is formless and relationless.[8] But the Mīmāṁsā of Prabhākara and the Vedānta of Rāmānuja say that indeterminate perception is not

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[5] See Rāmānuja, *Śrī-bhāṣya,* A. V. Narasimhacharya, ed. (Madras: Venkateswarand Co., 1909), Vol. I, pp. 18 f., and 50 f., for Rāmānuja's criticism of Śaṁkara.

[5a] Dialectic also is used, particularly by Buddhism and Śaṁkara's Vedānta, for establishing their conceptions of ultimate reality; and meditation also is used by almost all schools for realizing it. But neither is mentioned as one of the sources of knowledge. There is no separate name even for dialectic.

[6] In fact, the number is much larger than six—perhaps as many as eighteen. As L. Śrīnivāsacārya says in his *Mānameyarahasyaślokavārtikam* (Mysore: Government Press, 1925), p. 285, God alone knows who accepts which means of valid knowledge and who rejects which. Rejection is made by denying a particular way, e.g., memory and tradition, as knowledge at all or by reducing a particular means to some accepted one. We must not forget that a means of valid knowledge does not necessarily give valid knowledge; it is only one of the possible ways of knowing truth. Then even memory is important for historical knowledge (*itihāsa*), and tradition (*aitihya*) will not be rejected by an archeologist, who begins his diggings after hearing a popular story that some gods lived in a nearby locality and went down under the earth. He could not have obtained his knowledge otherwise. One may say that his knowledge is verbal knowledge, but it is for him much more than knowledge given by the story. It has to be noted, however, that, in spite of the keen analysis of the eighteen means of knowledge in the controversies, no systematic morphology of knowledge was developed in India such as that of the idealists, e.g., B. Bosanquet, *Logic or Morphology of Knowledge* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911).

[7] I do not discuss which school accepts which of the six, as the information can be found in the works referred to already.

[8] *Prakāratādiśūnyam hi sambandhānavagāhi tat. Kārikāvali,* Hariram Sukla, ed. (Banaras: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1951), p. 485.

formless; only, it does not involve memory, and so the form (universal) is not distinguished in it. It is what corresponds to Russell's knowledge by acquaintance. In knowledge by description, in which the What is involved, memory enters. So, real perception is knowledge by acquaintance and is indeterminate and relationless. Although the Buddhist Vijñānavādins do not accept the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the particular, they say that in perception we cognize only the particular (*apoḍha*), that which is itself and not anything else (*apoha*). Names, forms, and relations enter our knowledge later, but they have no ultimate reality. The rivals of the Buddhists point out that that factor of perception which is "not anything else" is relational, and perception cannot, therefore, be non-relational.

Now, according to the Nyāya theory, which is generally accepted, that we perceive a determinate individual horse, e.g., means that we perceive an object determined by the universal (form, *prakāra*) horseness. Here the Nyāya has an interesting development. Through the perception of horseness in the individual, we cognize—indeed, perceive—all individual horses. "That is a horse" then becomes "That is a member of the class of horses." Thus the class concept or idea is accepted by the Naiyāyikas, who utilize it for forming universal premises such as "All horses are mortal." To obtain the idea of the class "horses," it is not necessary to perceive many horses.

The Nyāya divides perception into the ordinary and the extra-ordinary. The cognition of the class horses is one form of the extra-ordinary. The second type of the extra-ordinary is the perception of an object of one sense organ by another. I see a rose and say, "That is a sweet rose." The sweet smell is generally perceived by the nose, but here I see it through the eye. The third type belongs to the *yogin*.[9]

Thus, it is recognized that in perception we see the individuals, but it contains factors that enable us to go beyond the individuals and expand our knowledge to cover the rest of the world. Again, what we know in perception is not the abstract individual, but a particular individual, not a mere member of a class, but this or that member.

*Inference*.[9a] It is recognized by all schools that inference is relational. The relations generally accepted in this context are class membership, class inclusion, causal relation, and spatial and temporal relations. But, until inferential knowledge ends in perception, we stay in the realm of the Whats only, i.e., of description. We may infer the presence of fire in the mountain,

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[9] The three types are called *sāmānyalakṣaṇa, jñānalakṣaṇa,* and *yogaja*. The last includes telepathy, clairvoyance, and direct cognition of infinitesimal entities.

[9a] It should be noted that Indian logicians always meant by "inference" syllogistic inference.

and we may know also that that fire differs from every other fire, but it is still a matter of Whats or description. However, although several kinds of relations were accepted for inference, and, although the idea of structure (*samsthāna, ākṛti*) was also known, formal logic as the science of order was not developed.

*Comparison.*[9b] Comparison as a means of knowledge is understood in two ways. The Naiyāyikas understand it as perception through analogy or similarity. If an American hears from a friend that a buffalo is like a bison, having the common feature x, when he actually sees the buffalo for the first time, he says, "That is a buffalo." This cognition means "That is an object characterized by the common characteristic x." But, according to Prabhākara, comparison is the cognition of similarity itself.[10] When an American sees a buffalo, whether after or without the verbal knowledge of the common characteristic, he cognizes an object with a form. This cognition is mere perception. But he says also, "That is similar to a bison." This cognition is the result of comparison, which, therefore, is a way of knowing distinct from perception and verbal knowledge.

The cognition of similarity is important for the extension of our knowledge of the world and for obtaining knowledge of universals and classes, so that we can be masters of our knowledge without losing ourselves in the forest of individuals. It is possible to compare individuals with individuals, classes with classes, and universals with universals. But class comparisons do not seem to have engaged the minds of these thinkers very much. That is why Indian logic has not developed any systematic theory of classification, although one may find some roots of the doctrine. However, Prabhākara recognizes, not only that similarity belongs to the world of objects, but also that mind has a peculiar capacity to discover similarities, and this capacity is a distinct way of knowing.

*Postulation.*[10a] Postulation[11] is the method by which we posit something for the completion of our understanding and meaning. If two statements p and q are opposed and yet both are true, we have to postulate a statement r that can explain both the opposition and the truth of p and q. The postulated entities may be sensible or supersensible.

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[9b] I leave out verbal knowledge now, since it will be discussed in the section of this paper on the philosophy of language.

[10] Some logicians, e.g., Hobhouse, say that similarity is not an object of thought, but of perception, meaning thereby that it is directly perceived. Russell also held that similarity is perceived. Prabhākara says that it is directly cognized, but not perceived, through a peculiar way of knowing.

[10a] Those who do not accept postulation as a distinct way of knowing reduce it to a syllogism from a negative major premise or to a disjunctive syllogism. (See my "*Arthāpatti:* Its Logical Significance," note 11.)

[11] For a critical estimate of postulation, see the author's article, "*Arthāpatti:* Its Logical Significance." In A. S. Altekar, ed., *Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Conference* (Benares: Benares Hindu University, 1942).

An example of the sensible is:

Devadatta is growing fat; but he claims not to eat at all, and none has observed him eating during the day.
Then he must be eating secretly at night.

Here his having eaten is observable.

An example of the supersensible is:

Ethical action performed in this life can produce a happy existence in the next life.
But between this life and the next there is a time interval, and causation is a continuous process.
Then ethical action becomes and stays as an unseen potency during the time interval.

This potency is called the extra-ordinary (*apūrva*) and the unseen (*adṛṣṭa*). Postulation enables us to extend our knowledge to unseeable realms and works mainly with the Whats. We may postulate individual objects like the center of the earth; yet, we are still within the realm of knowledge by description.

*Non-apprehension.* If the world is a world of plurality—the ethical world has to be a world of plurality—then negation in the form of difference between any two objects and also in the form of absence of every object everywhere except where it is present has to be accepted. But how do we know negation at all? The Mīmāṁsā of Kumārila and some followers of Śaṁkara accept non-apprehension or non-cognition as a form of cognition itself. I cognize the absence of the rose on the table. But this cognition is neither perception, because there can be no sense-contact with absence, nor inference,[12] because there is no syllogistic reasoning. It is a peculiar way of cognizing, which Kumārila calls by the contradictory term non-cognition. How can non-cognition be a form of cognition? The Nyāya accepts the reality of negation, but rejects non-cognition as a way of cognition. The Advaitins go along with Kumārila so far as the empirical world is concerned.[12a] Negation enables us to distinguish individual from individual, class from class, and universal from universal.

## IV. The Validity of Knowledge

The question of the validity of knowledge occurred to the Indian thinkers in a peculiar way. They knew that every one of the ways of knowing may misfire:

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[12] Some Buddhists hold that negation is known through inference. See my article, "The Buddhist Conception of Negation," in G. Hanumantha Rao, ed., *Hiriyanna Commemoration Volume* (Mysore: Mysore Printing and Publishing House, 1952).

[12a] The Buddhists say that non-apprehension is the same as inference. (Prajñākaragupta, *Pramāṇavārtikābhāṣyam* (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953), pp. 344-348). The Jainas classify it under perception. Prabhāchandra, *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* (Bombay: Nirnayasagar Press, 1941), p. 346.

illusions and hallucinations of perception are false; fallacious inference cannot give truth; postulation has to stand the test of modal negation (*tarka*); and so on. They knew also that whatever is contradicted cannot be valid and that at our level we can be certain only of the uncontradictable. They knew, further, that the world is a world of action and that uncontradictability cannot be attained in our knowledge of the empirical world; so, they held that all cognition can be confirmed or disproved through action.

But the question of validity occurred in a new form also. Knowledge is a form of consciousness which reveals objects. Its function is to reveal truth. Then should we take our cognitions as true only because they are forms of consciousness? If we cannot, then should we distrust all cognition? If we do, what else is there to trust? If the individual is to distrust every act of his consciousness, how can he know the truth about the world at all?

Hence arose the conception of the self-validity of knowledge (*svatah-prāmāṇya*), accepted by the Sāṁkhya, the Mīmāṁsā, and the Vedānta. The Buddhist Vijñānavādins and Mādhyamikas, on the other hand, maintained that all cognitions are by themselves invalid (*svatah-aprāmāṇya*),[12b] because cognitions present objects, but no object is real. According to the Vijñānavādins, the impersonal consciousness (*vijñāna*) that reveals itself to itself in every cognition is alone true—its content is false; according to the Mādhyamikas, even that impersonal consciousness is false—only the *śūnya* (void) is true. Then, if all cognition is by itself valid according to one group and false according to the other, why do we draw the distinction at all between validity and invalidity? The former group, except the Sāṁkhya, maintains that a cognition is made invalid by something other than that cognition (*paratah-aprāmāṇya*), and the other group thinks that it is made valid by this other (*paratah-prāmāṇya*), the other being the world of action or the pragmatic world. (The Jainas accept both.) The distinction is due to the nature of the pragmatic world.

The Sāṁkhya contends that the invalidity of cognition belongs to, and is cognized by, cognition itself, and cognition is therefore invalid also by itself (*svatah-aprāmāṇya*). This invalidity may be detected by the failure of the object of cognition to lead to the expected results (*arthakriyā*), but neither is a false cognition made false nor a true cognition made true by anything else. The Nyāya, on the other hand, maintains that cognition is neither true nor false by itself, but is made so by the proper or improper working of the means of cognition, such as the eye, the light, and the other media. Since we cannot always know whether these means are defective or not, and since the world

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12b Prajñākaragupta, *Pramāṇavārtikābhāṣyam*, pp. 230 ff.; pp. 631 ff.

is a world of action, the pragmatic criterion that the object of cognition must lead to the expected results can help.[13]

Thus, for the Nyāya the world is there and is pragmatic also. But the individual is deprived of his confidence in his cognitions. For the Buddhists, the world is not real—it has only a pragmatic truth.[13a] The others ask the individual to trust his consciousness and yet to be careful. But, for all, the world is a pragmatic world, although they differ from one another on whether it is something more besides.

## V. The Object of Illusion

We generally speak of illusions in the case of perception only, but not in the case of any of the other ways of knowing. The object of illusion is always an individual. Neither is illusion mere memory, nor the object of illusion a mere impression. Memory and impressions may be factors in the perception of illusory objects, but are not themselves perception. The Sāṁkhya, the Mīmāṁsā of Prabhākara, and Rāmānuja maintain that, since all cognitions are true by themselves, the object of illusory perceptions also is real and existent, although it cannot lead to the expected results of action. The Nyāya maintains that illusion is due to the "misplacement of the universal or form (*prakāra*) in the object." If the rope is cognized as a snake, and I say, "That is a snake," then I misplace the universal snakeness in the That. Yet, the That is real, and the snakeness also is real as it exists in real snakes. There is nothing unreal in illusion; it is only a false classification. Kumārila, with the intention of upholding the self-validity of all knowledge and the reality of the objects of all cognitions, accepts the Nyāya position, with this difference, that, since the illusory snake is seen in time and space, and since the universal cannot exist in time and space but is above them, the illusory snake, which is perceived, is not a universal but some other snake seen previously. That is,

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[13] The *vyāvahārika* (or pragmatic) world means the *artha-kriyākāri* (that which does or performs the purpose intended) world. I cannot discuss here the many interesting details, analyses, and implications of the *prāmāṇya* doctrines. They can be obtained from the works mentioned earlier.

[13a] There is every justification for using the word "pragmatic" here. For the Mahāyāna Buddhists, the objective world is produced by the *saṁskāras* left by practical activity and is meant for practical activity. So, the objects, not only epistemologically understood but also in their very constitution (in their *sattā*), are pragmatic by nature. For Prabhākara, also, they are so. But, for the Nyāya and the other schools, they are only epistemologically pragmatic, i.e., they are pragmatic for purposes of epistemological verification. In short, all schools that accept the doctrine of *karma* do and have to accept the pragmatic criterion, at least for confirming empirical truth. For the world, even if it has its own existence, is created according to the past actions of the souls and for the sake of their future actions and enjoyment. But we should keep in mind that the schools differ in answering the question whether to confirm truth is the same as constituting the being of the object concerned.

the snake seen is a remembered snake, or the particular rope is seen as the particular remembered snake. Prabhākara also holds that both the rope and the snake are real objects, but adds that, since the particular snake cannot be identified with the particular rope, illusion is only the non-cognition of their difference. For the Vijñānavādins, everything except consciousness is an illusion, and all the objective forms which our consciousness takes are illusions.

The Advaitin says that "That is a rope" and "That is a snake" are both perceptions of individuals. The snake we see is neither a misplaced real universal (*sat*) nor a mere mental image or fabrication (*asat*). It is not even a remembered real snake. It is not existent, because it is contradicted by the later perception: "That is not and was not a snake." It is not non-existent, because Being shines through it through the word "is." It is, therefore, neither existent nor non-existent, i.e., it is inexplicable (*anirvacanīya*). By this interpretation, the self-validity of our knowledge is not violated, because the purpose of consciousness is to reveal Being, and Being is revealed through the "is" in "That is a snake" also. The snake does not meet the pragmatic criterion, and is, therefore, kept out of the world of action, which is the world in which we live.

## VI. The Philosophy of Language

We may now consider the philosophy of language, particularly the theories of the word and meaning. Although we do not find in Indian thought the picture theory of language of the early Wittgenstein, we find the attempt to treat those parts of the sentence as primary which represent the main features of reality. While Cassirer[14] regards language as one of the forms of man's self-liberation from the entanglement in the world of individual objects, Bhartṛhari,[15] the Grammarian, regards the main function of language as the spiritual liberation of the individual. As Cassirer says that man is an *animal symbolicum*,[16] Bhartṛhari[17] says that man evolves out of the Word itself. Like Heidegger,[18] he says that the question of Being is deeply involved in language, not in logic. Russell[19] writes that language externalizes experience; but the Sanskrit Grammarians will add that spoken language externalizes experience,

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14 Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), p. 228.

15 Bhartṛhari, *Vākyapadīya*, S. N. Sukla, ed. (Banaras: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1961), Part I, pp. 24, 141. Yet, Bhartṛhari's view should not be equated with that of Cassirer or Heidegger.

16 Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man*, p. 121.

17 Bhartṛhari, *Vākyapadīya*, Part I, pp. 4, 72-78.

18 Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Ralph Manheim, trans. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1961), p. 42.

19 Bertrand Russell, *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1948), p. 72.

which is the internal language and which is identical with its meaning. Language is not only expression but also communication—it involves the hearer-speaker situation;[20] and, as Carnap[21] wants, it has a representative function also. But how does it have this representative power, how does it descend into the expression of the speaker, and how does it convey its meaning to the hearer? These questions also engaged the minds, not only of the Sanskrit Grammarians, but also of the other Indian philosophers.

William von Humboldt[22] regarded the differences among languages as differences among world perspectives, and Hegel[23] called language the actuality of culture. But actual cultures and perspectives have fluid spiritual depths, which must be common to all men. What Benjamin Lee Whorf says in this connection has particular significance. He says that our ordinary languages have different patterns, but these patterns originate in a pattern *par excellence* which is beyond time and space.[24] If this language pattern belongs to all men, what can that pattern be? The Grammarians of India were deeply interested in tracing the expressed language to this universal, inward language common to all men.

*The Nairukta philosophy of language:* Yāska,[25] the author of the *Nirukta,* the earliest lexicon in the world, refers to the view of Śākaṭāyana, who maintained that all nouns are derived from verbal roots. Yāska accepts this view because it agrees with his philosophy that the *Ātman* is the ultimate reality and that it is activity itself. This understanding of the *Ātman* is in accord with the etymological meaning of the word *"brahman,"* which is derived from the verbal root *"bṛh,"* meaning "to grow," "to expand." The *Brahman* is the ever-growing, the ever-expanding. It is *sattā* (Being) itself, but *sattā,* or Being, is activity itself. "To be" is a verb and represents an act. Then the primary part of the sentence is the verb. The most basic of all verbs is the root *"as"* (to be). Every other verb is its form, i.e., every other act is a form which the

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[20] C. W. Morris, *Foundations of the Theory of Signs* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), clarifies this situation.

[21] R. Carnap, *Philosophy and Logical Syntax* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., Ltd., 1935), p. 27.

[22] Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man,* p. 121.

[23] Paul A. Schilpp, *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer* (New York: Tudor Publishing House, 1958), p. 405.

[24] Benjamin Lee Whorf, *Language, Thought and Reality* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), p. 253. Whorf explains the levels in terms of the Buddhist and Yogic terms *"nāmā-rūpa"* (name-form) and *"a-rūpa"* (the formless). He does not seem to have known the philosophies of the Grammarians. J. Vendreys, in his *Language,* Paul Radin, trans. (New York: Barnes and Noble Inc., 1951), p. 234, writes: "But neither is it unreasonable, on the other hand, to claim that there is one human language which is fundamentally identical in all latitudes." This universal language must be the unexpressed, the internal language of man.

[25] Yāska, *Nikrukta,* L. Swarup, ed. (Bombay: Sri Venkateswar Press, 1947). He is assigned to some time between 800 and 500 B.C.

primary act "to be" takes. What we have to note is that "to be" is an act, and the "is" is not a mere copula. In the Nairukta philosophy, Being is the same as becoming, and the noun is to be derived from the verb. In fact, all the other parts of the sentence are modes of the verb.[26]

The Nairukta philosophy may seem strange, but it is essentially the philosophy of language that accepts the world as activity. But activity should not be understood as unstructured and unpatterned. We can understand it in terms of play or, rather, of dance, which has a definite pattern—a beginning, an end, certain patterns, and different men and women following the patterns of the dance activity.

*The Mīmāṁsā theory of language:* To say that Being is only of the nature of activity and the ethical individual is nothing more than one of the modes of that activity did not satisfy the ethical realism of the Mīmāṁsakas—for the individual as a free agent is responsible for his actions—who maintained that the noun and the verb, the doer and his action, are equally important and are forms of Being. This view is accepted by both Kumārila and Prabhākara, although the latter gives in his discussions greater importance to activity than Kumārila gives.

Prabhākara says that, since activity is the controller of the manifold forms of the world, the verb is more important than the noun in the sentence and holds together all the nouns and their relations and conveys the total meaning. The meaning of every word is the activity it leads us to. Prabhākara goes to

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[26] Thus, "That is a horse" means that "the That is a function of the universal 'horseness,' which is a function of the Is." We should remember that "horseness" is not an abstraction, but the formative act of Being (Is). Function would be the formative act, not an abstraction. We may also say that, since the formative act is the expression of power, "horseness" is a power of the Is, and the That is a power of "horseness." We can then interpret "That is a horse" as

That [Horseness (Is)]

or as

(That)
(Horseness)
(Is)

provided we do not forget that the power here is not arithmetical power, but the ontological or the power of the act of being. One may compare this view with Plato's view of language and Cassirer's *Vieldeutigkeit* of the copula (W. M. Urban, *Language and Reality*, [New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939]), pp. 302 ff. Then "Brutus killed Caesar" will be

Brutus→Caesar { Past [Killing (Is)] or

(Brutus→Caesar)
(Past)
(Killing)
(Is)

It seems that the Is cannot be avoided even when it is not used, if we want to convey the existential import. The verb itself must convey it, and the verb must be activity also. It is not a mere relation, as it is in Russell's logic. If killing is only a relation, then relations must have past, present, and future. Then they cannot be constants. If by some *tour de force* they are turned into constants, expressions become ethically lifeless.

the extent of saying that the being (*sattā*) of an object lies in its operational efficiency.[27] For holding such a view, he is classified with the Buddhist Vijñānavādins by Śrī Harṣa.[28] However, Prabhākara accepts the independent existence of nouns apart from verbs, but contends that, without being associated with the activities conveyed by verbs, the meaning of nouns cannot be understood. But, as the Vijñānavādins do not accept stable substantives like the *ātman*, for them "to be" is to be a process; the world is pure process, and everything is pure process and momentary.

*The Nyāya theory of language:*[29] The Naiyāyikas generally accept the Mīmāṁsā theory of Kumārila. Their old school maintained that Being (*sattā*) is present in substances (*dravyas*), qualities (*guṇas*), and activities (*karmas*). However, this school tends to treat activity as a qualifying adjunct (*viśeṣaṇa*) of substance, while the Mīmāṁsā gives it an importance at least equal to that of substance. That is, the noun is more important in the Nyāya than in the Mīmāṁsā, for ethics is more concerned with the nature of actions than with that of men. Furthermore, the concept of *sattā* itself is different in the two schools. For the Mīmāṁsā, it is ontological; for the Nyāya, it is the most common feature of all beings or of everything that is. As it is understood to be the most common feature, the Neo-Nyāya rejected it altogether, for the reason that it can never be cognized. They accepted, instead, the idea of *bhāva* (positing), adding that, not only substance, quality, and activity, but also universal (*sāmānya*), inherence (*samavāya*), and the particular (*viśeṣa*) are *bhāvas*. But the word *"bhāva"* means for the Mīmāṁsā the act of being (something) —it is a verb; for the Neo-Nyāya, it is affirmation (as opposed to negation) —it is the positive as opposed to the negative.

*The Vedāntic theory of language:* According to the Advaita, the main purpose of language is to reveal Being (*sattā*), which is the same as the *Brahman*.[30] This school accepts the view of Kumārila, so far as the empirical world goes. But Kumārila, being a pluralist and also an ethical activist, does not hold that Being belongs to the *Brahman* alone, but is present in both the noun and the verb. This is what Rāmānuja also accepts, but, with this difference, that in his conception of ultimate reality, which is pluralistic in a way, he imposes monism on pluralism by accepting two ultimate categories, substance

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27 Cf. F. W. Bridgman's operational theory of symbols, in Urban, *Language and Reality*, p. 532.

28 Śrī Harṣa, *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍākhādya*, G. N. Jha, ed. (Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1904), p. 1068.

29 A connected account of the Nyāya theory of language is available in Jagadīśa, *Śabdaśaktiprakāśa*, Dunderaj Sastri, ed. (Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1934).

30 Cf. *Asti bhāti priyam rūpam nāma cetyamsapañcakam, ādyam trayam brahmarūpam jagadrūpam tato dvayam:* Being, shining, pleasantness, name, and form are the five factors [of all cognition]; the first three belong to the *Brahman* and the other two to the world.

and quality, thereby reducing activity also to a quality (*viśeṣaṇa*); but in his conception of empirical reality he seems to go along with Prabhākara. Now, for the Advaitins, the same Being is revealed through all sentences. "That is a horse" is meant to reveal Being through the "is." That is why Rāmānuja[31] asks why the man who wants to purchase a horse will not be satisfied with purchasing a cow, if "That is a horse" and "That is a cow" reveal the same Being. The Advaitin would answer that the man is not interested in Being itself, but in Being in the form of the horse and not in the form of the cow. His interest is pragmatic, not ultimate.

*The Grammarian theory of language:* The Grammarian philosophers, e.g., the Nairuktas, are also called the wordists (*śābdikas*). Bhartṛhari[32] is the greatest among them. He accepts the Mīmāṁsā theory that Being is revealed through both the noun and the verb. But, like Śaṁkara, he is a monist. Language is meant to reveal Being, but Being is the Word itself, the Word that is God himself, the *Logos*, the Word-*Brahman*. He draws no distinction[33] between the *Logos* and the higher *Brahman*. The distinctions between the individual and the world, the subject and the object, and subject and the verb (the grammatical predicate), etc., all originate in the *Logos*. The structure of the *Logos* is the structure of the grammatical sentence. Thus, the *Logos* as the Word received a more systematic exposition in India than the *Logos* as Reason, although the *Logos* as Reason in the ontological sense was clearly enunciated in the Sāṁkhya doctrine of the *mahat* (Reason), the Upaniṣadic doctrine of the *Mahān Ātmā* (the *Ātman* as Reason, so *Logos*), and the Vedāntic doctrine of the *citta* (apperception) and the *buddhi* (reason). For the wordists, including Bhartṛhari, Being is the *Mahān Ātmā*[34] itself.

*The word and its meaning:* It is not possible in a single paper to present the doctrines of all schools in a connected form. Since the Grammarians are the philosophers of the Word, and since Bhartṛhari is the greatest among them, I shall present his views mainly and give the views of some of the other schools as differences.

The first peculiarity of Bhartṛhari's semantic theory is that there is no cognition without a corresponding verbal sentence. Thus, the cognition "That is a horse" is also the verbal expression "That is a horse." Just as the Naiyāyikas

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[31] Rāmānuja, *Śrī-bhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 28.

[32] He is generally assigned to the second half of the sixth and first half of the seventh centuries A.D.

[33] This distinction was later drawn by the Tāntric school, to which even Śaṁkara seems to have belonged in his *Prapañca-sāra-tantra*. See Sukla's commentary on the *Vākyapadīya*, Part I, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-131. The Upaniṣadic view also draws the distinction. See *ibid.*, p. 19.

[34] Mādhavācārya, *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*, Ganes Vinayak Apte, ed. (Poona: Anandasrama Press, 1928), pp. 114-115. This view is attributed to one Hari and is the same as Bhartṛhari's.

say that the object is determined by the universal "horseness," Bhartṛhari says that it is determined by the word "horse" also. For him, horseness is not a common characteristic (*sāmānya*), but is "being a horse," which is an act. Thus, "That is a horse" means: Being in the form (universal) of the act (*bhāva*) of being a horse and in the form of the word "horse" has become (*vivṛta*) that particular individual. This view is not accepted by any other school. The identity of word and meaning is called *"sphoṭa"* by Bhartṛhari. The word *"sphoṭa"* means bursting forth, and therefore what so bursts forth into the different syllables of the word, its meaning, the world, and the individuals. This is like saying that the Word which was with God and was God burst forth into the manifold of the world.

Every word has its *sphoṭa*. When we hear the word "ant," we do not hear the letters a, n, and t simultaneously, in that order, but successively; when one of them is heard, the others are not there. So, we say that every sound is retained in our memory, and, when the last sound is heard, it is ordered by our mind into the form a-n-t along with the first impressions, because only then can we have a meaning. But why are the sounds not ordered in the form t-a-n, as "tan" also is a meaningful word? So, it is said that a word pattern or universal called *"sphoṭa"* has to be accepted, of which, like Plato's Ideas, the hearer is reminded by the successive utterances of the sounds by the speaker. This universal sound-pattern is supersensible. Bhartṛhari would say that Plato should have acknowledged that the ideas or meanings are inseparably connected with words also.

I have already referred to the two doctrines of the universal, the universal as comprising the common characteristics of the individuals (*sāmānya*) and the universal as the act of being a particular form and called *"jāti"* (universal).[35] Bhartṛhari accepts the second view. Then, as the meaning of a word is the universal, it is the act of being a particular form, e.g., that of being a horse. According to Bhartṛhari, the meaning of a word is never the particular individual, but the universal. That a word can mean something indicates its power (*śakti*), and that power is the act of being.

The Mīmāṁsakas accept the eternity of words and also the reality of the power (*śakti*) of words to mean, but not the doctrine of *sphoṭa*, as they do not accept the concept of the *Logos* as constituting the Being of the world. The Nyāya does not accept the eternity of words. It denies also that the word means only the concept or the universal, and says that it means the universal, the structure (*ākṛti, samsthāna*), and the individual. This view is accepted by many Vedāntins and some Wordists. The Mīmāṁsakas generally maintain

[35] This is defined by Kumārila, for instance, as *janmopādāna*, the material or substantive cause of the individual's being what it is. K. Kunjunni Raja, *Indian Theories of Meaning* (Madras: The Adyar Library, 1963), p. 237.

that the word means primarily the universal, which for them is the structure,[36] and the individual is cognized through the universal, which brings in (*ākṣipati*) the individual, and which cannot exist without it. Here Prabhākara introduces a distinction. What is said is true in the case of cognitions due to memory but, in the case of actual perception, the universal connotes the intended activity (*pravṛtti*) and is therefore the instrument[37] of activity (*pravṛtti-nimitta-para*). The word therefore means this activity. Thus, the proposition "This is a pen" means "This is meant for writing." The Buddhists hold the same view.

As *sphoṭa* is not only the word but also the meaning, Bhartṛhari maintained that the sentence alone has *sphoṭa,*[38] but not the separate words. Words by themselves have no meaning; they have only an incomplete and derivative meaning. Prabhākara agrees with this view—we should remember that he does not, however, accept the *sphoṭa* doctrine—because for him also words can have meaning after, but not before, they are related, i.e., nouns can have meaning only when related to verbs meaning action, and the verbs should be imperatives, primarily for purposes of obtaining meaning. Bhartṛhari does not insist upon the verb's being in the imperative mood.

Although the Buddhists accept the operational theory of meaning, they say that words can mean particular objects, each of which is what is other than its other (*apoḍha*) and is unrelated. The Nyāya, the Mīmāṁsā of Kumārila, and most of the other schools maintain that words can have their separate meanings and can later be combined into sentences.[39]

Bhartṛhari says that every word or sentence has two facets, the mere sound-pattern and the meaning-bearing sound-pattern. The former is perceived by the ear; it is not speech but noise. The latter, which is *sphoṭa,* is beyond time. It comes down through time to the level of the ear by passing through two stages. From the standpoint of the hearer, the sounds pass in the reverse order through the same stages. The first is called the pronounced word (*vaikṛta-dhvani*).[40] It has time sequence in that the sounds are pronounced one after another. It has meaning, although distinguished from itself. Having meaning is not the

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[36] For the Jainas, also, the universal is the common structure of the individuals.

[37] Cp. William James's pragmatism and John Dewey's instrumentalism.

[38] The *sphoṭa* of the sentence is called *akhaṇḍa-sphoṭa,* or indivisible *sphoṭa.* There are different kinds of *sphoṭa,* that of the sentence, of the word, of the syllable, and of the letter. But that of the sentence alone is self-complete. See Sukla's commentary on the *Vākyapadīya,* Part I, *op. cit.,* p. 45. For an explanation in English, see K. Kunjunni Raja, *Indian Theories of Meaning,* pp. 100-140. Gaurinath Sastri's *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning* (Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1959) is another pertinent book in English.

[39] This doctrine is called *abhihitānvaya-vāda* (the doctrine that uttered words are related) as against Prabhākara's doctrine, which is called *anvitābhidāna-vāda* (the doctrine that related words are uttered).

[40] "*Vaikṛta*" means "distorted." Since not all persons pronounce the word in the same voice, the original word is said to be distorted.

first facet, which is mere sound. The second stage is called the original word (*prakṛta-dhvani*), or *das Urwort*. It is, we may say, the word-universal, which appears on different lips and tongues in different ways. It is still in time on the lips and in the ears of men. The meaning has still to be distinct from it. The third stage is *sphoṭa,* which is supersensible and beyond time and in which the word and meaning are identical. It is Being itself as the Word. What the object and the pronounced word reveal is this *sphoṭa*. It is the word and its meaning, which is universal, and becomes the individual through *vivarta*[41] causality and the power of temporalization (*kālāśakti*). *Vivarta* is the causal process in which the cause produces the effect, without itself undergoing any change. "*Vivaraṇa*" literally means articulation, explanation, etc. So, it is articulation by bursting forth. The individual is the result of the bursting forth of the universal. *Sphoṭa* as a universal, which is a formative act of Being, becomes the individuals without itself being affected by the process. Individuals may come into, and go out of, existence, but the universal remains the same.[42]

Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language is based, of course, upon the grammatical structure of Sanskrit. But his central doctrines may be of interest even for other languages. The noun and the verb are the most important parts of the sentence. Next come the suffixes and the indeclinables. The definite and the indefinite articles come under pronouns or names that can be applied to every noun (*sarvanāmāni*). Gender and number are worked out in declensions, and

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41 See Sukla's commentary on the *Vākyapadīya, op. cit.*, Part I, p. 146.

42 From the cosmic point of view the *Logos* (*Sphoṭa*) is said to have three stages. The first is called the *paśyantī*, the seeing or experiencing stage, in which there is no distinction between the word, meaning, and object. This is the principle of rational consciousness (*buddhi-rūpa*) itself, the *Sphoṭa* in its essence and completeness, the *Logos*. It is supersensible; we know it only in flashes. The second is called the "*madhyama,*" the intermediate stage, and corresponds to the *Urwort* (*prākṛta-dhvani*). The third is called "*vaikhari,*" the gross sound, and corresponds to the pronounced word. The categorial scheme of the *Logos* is given by Bhartṛhari in terms of the grammatical structure of the sentence. The parts of speech are four: the noun (*nāmā, nāmā-dheya, prāti-padika*); the verb (*kriyā, bhāva, dhātu, ākhyāta*); the suffixes (*upasargas*), which not only change the meaning of the root by becoming its mode, but also act as prepositions; and the indeclinables (*nipātas*), which act as adverbs also. Of these, the first two are primary, because without either there can be no meaning of the sentence. If the sentence is the unit of expression, then what is expressed is the unit of Being. Bhartṛhari does not give us further insight into the structure of the *Logos*. All that we know is that it is both noun and verb. It is primarily Being (*sattā*) and manifests itself as nouns and verbs, beings and activities. These can have different modes as expressed by adjectives, adverbs, etc., according to the nature of the language. Bhartṛhari seems to have avoided the discussion of the logical structure of the *Logos*, because, first, man cannot rise to the level of the *Logos* to understand it fully; second, man can have before his consciousness only single flashes of the *Logos*, but not all the possible ones together and exhaustively; third, the sentence understood by man is the appearance of the highest *sphoṭa* in time, and to grasp the whole *sphoṭa* man has to become supra-temporal; and, fourth—perhaps this is the most important reason—since the *Logos* includes activity (*bhāva*), to present it as a logical structure would be to present it as static and therefore to falsify it. Man may abstract the pure logical structure, but in so doing deprives it of Being.

number alone in conjugations. Furthermore, Sanskrit has its own peculiarities, particularly the compounds. The schools differed from one another in interpreting them. Not even the Grammarians were unanimous.

It would be an oversimplification, made from a preconceived view, to think that Sanskrit cannot express the individual and that it has no articles, and so on. "It is wrongly thought that *"Ayam aśvah"* is literally "It is horse"; for the original word (*prātipadika*) *"aśva,"* when declined as *"aśvah,"* means "a horse" in the nominative case. When number also has to be emphasized, the word *"eka"* is used. Further, *eka* means also "a certain"; and, when "a certain" is meant, *"eka"* has to be used. Thus, "Once upon a time there was a king" refers to a certain king, but not to any one of the past kings. Then the Sanskrit expression is *"Ekadā ekah rājā āsīt."* Where "the" is wanted, *"tat"* is used. As Sanskrit is declensional, both *eka* and *tat* have to be declined. They have no separate meaning in the sentence, but only through the noun to which they refer. Hence, the Grammarians insist on declining them also.[43]

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Bhartṛhari's semantic analysis may be charted somewhat as follows:




From the standpoint of the speaker, the word starts from the *sphoṭa* and splits itself downward into the pronounced word and the individual. From the standpoint of the hearer, verbal knowledge starts with the pronounced word, goes up to *sphoṭa*, and then comes down to the individual. The concept and connotation are taken together by Bhartṛhari as meaning. I have separated them, as we do not always have the whole possible content of the universal, even when we know the universal, but get the denotation with a partial content.

[43] In fact, every idea expressed in any of the European languages can be expressed in Sanskrit or any language derived from it. See F. Max Müller, *Science of Thought* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1887), Vol. II, pp. 412-413.

As the verb was taken to be important, grammar was not reduced to logic. Regarding the meaning power of the verb, the schools hold different views. If we take the example, "He is cooking food," what is the comprehension of the meaning of "is cooking"? The Wordists, including Bhartṛhari, say that it refers to the subject "he," the object or end of the process "food," and the activity (*bhāva*) of collecting the fuel, setting fire to it, and so on, and this assimilates all factors into a single formative process. This agrees with Bhartṛhari's position that the meaning of a sentence is indivisible and the verb has to refer to the subject and the object. Furthermore, the verb as such refers separately to the operation of collecting fuel, etc., and the result, food, which means that the distinctions are preserved. The Neo-Nyāya maintains that the verb refers directly to the action, but indirectly to food, as action ends in the result. However, action is known as a qualification of the subject "he." The Mīmāṁsakas in general say that the verb refers to the operation only. But Maṇḍana, when he was a Mīmāṁsaka,[44] said that it refers to the result. The Advaita position is not clear, but it generally follows the Mīmāṁsā. There are several other views with varying shades of difference. What we have to note is that these differences are due, not only to the different metaphysical backgrounds and world perspectives, but also to the fact that all activity is structured, and thinkers differed in understanding which aspect of the structure is essential for activity.

## VII. Conclusion

The attitudes of the different epistemological perspectives may now be summarized:

1. The fact that different philosophies and world perspectives can be developed in the same language shows that within the same culture there can be different world-perspectives. All advanced cultures are in this sense pluralistic, their members leaning toward one or the other perspective according to circumstances.

2. The Nairukta philosophy of language shows that some thinkers of the time viewed the world, or even reality, as pure activity. It was felt correspondingly that the attitude of man toward the world had to be one of active life. The individual came in only as a mode of activity. The world consists of

[44] Tradition tells us Maṇḍana was at first a Mīmāṁsaka and later became a follower of Śaṁkara's Advaita, assuming the name of Sureśvara. But some historical scholars believe they are not the same person. First, whether they are the same or different is immaterial for the present paper. Second, even now scholars are attempting to prove the opposite. See R. Balasubramanian, "Identity of Maṇḍana miśra," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 82, October-December, 1962.

the modes of an infinite number of activities, which originated out of a single original Activity, the *Ātman.* It is Being itself.

3. The Mīmāṁsā attitude toward the individual and the world was different. The primary parts of the world are the individuals and their activities, which together are controlled by a supreme, unitary Activity. But this Supreme Activity is not the *Ātman,* but pure Activity as such.

4. The Grammarians, under Bhartṛhari, equated Being with the *Logos* and treated beings and their activities as articulations (*vivartas*) of the *Logos.* The individual is ultimately a formation of the *Logos* and can have no separate Being of its own. The world consists of the formations of the *Logos* and is its manifestation.

5. The Naiyāyika attitude toward the world is different from the above views. They do not treat the individual and the world as the formation or becoming of any suprapersonal Being, but assign independent reality to every object.

6. For the Advaita of Śaṁkara, all knowledge is meant ultimately to reveal the primary Being itself, although in the pragmatic world we are interested in secondary beings and ignore Being. For both the Nairuktas and the Grammarian Bhartṛhari also, the ultimate purpose of knowledge is to reveal primary Being itself, however differently it is understood. Both base their philosophies on language, not merely on logic. Their methodology is etymology for the Nairuktas and analysis of grammar for Bhartṛhari, respectively.

7. Of all the Indian schools, the epistemologies of the Mīmāṁsā and of the Nyāya are the most important and elaborate, although different. The Advaita generally follows the Mīmāṁsā. But the latter's conception of the individual's intimate, ultimate, and deep involvement in the world through action is not acceptable to the former, which treats such involvement as bondage and points to Being as above becoming and therefore above action.

8. What is generally called valid knowledge (*pramā*) need not be the same as knowledge of Being (*satya*) for the Advaita, Bhartṛhari, and even the Nairuktas. So, ordinary forms of knowledge need not be knowledge of Being present in the world. Being is generally missed by them.

9. The usual epistemological forms, such as perception and inference, show how we cognize the individual and how, on the basis of perception and with the help of other forms, we construct the idea of the world.

10. The individual is regarded as cognizing himself as the particular "I," although this I-consciousness has been a problem of serious metaphysical inquiry for all the schools. The problem of the knowledge of other "I's" and of other minds does not seem to have engaged the minds of Indian epistemologists much, although it is maintained by some of them that yogic powers enable one

to know other minds. It is practically taken for granted that other minds and individuals exist, although the Advaita and some schools of Buddhism deny their ultimate reality. The Vaiśeṣika uses analogy for knowing other minds.

11. All the schools, including the Advaita and Buddhism, affirm that this world satisfies *also* the pragmatic criterion of truth, although many schools of the Vedānta and of Buddhism say that this world is only that which satisfies the pragmatic criterion. For they say that this world is only a world of action. But the others maintain that this is a world that exists in its own right also. Here we see the interpenetration of epistemology and metaphysics.

12. The individual is expressed by concrete names or nouns, not abstract nouns, and actions by verbs. The class is expressed generally by the plural, but occasionally by the singular also. It is only in the Nairukta philosophy that the noun is a mode of the verb, for, according to some Sanskrit Grammarians, all nouns are derived from verbal roots. But many Grammarians do not accept this view, and say that both the noun and verb are formations of Being. The rest treat the two as independent.

13. The linguistic philosophy of the Sanskrit Grammarians shows that the grammatical sentence, in which the verb is important, is a fuller and better expression of reality than logical propositions, in which relation is more important than the verb. Logic cannot be an expression of life, which is a becoming (*bhāva*). Logical propositions can never be true substitutes for grammatical sentences. Relations are expressed by prepositions and conjunctions, but verbs are neither.

Logic expresses structure, but grammar expresses activity. The "is," or "being," is a predicate in grammar, but a relation in logic. The predicate is a verb, and so an activity in grammar, but only one of the terms of the relation in logic. If logic cannot express activity as activity, it is inappropriate to ethics, the main concern of which is activity.

14. Since activity has structure—a beginning, an end, modes of operation, etc.—logic is an abstraction out of grammar but not vice versa. If we take grammar as a crude form of logic, we kill the very life of activity. The world does not consist primarily of individuals and relations, but of individuals and their activities, involving relations, of course. The world itself is a structured process.

15. The verb also as activity is an object of cognition. We know, of course, that the word meaning activity is not itself activity. Yet, the word does not mean mere relation, a static constant.

16. The philosophy of the Sanskrit language points to a new doctrine of the universal, which is a good commentary and complement to Plato's theory. The doctrine has an interesting ontological significance. The universal "horseness,"

for instance, is not a group of common characteristics or a mere propositional function, but the formative act of being a horse. The universal is not a static form, but the formative act of being. From the logical point of view, "That is a horse" is a classificatory judgment. But from the ontological point of view, it is the formative act of being. Ontology seems to be embedded in grammar, but not in logic.

One may express the central teaching of Indian epistemology about the individual and the world thus: The true and significant knowledge of the individual and this world is the knowledge of the individual in his field of action. But this statement is true only with regard to the empirical world.

### Supplement

Before passing on to the discussion of verbal knowledge, it is important to note two different concepts of truth found in Indian thought, the concepts of *prāmaṇya* and *satya,* which are as often mixed up as differentiated. *Prāmāṇya* is the universal form of *pramāṇa,* which means the instrument of *pramā* meaning valid knowledge. *Pramā* is derived from two words, *"pra"* meaning much and the root *"mā"* meaning to measure. *Pramā* is therefore "the measured" and so measured knowledge. The measure here may be the instruments of cognition such as the senses and the media or the object itself. But curiously enough, not only the instruments of perception, etc., but also perception, etc., are called *pramāṇas.* This usage was laid hold of by Prabhākara, and Buddhist Vijñānavādins, who said that *pramāṇa* is the same as *pramā.* Although the other schools reject this interpretation, they are not consistent in the use of *prāmāṇya,* which, for them, does not mean merely the universal of *pramāṇa* but also that of *pramā,* so that *prāmāṇyam* and *pramātvam* have come to mean truth and validity.

This conception of truth and validity, which is purely epistemological and is based generally on the tripartite division (*tripuṭi*) of the knowledge situation into the known, the knower, and knowledge and on the idea of measure, is mixed up with the ontological meaning of truth as *satya,* derived from the verbal root *"as"* (to be) and *"sat"* (*ein Seiendes*), its present participle. The abstract noun from *sat* is *sattā* (Being). Another derivation from *sat* is *satya* (*sat* +*ya*). The suffix *ya* is used in three senses: (1) the abstraction of what is common to all; (2) being descended from or being born or originating from; and (3) for the sake of or what is good for. In the first sense, *satya* is what is common to all beings; in the second, it is what is derived from Being (*sattā*); and, in the third, it is what leads to or is good for *sat* or *sattā.* Although *sat* means "a being" and *sattā* means "Being," the two words are often interchanged; the *Brahman,* for instance, is not only *sattā* but also *sat.*

Now, in *pramā* as true knowledge, the individual knower is taken as distinct from his knowledge and both again from the object. Truth pertains to knowledge. But, *satya* being an ontological concept, truth pertains to the being as it appears or is known. In the object as known epistemology and ontology coincide. The concept of truth as validity and that as ontological reality get mixed up. And, when one talks of ultimate truth, one may be thinking of Being (*sattā*), but not the truth (*pramāṇya*) of propositions like "That is red."

Yet, we have to note that, although the Advaita distinguishes three kinds of *sattā* (*sat* and *satyam* also are used) from the standpoint of Being, it does not distinguish three kinds of *pramā* or *pramāṇya* from the standpoint of epistemology. Being as such is ultimate (*pāramārthika*) *sattā*. But the same Being shines through the pragmatic (*vyāvahārika*) *sattā* and also the apparent (*prātibhāsika*) *sattā*. Without Being shining through them, we cannot say: "That is a rope" or "That is a snake." When I imagine a snake, I do not say, "That is a snake," but "I imagine a snake." The "is" is not used when we imagine something.

Like the distinction between *prāmāṇya* and *satya*, the distinction between *sattā* and *bhāva* is important. I have explained *sattā*. The word *bhāva* is derived from the verbal root *"bhū,"* to which the English verb "to be" and the German word *"bin"* can be traced. In English and German, "is" and "be" are confused—the tendency to confuse them is found in Sanskrit also, although to a lesser degree, and is indicative of a deep ontological problem—and the words "become" and *"werden"* are made to do the work of *"bhū."* Although the word *"bhū"* means "to become" also, its primary meaning is the act or process of being (either the same or something else). Because of the idea of process involved, the word in many contexts means "to become." As the grammarians explain it, it is the becoming of Being itself. Becoming is Being as an act of formation, or in a formative act.

Now, the *bhāva* of horses is the universal "horseness." This is the same as the *sattā*, or being, of the horses as a formation. The *sattā* of horses is the "isness" of horses, whereas their *bhāva* is the act of being a horse for all the horses. That is why *bhāva* has come to mean the verb for the Sanskrits. Thus "horseness" does not mean the common characteristic of horses (their *sāmānya*), but the act of being a horse present in every one of the horses. This is a new concept of the universal as an act of the verb, and this is an ontological conception. If we wish to understand what the Sanskritists mean by the world, we have to understand what they mean by truth, Being, and becoming also. The universal for the Sanskrit Grammarians is the becoming of Being, the formative or form-assuming process of Being itself. There is no becoming without Being.

HAJIME NAKAMURA[a]

# *Consciousness of the Individual and the Universal Among the Japanese*

ANY ADEQUATE DISCUSSION of the status of the individual and of the relationship between the individual and the universal in Japanese thought and culture, in terms of methodological tendencies, requires an examination of two major aspects of the problem—the philological or linguistic and logical,* that is, the tendency toward an absence of theoretical or systematic thinking, along with an emphasis upon an aesthetic and intuitive and concrete, rather than a strictly logical, orientation. The status of the individual tends to be determined for the Japanese mind by both of these somewhat unique tendencies of thought.

## I. THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN DAILY LIFE

The logical problem of the relationship between the universal, the particular, and the individual was not discussed with full awareness by Japanese scholars before the introduction of Western scholarship, except by some Buddhist monastic scholars who elaborated on Chinese versions of Indian Buddhist logical texts.

The concept of "the individual" can be expressed with the singular in daily usages of speech, but the singular and the plural have always been expressed in the Japanese language in terms of human relationships.

Number is not always made explicit in the grammar of Japanese sentences. A distinction is not always made between the singular and the plural. And reduplication in the Japanese language (e.g., *"yama-yama,"*[b] i.e., mountains; *"kami-gami,"*[c] i.e., gods) cannot be said strictly to indicate plurality, as reduplication requires the individuality of signification. Furthermore, not all nouns can be put into plural forms. Plurals become better indicated as we proceed higher from domestic animals to servants. Several kinds of plural

* These aspects of the problem are treated at some length in my *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples,* Philip P. Wiener, ed. (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1964), from which some of the material here is taken.

suffixes are variously used to suit different occasions: *domo*[d] and *tachi*[e] are used for persons of equal or inferior status or for intimates, as, for example, *funa-bitō-domo*[f] (boatmen), *hitō-tachi*[g] (people), *tomo-dachi*[h] (friends).[1] When respect must be shown, the suffix *kata,*[i] which originally meant place or direction, is used, as, for example, *anata-gata*[j] (you) and *sensei-gata*[k] (teachers). In short, the use of plural suffixes is determined by the relationship of social ranks and the feeling (intimacy, hate, respect, disrespect, etc.) which the speaker entertains for the persons of whom he is speaking, just as in the cases of *tu* and *vous* in French, and *du* and *Sie* in German. This clearly evidences the Japanese trait to think of things in terms of human relationships rather than as separately existing facts in the objective world. The various plural forms are therefore not strict equivalents of Western plural forms, though in modern times, owing to the influence of Western languages, number has come to be expressed in nearly the same way as in Western languages. (An affix, *moro-morono,*[l] can be added to any word to denote the plural.)

It sometimes happens that a plural suffix attached to a noun loses its own meaning, becoming simply a blank, meaningless component of a compound, and the compound may indicate the singular number, as in the case of the word *"wakai-shū,"*[2] which is made[m] up of *wakai*[n] (young) plus *shū*[o] (plural suffix, people). This word may mean both youngsters and a youngster.

The Japanese do not think it necessary to represent the individual as objectively existing, but, when two people are conversing, they are clearly aware of the distinction between singular and plural. One of the most distinguishing features of the Japanese language is the lack of clear indication of number. This is not so, however, with regard to personal pronouns, particularly the first and second person. The singular and plural in the first and the second persons are clearly distinguished. This phenomenon in their language indicates that the Japanese, who are disinclined to measure the objective world with a certain established unit, are quite sensitive to the distinction between "I" and "you" in human relations. In this case, the consciousness of the individual appears conspicuously.

This does not mean that conceptualization in universals was lacking among the Japanese of the past. The move to conceptualize human affairs in terms of laws and concepts, which are universals, was effected by the Japanese to some extent. The concept of universal law came into existence very early, in

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[1] I mention these linguistic expressions as current in contemporary daily life. They represent the present-day usage of these words. Historically speaking, *domo* was used for persons of inferior status, such as *midomo*[co] ("me"). *Tachi,* which seems to have derived from *doshi,*[cp] was used for persons of superior rank in such cases as *kindachi*[cq] (courtiers). From around the Muromachi[cr] period (1138-1568), it came to be used for persons of equal rank also. I owe this historical information to Professor Ichirō Hori.[cs]

[2] Originally it meant "a group of youngsters of the same age grade."

the time of Prince Shōtoku,[p] when he said, "Sincerely revere the Three Treasures. The Three Treasures, viz., the Buddha, the Law (*Dharma*), and the Brotherhood (*Saṅgha*), constitute the final ideal of all living beings and the ultimate foundation of all countries. Should any age or any people fail to esteem this truth? There are few men who are really vicious. They will all follow it if adequately instructed. How can the crooked ways of men be made straight unless we take refuge in the Three Treasures?"[3] Here we find the concept of a universal law, which is something beyond laws based on the inductively given status of the individual in the joint family and of the family in its respective tribe or caste. This is merely one example. The concept of natural law was most conspicuously expressed by Master Jiun[q] (1718-1804) in the modern period. But the Japanese seem not to have had the inclination to express things in an abstract way. Logic was nothing but a transplantation of Buddhist logic from India, and it did not develop from among the Japanese.

Among Japanese thinkers, a tendency to respect the natural feelings of man justifies the great importance attached in Japan to the rules of propriety based upon human relationships.

The recent trend in philosophical writings in Japan to assign individuality only to man might have come from this humanistic tendency of thinking among the Japanese. The habit of attaching importance to human relationships is manifested outwardly in their practice of the rules of propriety. Generally speaking, exchange of greetings in the West is simple. Japanese greetings are, on the contrary, highly elaborate, although they differ greatly from area to area.

Due to the stress on social proprieties in Japan another characteristic of its culture appears, viz., the tendency of human relationships to supersede or take precedence over the individual. To lay stress upon human relationships is to place heavy regard upon the relations of many individuals rather than upon the individual as an independent entity.

Personal pronouns are much more complicated in Japanese than in other languages. The choice of the proper pronoun to fit the particular situation is an ever-recurring problem in speaking Japanese. Special pronouns are required for superiors, equals, inferiors, intimates, and strangers. If one should confuse them, difficulties would ensue. A Japanese, therefore, must bear in mind such human relationships as rank and intimacy every time he uses a personal pronoun. Such restricted uses of personal pronouns are related to the use of nouns and verbs as well. A distinction is made, for example, between words used in addressing persons of superior rank and those used in addressing persons of inferior rank.

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[3] Prince Shōtoku's Seventeen-Article Constitution,[ct] Article 2.

When this type of thinking is predominant, consciousness of the individual as an entity appears less explicit, i.e., always in the wider sphere of a consciousness of personal relationships, although the significance of the individual as an entity is still recognized; the recognition of the equal value of all individuals is lessened, of course, when he is placed in a class, but it means that it represents the tendency to pay more attention to each individual as the subject to which various virtues belong, not as an object like an inanimate thing.

The first person or the second person is often omitted as the subject in a Japanese sentence. Generally, in such a case the subject is implied in the whole sentence structure, but frequently a sentence may completely lack the subject. The subject can be determined according to the context. The Japanese do not want to express explicitly the subject of an action, unless necessary. This indicates that the Japanese do not think it always necessary to mention the individual or an independent performer of actions as an objective being.

The Japanese in general did not develop a clear-cut concept of the human individual *qua* individual as an objective unit like an inanimate thing, but the individual is always found existing in a network of human relationships. This means that the Japanese always wanted to locate the individual in experience, not in the abstract. Largely because of the Japanese emphasis on concrete immediacy in experience, the individual was grasped as a living thing, and not as a bloodless, inanimate thing in the realm of the abstract. The living individual is always located in various kinds of human relationships.

## II. Awareness of the Relation Between the Individual and the Universal

In terms of logical thinking, the forms of expression of the Japanese language are more sensitive and emotive than directed toward logical exactness. This reflects the traditional attitude of the Japanese to lay more emphasis on the aesthetic and artistic aspect of human life.

The relation between the individual and the universal was not thought of with full awareness by the Japanese in the past. The concept of "the individual" in the logical sense was expressed by Buddhist logicians of Japan with the word *"jisō,"*[r] a Japanese equivalent of the Sanskrit word *"sva-lakṣaṇa,"* but it was not used by intellectuals at large.

The word *"kobutsu,"*[s] meaning the individual, was coined after the introduction of Western logic. The Japanese language does not tend to express precisely and accurately the various modes of being, but tends to be satisfied with vague, topological expressions. As for nouns, the Japanese have no clear distinction between singular and plural, nor is there a distinction between

genders, and no articles are used. For verbs, also, there are no distinctions of person and number. In these respects, Japanese resembles Chinese. Genders and articles may not have anything to do with the logical character of a language. The absence of these may make it better for logical thinking. This problem needs further investigation.

The original Japanese language, as clearly revealed in Japanese classical literature, had a rich vocabulary of words denoting aesthetic and emotional states of mind. On the other hand, words denoting intellectual, inferential processes of active thought are notably lacking. In the original Japanese language, in which words were for the most part concrete and intuitive, the construction of abstract nouns was deficient. Hence, it is extremely difficult to express abstract concepts solely in words of the original Japanese. When Buddhism and Confucianism were later introduced into Japan and philosophical thinking developed, the vocabulary which was the means of expressing these philosophical thoughts was entirely Chinese, simply taken over. Although Buddhism was very widely propagated among the people, its scriptures were never translated into the Japanese language. "In our country, there is no attempt to translate [Chinese versions of Buddhist scriptures],"[4] said Kokan Shiren[t] (1287-1346), in his *Genkō shakusho*[u] (A History of Japanese Buddhism), and he cited this fact as a characteristic of Japanese Buddhism. Western philosophical ideas now prevail widely in Japan, but the linguistic means by which they are expressed are, in most cases, words coined by properly connecting two Chinese characters which are, by convention, made to correspond to the traditional Occidental concepts. The words *"gainen"*[v] and *"risei,"*[w] for instance, are the present-day Japanese terms for "concept" (*Begriff*) and "reason" (*Vernunft*), respectively. Sometimes such words are constructions of three or four characters. The pure, original Japanese had difficulty in serving as a means of expressing philosophical concepts.

The greatest obstacle in this respect seems to lie in the fact that the Japanese language does not have any fully established method of composing abstract nouns. The language does not have the infinitive form of the verb, the special character of which is to express an indefinite situation, a relation itself rather than a thing. Although the Japanese do have what is called the "nominal use" corresponding to the infinitive, this is completely identical in form with a verbal form which, in conjunction with temporal verb-endings or an adjective, forms a compound word. For example, the so-called nominal form *warai,*[x] which is completely identical in form with the form of the verb *warau*[y] (to laugh) appearing in *warai-tari*[z] (laughed), *waraite*[aa] (laughed and . . .), *warai-goto*[ab] (laughing matter), etc., signifies the act or fact of laughing. Moreover, this

[4] *Genkō shakusho,* Vol. 30.

verb-form in time has tended to lose its special significance as an expression with a compounding function, and has also come to be used as a noun. For instance, *warai* has the senses both of *warau-koto*[ac] (the individual act or the fact of laughing) and of *warai-to-yū-mono*[ad] (the universal concept of laughter); consequently, the distinction between *"die Lache"* and *"das Lachen"* is not made.[5]

Furthermore, the Japanese have no established method of turning adjectives into corresponding abstract nouns. As may be seen in such examples as *fukasa*[ae] (depth), or *fukami*[af] (deepness), the suffixes *-sa*[ag] and *-mi*[ah] make abstract nouns out of adjectives to some extent. But this manner of transformation or noun-building is available for only a limited range of adjectives.

Things being so, present-day Japanese intellectuals have come to add the Chinese character *"sei"*[ai] to any word to form any abstract noun. This is the Japanese substitute method for the original lack of an ending to form an abstract noun.

In short, the Japanese language, so far, has had a structure rather unfit for expressing logical conceptions. The fact that it is difficult to make derivatives representing abstract nouns means that it has not been habitual for the Japanese to be aware of the relations between the universal and the individual in terms of logical thinking. Consequently, when the Japanese adopted the already highly advanced conceptual knowledge of Buddhism and Confucianism, they made no attempt to express it in the original Japanese language, but used Chinese technical terms without modification. Again, in translating the concepts of Western learning, the Japanese used Chinese characters and did not render these concepts into pure, original Japanese directly.

When we step into the realm of syntax from that of word-construction, the Japanese language manifests its non-logical character all the more clearly. The language lacks the relative pronoun "which," standing for the antecedent, that helps develop the process of thought. We find it inconvenient, therefore, to advance closely knit thinking in a succinct form in Japanese.[6] If we repeat nouns and adjectives unsparingly, then logical exactness can be attained. In scientific works this way of expression has been carefully adopted. However, in literature it is often difficult to determine what modifies what, when several adjectives or adverbs are juxtaposed. Because of these defects, Japanese presented difficulties

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[5] Tetsurō Watsuji,[cu] *Zoku Nihon seishin shi kenkyū*[cv] (Supplement to Research in Japanese Intellectual History) (Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 1935), p. 397.

[6] Dr. Kanae Sakuma,[cw] on the other hand, maintains that the Japanese language contains words performing the function of the relative pronoun, by the suitable manipulation of which the lack of the relative pronoun may be compensated for. *"Kyūchakugo no mondai,"*[cx] (The Problem of Agglutinative Languages), in *Kokugo kokubun*[cy] (Japanese Language and Literature), viii (October, 1938).

for logical expression, which has to be exact, and, as is generally pointed out, its non-logical character naturally handicaps the development of ability in logical thinking among the Japanese people, and has actually brought about grave inconveniences in their practical lives. Indian books of Buddhistic philosophy were originally written with logical accuracy, but Chinese versions of them and Chinese commentaries upon them became remarkably non-logical. Thereafter, the Japanese continued their ambiguous and obscure interpretations of the Chinese texts without change, and, as a result, they did not attempt to analyze them logically. Although special phraseologies have been worked out in legal jargon, etc., for technical considerations, to avoid ambiguity, such a practice is by no means universal.

In the same way, Japanese frequently omits the subject, and this, too, has something to do with the non-logical character of the Japanese people. In such a case, even though the subject is omitted, we usually find it naturally suggested or can easily infer what it is by referring to linguistic context, or by looking at the situation in which the utterance is made. But it cannot be denied that at times, when the situation is not completely clear, the omission of the subject makes the meaning ambiguous and causes misunderstanding. Very often it is not clear whether the subject is an individual or a group of individuals.

In connection with the omission of the subject, we must note that anacoluthon very frequently occurs in Japanese sentences. While it is to be found also in Indo-European languages, examples there are rare;[7] whereas Japanese not only has abundant examples of it, but also even the fact that the subject has changed within a single sentence is not clearly noticed. For example, in literary works of the Heian period (794-1186), instances of anacoluthon are very frequent. And this characteristic of the Japanese way of thinking appears also in the annotations to Chinese Buddhist texts.[8] That the Japanese people can dispense with the subject in their linguistic expression is due to the fact that the

[7] In the sentence "All beings who hear his name blissfully trust in him, and think even once—which all is the directing of their minds toward him with the sincerest effort —and who desire to be born in his country will at once be born, attaining thereby the Unretrogressive State,"[cz] in the *Daimuryōjukyō*[da] (The Great Sūtra of the Pure Land), it is obvious that the object of the "directing of their minds"[db] is living beings,[dc] cf. *Sukhāvatīvyūha-sūtra*, 26: *ye kecit sattvās tasya bhagavato 'mitābhasya nāmadheyam śṛṇvanti śrutvā cāntaśa ekacittotpadam apy adhyāśayena prasādasahagatena cittam utpādayanti te sarve vaivartikatāyām śānty anuttarāyāḥ samyakṣam bodheḥ*, but Shinran took the subject of the phrase "the directing of their minds" for Amitābha Buddha (!); cf. his works, *Jōdo monrui jushō*[dd] (Anthology of Scriptural Passages on the Pure Land), *Ichinen tanen shōmon*[de] (Scriptural Passages on Immediate and Mediate Attainment), and *Kyōgyō shinshō*[df] (The Book on the Teaching, Practice, Faith, and Attainment); see Rev. Murin Kusaka,[dg] ed., *Bantō shinpon kyōgyō shinshō*[dh] (An Authentic Text of the Kyōgyō shinshō) (Kyoto: Chojiya Shoten, 1923), p. 103.

[8] Chikurō Hiroike,[di] *Shina bunten*[dj] (Grammar of Chinese) (Tokyo: privately published, 1905), p. 67.

intuitive understanding of the scene referred to in their discourse is usually attained beforehand by their close bonds and nexus with others. Therefore, the necessity of clearly indicating the subject occurs only in those cases in which some doubt about the intuitive understanding of the subject arises. (In other words, logically correct assertion of the "obvious" sounds harsh to the Japanese people.)

Generally speaking, logical consciousness begins with consciousness of the relation between the individual or the particular and the universal; and the Japanese on the whole have not been fully aware of this relation, or have been poor in understanding a concept apart from particular or individual instances. This exactly corresponds to the tendency, characteristic in the Japanese way of thinking, not to make a sharp contrast between subject and predicate in the expression of judgment.

Keizan Hio[aj] (1789-1859), in his two volume work, *Kunten fukko*[ak] (Restoration of Kunten), criticized the usages of *kunten*[al] (marks used in paraphrasing Chinese into Japanese) prevalent in the Tokugawa[am] period (1615-1867). According to his view, for example, scholars at that time misread the Chinese phrase *"Yen Hui che,"*[an] which means "a man called Yen Hui (i.e., Gankai)," as *"Gankai naru mono,"*[ao] which is an abridged form of *"Gankai ni aru mono"*[ap] (strictly, "the man exemplified in Gankai"). In so doing, he argued, they committed an error in the indication of the meaning. However this may be, such a distinction is generally not recognized by Japanese scholars, and this confusion continues to the present time. Whether or not Hio's theory is right is a question to be entrusted to experts, but in any case one can say that there was no method fully established in Japanese for expressing universals by a universal concept, in contrast to individual cases.

Therefore, the Japanese people are not inclined to present the universal concept as a predicate in a judgment, so as to make its expression concise. They are not usually content until they have presented a set of particular instances or individual cases pertaining to universal propositions.

Dōgen[aq] (1200-1253) has been called one of the greatest philosophers Japan ever had. When an Indian philosopher formulated an idea simply and definitely in a universal proposition, e.g., "The Three Worlds are but one mind,"[9] Dōgen explained the thought by enumerating various particulars. Thus:

The mind is neither one nor two. It is neither in the Three Worlds nor beyond the Three Worlds. It is infallible. It is an enlightenment through contemplation, and

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[9] *"cittamātram idam yad idaṁ traidhātukam"* (The universe is nothing but our presentation), *Daśabhūmika-sūtra,* J. Rahder, ed. (Paris: Paul Geunther, 1926) p. 49; *ci vijñaptimātram evedam* (The universe is nothing but our ideation), *Triṁśikā,* S. Lévi, ed., (Paris: Libraire Ancienne Honore-champion, 1932), 27, p. 42.

it is an enlightenment without contemplation. It is walls and pebbles; it is mountains, rivers, and the earth. The mind is but the skin, flesh, bones, and marrow; the mind is but the communication of enlightenment through the Buddha's smile. There is a mind, and there is no mind. There is a mind with a body; there is a mind without a body. There is a mind before a body; there is a mind after a body. A body is generated from the womb, the egg, moisture, or fermentation. The mind is generated from the womb, the egg, moisture, or fermentation. Blue, yellow, red, and white are nothing but the mind. Long, short, square, and round are nothing but the mind. Life and death are nothing but the mind. Years, months, days, and hours are nothing but the mind. Dreams, illusions, and mirages are nothing but the mind. The bubbles of water and the flames of fire are nothing but the mind. The flowers of the spring and the moon of the autumn are nothing but the mind. Confusions and dangers are nothing but the mind.[10]

A similar way of thinking may be noticed in Japanese Confucianists. Sorai Ogyū[ar] (1666-1728), for example, did not like the sort of abstract speculation found in the Sung[as] school; he made more of particular or individual "things" (*wu*[at]) than of universal "principles" (*li*[au]):

The great sage kings of the past taught by means of "things" and not by means of "principles." Those who teach by means of "things" always have work to which they devote themselves; those who teach by means of "principles" merely expatiate with words. In "things," all "principles" are brought together; hence, all who have long devoted themselves to work come to have a genuine intuitive understanding of them. Why should they appeal to words?[11]

Words are relevant to universals. Therefore, learning consists, to Ogyū, in knowing as many particular or individual things as possible: "Learning consists in widening one's information, absorbing extensively anything and everything one comes upon." This reflects his attitude that scholarship should be based upon empirical facts. But, since Ogyū ignored the science of Nature, learning, which is to amass a knowledge of particular or individual facts, culminates, for him, in the study of history—a preference which is closely related to the empiricistic character of his "learning": "Since learning is to have wide information and to have experience with realities, it culminates in history."[12] Here individual cases were emphasized.

Even the scholars of the Japanese classics, who tried to repudiate Buddhism and Confucianism, exhibited the same way of thinking. Atsutane Hirata[av] (1776-1843), for example, rejected the concept of abstract, universal "prin-

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[10] *Shōbōgenzō*[dk] (The Essence of Buddhism), chap. "Sangai yuishin"[dl] (The Universe is Nothing but Our Presentation).

[11] *Tōmonsho*[dm] (Questions and Answers), Book I, in *Nihon rinri ihen*[dn] (Collected Japanese Ethical Texts), Tetsujirō Inouye[do] and Yoshi maru Kanie,[dp] eds. (Tokyo: Ikuseikai, 1902), Vol. VI, p. 157.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 156.

ciples," and declared that we only had to know "actual things," i.e., concrete particulars or individual cases.

> In fact, that which is called the "true way" is given in actual things, whereas conventional scholars are erroneously inclined to think that the "way" cannot be found out except by reading doctrinal books. For, if we can appreciate actual things, doctrines are dispensed with; and it is only when actual things, in which the "way" is given, are lacking that doctrines arise. Therefore, doctrines are far less valuable than actual things [i.e., individual cases]. Lao Tzu[aw] fully recognized this fact when he said, "When the Way decays, the doctrines of humanity and justice arise."[13]

As is shown by the historical development of Japanese thought—although so far only a few representative thinkers have been considered—the ability to think in terms of abstract universals has not fully developed among the Japanese. They have been rather poor in ordering various phenomena on the basis of universal patterns.

Japanese expressions are for the most part abundant in aesthetic and emotional feelings. A special kind of logic may be found here, but it is different from that generally called "logic." Japanese, rather, emphasized the aesthetic way of expression and the artistic way of life, and, with regard to scientific thinking, they tended to base their studies upon individual facts.

(There might nowadays be a question as to how to reconcile this alleged Japanese preference for the particular with the commonly observed modern preference of Japanese scholarship for theoretical learning rather than the pragmatic approach. Among present-day Japanese intellectuals there is a conspicuous tendency toward German abstract philosophy. Why the change? We would answer: This is not a real change. Such a tendency among intellectuals is due not so much to fondness for theoretical thinking as for things abstruse and productive of imaginative impressions upon them. Their alleged fondness for theoretical thinking is not always based upon the processes of induction and deduction in the logical sense.)

## III. Weakness in Logical Thinking in the Past

The non-logical character of the Japanese people naturally tended to prevent them from thinking with logical coherence or consistency.

Even in ancient times, Kakinomoto-no-Hitomaro[ax] composed a famous poem, in which he said, "In our land covered with reed and rice-ears, they

[13] *Nyūgaku mondō*[dq] (Elements of Study) in *Hirata Atsutane zenshū*[dr] (Collected Works of Hirata Atsutane), Moritane Hirata[ds] and Ioe Miki,[dt] eds. (Tokyo: Hirata Atsutane Zenshū Kiseikai, 1918), Vol. 15, p. 1. (In discussion, Professor Mei expressed the idea that Atsutane's citation is a twisted interpretation).

have not argued since the time of the gods." Out of such a point of view, the technique of constructing universal laws reducing particulars to order is not likely to develop. Norinaga Motoori[ay] (1730-1801), a scholar who claimed to have made clear the spirit of ancient Japan, said, "In ancient times, we had no talk at all even about the Way. The classic [of Kakinomoto] declares that in our land covered with reed and rice-ears, they have not argued since the time of the gods. Not to argue means not to expatiate or have much talk, as is the custom in foreign countries.[14]

"In ancient times in our land, even the 'Way' was not talked about at all, and we had only ways directly leading to things themselves, while in foreign countries it is the custom to entertain and to talk about many different doctrines, about principles of things, this 'Way' or that 'Way.' The Emperors' land in ancient times had no such theories or doctrines whatever, but we enjoyed peace and order then, and the descendants of the Sun Goddess have consecutively succeeded to the throne."[15] "To things themselves" has been the motto of many Japanese scholars.

The way of thinking on the part of the Japanese in general could not easily be changed by the introduction and dissemination of Buddhism.

It is commonly said that Japanese Buddhism reached its maturity in the Kamakura[az] period (1186-1392). "Kamakura Buddhism," however, did not develop systematic philosophical thinking on a large scale. Such prominent figures as Hōnen,[ba] Shinran,[bb] and Nichiren[bc] concentrated their efforts chiefly upon demonstrating the orthodoxy or validity of their own interpretations of Buddhist sacred texts. To cite an extreme instance, Chishin[bd] (Sage Ippen[be]) (1239-1289) declared on his deathbed that the people of this world should be content with the one phrase, "Pay homage to Amitābha Buddha" (*Namu Amida Butsu*[bf]), and ordered his books destroyed by fire.

On the other hand, some contemporary philosophers in Japan have tried to see in Dōgen, who continued to write philosophical works throughout his lifetime, the pioneer of Japanese philosophy. Though it is doubtless true that Dōgen was a distinguished thinker, as well as a high-minded spiritual leader, he was not the sort of thinker who developed a logically coherent system of thought. In spite of the fact that he cherished deep philosophical ideas which were gem-like in character, he was not inclined to elaborate the ethical thoughts he apprehended in a purely logical system. Probably he thought that a philosophical system set forth in a systematic way was useless and unnecessary.

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14 *Naobi no mitama*[du] (The Honest Spirit), in *Motoori Norinaga zenshū*[dv] (Collected Works of Motoori Norinaga), Seizō Motoori,[dw] ed. (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1926), Vol. I, p. 53.

15 *Ibid.*

Dōgen opined as follows, referring to the problem of life and death: "Life and death matter little, because the Buddha exists therein. And one is not perplexed by life and death, because the Buddha does not exist therein."[16] As far as the expression is concerned, we have here two formally contradictory propositions. But the gist of what he meant by the two sentences was quite the same.

The teacher Musō[bg] (Soseki[bh]) (1275-1351) declared, very clearly, that he did not aim at fixed logical coherency:

> Clear-sighted masters of the Zen sect do not have a fixed doctrine as something to be cherished for all time. They present any doctrine as the occasion demands, and preach as their tongues happen to dictate. They do not have a fixed source to rely upon. If one asks them what Zen is, they sometimes answer in terms of the sayings of Confucius,[bi] Mencius,[bj] Lao Tzu, Chuang Tzu,[bk] and non-Zen Buddhist teachers, and sometimes in terms of popular proverbs, and sometimes they explain what Zen[bl] teaches, point out a particular situation, or simply swing their mace in front of them or shout in a loud voice. Or they simply raise their fingers or fists. All these are means used by the masters, and called "the vivacious ways of the Zen sect."[17]

In this state, no universal proposition which is logically coherent is mentioned, but esteem of the individual situation in each case is emphasized.

Ever since the Tokugawa period (1615-1867), the schools of Chu Hsi[bm] and Wang Yang-ming[bn] have been energetically studied in Japan, but it is a question how far Japanese scholars were virtually sympathetic with them. It is likely that Japanese Confucianists did not like metaphysical speculation.

Absence of theoretical and systematic thinking is equally characteristic of former scholars of Japanese classics. Motoori, for example, did not want to express any concrete conception of method in his learning: "In final conclusion, to make strenuous efforts consecutively for long years is most essential to those who are engaged in learning, and it does not matter how they learn."[18] Motoori exhorted his disciples just to be diligent in their study, and did not develop any constructive thinking as to the learning itself.[19]

Of course, one cannot deny the possibility that one actually can express oneself as clearly in Japanese as in any other language. It is said that there is one school of thought which stresses the cultural conditioning of thought-patterns more than the limitation of the language concerned. At least, the Japanese *esprit*

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[16] *Shōji*[dx] (Life and Death) in *Shōbōgenzō,* in *Taisho shinshū daizākyā*[dy]) Buddhist Sacred Texts edited in Taishō period) (Tokyo: The Taishō Issai-kyō Kankō Kwai, 1931), Vol. 82, p. 305.

[17] *Mûchū mondō shu*[dz] (Questions and Answers in Dreams).

[18] *Uiyamabumi*[ea] (Introduction for Beginners), in *Motoori Norinaga zenshū,* S. Motoori, ed., Vol. IV, p. 601.

[19] *Ibid.*

should not be overlooked. However, the value of ways of Japanese expression lies more in aesthetic and intuitive aspects than in exactly logical ones.

Moreover, we do not want to advocate any sort of linguistic determinism. We admit the working influences of other factors. We just point out, with regard to logical aspects, some features of the manner of expressing thoughts by the Japanese in earlier days, for these features are quite relevant to those in contemporary times with regard to the concepts of the universal and the individual. On the other hand, Japanese expressions focus the thought and expression of the person on immediate, concrete details of life. This tendency is quite unique to the Japanese. That is why the Japanese way of thinking habitually avoids summations of separate facts into broad statements about whole categories of things, although such abstraction is necessary for logical and scientific thinking.

## V. The Development of Logic in Japan beyond Indian and Chinese Buddhist Logic

We need not despair completely, however, of the capacity of the Japanese people for logical thinking. The way of thinking of a people is simply a tendency and is capable of being reformed. There is evidence for this in the fact that modes of expression in the Japanese language have gradually been growing more and more strict and precise in recent years. Although it is true that Japanese heretofore has not tended to be fit for exact thinking, it will surely improve in this respect.

The fact that Buddhist logic did not fully develop in the past can be ascribed to the non-logical character of its immediate source, the Chinese *inmyō*[bo] (Buddhist logic). In spite of this limitation, there were Japanese scholars who tried at several points to initiate a development beyond Chinese logic in Japan. We mention an interesting, if rather trivial, example. In the Chinese logic, the word *"shūhō"*[bp] (*tsung-fa, pakṣa-dharma*) represents the predicate of an assertive proposition (*tsung*, major term, *sādhya*) as well as the predicate of a causal proposition (*yin*,[bq] middle term, *sādhana*). Chinese technical terminology did not distinguish between the two. Even if a distinction was made at first between the two uses through pronunciation, this distinction could not be preserved for a long time in a country using the Chinese language, in which pronunciation rather frequently changed. The Japanese, distinguishing the two terms in pronunciation, read in voiceless sound *shūhō*, in one case, where it means the predicate (P) of an assertive proposition, and in voiced sound (*shūbō*[br]), in the other case, where it means the predicate (M) of a

causal proposition.[20] Moreover, before the Meiji[bs] era (1867-1911), there were several scholars who had mastered Indian formal logic and had actually applied it to the study of Buddhist ideas. As examples we can mention the name of Rinjō[bt] (1751-1810) and Kaijō[bu] (d. 1805), of the Buzan school of the New Shingon sect. Surely, logic can be disseminated and developed among the Japanese people, if they endeavor seriously to study it.

There were some Japanese in the past who were willing to use terms of Buddhist logic, even with changed meanings. For example, it has been asserted that the word *"rippa"*[bv] (magnificent, splendid) is a phonetic equivalent to *"ryūha"*[bw] (assertion and refutation in a debate) and that *"mutai"*[bx] (unreasonable) also is due to Buddhist logic.[21] Although it is doubtful whether or not this assertion or conjecture is right, it is an established fact that there were some men of letters who took it that way. This means that some ideas related to logic were not alien to the common people, although they may not have been fully aware of their exact meanings.

It is an object of interest how far Japanese logicians developed their thought beyond the Chinese scholarship of Buddhist logic, which originated in India. Śaṁkarasvāmin (at the end of the sixth century) asserted that perception (*pratyaskṣa*) is caused by the individual object.[22] The traditional definition of perception in Indian and Chinese Buddhist logic was interpreted by Zenju,[by] a Japanese logician (723-797), as implying individuality.[23] An ancient Japanese logician said, "That which cannot be described with any word is called the thing-in-itself (*jisō*,[bz] *sva-lakṣaṇa*), i.e., that which should be predicated (*uhō*,[ca] *dharmin*). That which should be described with a word is called 'characteristic' or 'quality' (*hō*,[cb] *dharma*)."[24]

Hōtan[cc] (1654-1738), a modern Buddhist logician, went still further. He

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[20] Hakuju Ui,[cb] *Bukkyō ronrigaku*[cc] (Buddhist Logic) (Tokyo: Daito-shuppansha, 1944), p. 168.

[21] Y. Yamada,[cd] *Geirin*[ce] (Arts), Vol. 3 (1952), Nos. 1, 2. As for *"mutai"*[cf] (non-entity), see Chikū,[cg] *Inmyō inu sanshi*[ch] (Introduction to Buddhist Logic) (1854), p. 19b. But this term seems not to have been so important in original Indian Buddhist logic.

[22] *pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham yaj jñānam arthe rūpādau nāmajātyādikalpanārahitam tad akṣam akṣam prati vartata iti pratyakṣam*
*kalpanājñānam arthāntare pratyakṣābhāsam*
*yaj jñānam ghaṭaḥ paṭa iti vā vikalpayataḥ samutpadyate tad arthasvalakṣaṇaviṣayatvāt pratyakṣābhāsam.*

*The Nyāya-praveśa*, Anandshankar B. Dhruva, ed. (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1930), p. 7. (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. XXXVIII).

[23] *Gengen betten shoryō shikyō*[ci] (Objects of Perception), in *Inmyō nisshō riron shomyōtōshō*[cj] (Gloss on the Commentary on the Introduction to [Buddhist] Logic) (Traditional edition, Vol. 6b, p. 454b). See p. 461b: "It is not called 'perception' because it partakes in universals."[ck]

[24] See also: "With regard to the fact that it cannot be described, it is called 'thing in itself'; if it can be described, then it is called 'universal,'"[cl] in *Myōhon shō*[cm] (Clarification of Rules), Bussho Kankōkai,[cn] ed., in *Dai-Nippon bukkyō zensho*[co] (Tokyo: Bussho Kankōkai, 1911), Vol. 4, p. 47.

said, "The thing-in-itself is apprehended by direct perception. Any characteristic which can be found in common throughout various things is an object of inference.[25] "The reality of things is called the thing-in-itself. It is an individual and cannot be in common with others. Genus is found throughout various things, just like a thread piercing flowers. This characteristic can be set up as an object of the mind in an ordinary situation (not in meditation). Genus in Buddhist logic is an object of inference."[26]

What characterized his concept of the individual was that he thought that the thing-in-itself is something substantial. He said, "Fire burns the body. Therefore, this fire can be regarded as an individual object. Only the fire that can burn the body is named the thing-in-itself."[27] This definition of the thing-in-itself is conspicuously empiricistic, and makes quite a contrast to the idealistic concept of the thing-in-itself held by Indian Buddhist logicians, such as Dharmakīrti, etc., who belonged to the tradition of Buddhist idealism (Vijñāna vāda).

Dialectical thinking was not clear in Eastern countries before the introduction of Western civilization. The Tendai[cd] and Sanron[ce] philosophies of ancient China and Japan had conspicuously dialectical thinking, but it did not develop in the line of dialectics. In modern Japan there have been some individual thinkers who held some dialectical ideas. Ishida Baigan[cf] set forth the thought that negative and positive are two things and yet they cannot be separated. But, even if they seem to be one, they are the two aspects of motion and quiescence.[28]

Miura Baien[cg] expressed a theory of dialectics of his own. "The way to understand Nature [or the universe] is dialectics (*jōri*[ch]). The secret (*ketsu*[ci]) of dialectics is to see synthesis (*gōitsu*[cj]) in antithesis (*han*[ck]). It is to give up one-sided preoccupation and to correct marks (*chōhyō*[cl])—*yin*[cm] and *yang*[cn] are antithetic to each other and constitute opposition. As they are antithetic to each other, they can be brought to synthesis."[29] Here we find the thought of dialectics in its incipient stage.

## VI. Conclusion

We have discussed the reflection on or the awareness of the concept of the individual by the Japanese in terms of the daily use by the common people and

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[25] *Inmyō zuigen ki*[ep] (Sources of Buddhist Logic), Vol. 8, published in 1711, p. 16a.

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 9b-10a.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 13a.

[28] *Seiri mondō*[eq] (Questions and Answers on Nature), translated into English by Paulo Beanio-Brocchieri (Rome: Instituto peril Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1961), pp. 19-20.

[29] Hiroto Saigusa,[er] *Miura Baien no tetsugaku*[es] (The Philosophy of Miura Baien) (Tokyo: Daiichi Shobō, 1941), p. 132; also his *Nihon no yuibutsu ronsha*[et] (Japanese Materialists) (Tokyo: Eihōsha, 1928), p. 93.

language in terms of the logical thinking by thinkers. Throughout various phenomena we may safely notice the following four features:

(1) Conflation, rather than confrontation, of different individuals was esteemed, at least in the realm of subjective reflection, reflecting the social concept in which each individual is situated.

(2) When the Japanese have discussed the significance of the individual in terms of linguistic use, the significance of the individual as against the universal has tended to be minimized, but now it is going to be emphasized as something contrasted with the universal when necessary.

(3) When any proposition was made in terms of logical and philosophical thinking, individual cases relevant to the proposition were mentioned emphatically in detail.

(4) Japanese thinkers have tended to lay more emphasis upon, and have paid more attention to, empirical facts, which should be mentioned individually. This reflects the traditional Japanese empiricistic attitude.

The focus of the Japanese on the facts of life did not allow for the abstraction from experience of a concept of the individual "as such," in isolation.

The above discussions lead us to an important corollary. Heretofore, it has often been said in the West as a cliché that Westerners tend to be individualistic and diremptive, whereas Easterners tend to be monistic or all-embracing. But it has been made clear that this is wrong. Insofar as Japanese thought is concerned, we can say with certainty that the Japanese have tended to be individualistic, due to the attitude of focusing on immediate experience directly.

Concerning logical thinking, we can say that, although the mass of Japanese people have been limited to a language that was rather deficient as a tool of logical exactness, philosophic thinking did develop among Japan's educated classes through the use of Chinese.

Logic can be disseminated and developed among the Japanese people, if they endeavor seriously in a right way. Logical improvement will not be impossible in the future, although it is fraught with many difficulties. This will entail a greatly increased awareness of the relation between the universal and the individual on the part of the Japanese.

It is important for the Japanese people as a nation to develop the habits and language tools of logically exact thinking. We cannot foresee the developments in the future, but industrialization, which is going on very rapidly in contemporary Japan, does not seem to change the above-mentioned features very much or easily, but to develop along the lines which have been long established and practiced among the people. It is natural that the Japanese do not want to lose their traditional aesthetic and empirical attitude.

a 中村元
b 山々
c 神々
d ども
e 達，たち
f 舟人ども
g 人達
h 友達
i 方
j 貴方がた
k 先生がた
l 諸々の
m 若い衆
n 若い
o 衆
p 聖徳
q 慈雲尊者
r 自相
s 個物
t 虎關師錬
u 元亨釋書
v 概念
w 理性
x 笑い
y 笑う
z 笑いたり
aa 笑いて
ab 笑い事
ac 笑うこと
ad 笑いと言えうもの
ae 深さ
af 深み
ag さ
ah み
ai 性
aj 白尾荆山
ak 訓点復古
al 訓点
am 德川
an 顏回者
ao 顏回なる者
ap 顏回ルある者
aq 道元
ar 荻生
as 衆
at 物
au 理
av 平田
aw 老子
ax 柿本人麿
ay 本居
az 鎌倉

ba 法然
bb 親鸞
bc 日蓮
bd 源信
be 一遍上人
bf 阿彌陀佛
bg 夢窓
bh 疎石
bi 孔子
bj 孟子
bk 莊子
bl 禪
bm 朱子
bn 王陽明
bo 因明
bp 宗法
bq 因
br 宗法
bs 明治
bt 林常
bu 戒定
bv 立派
bw 立破
bx 無體
by 禪師

bz 自相
ca 有法
cb 法
cc 鳳潭
cd 天台
ce 三論
cf 石田梅巖
cg 梅園
ch 條理
ci 訣
cj 合一
ck 反
cl 徵表
cm 陰
cn 陽
co 身ども
cp どし
cq 公達
cr 室町
cs 堀一郎
ct 聖德太子十七條憲法
cu 和辻哲郎
cv 續日本精神研究
cw 佐久間鼎
cx 吸着語の問題

cy 國語國文

cz 諸有衆生,聞其名號,信心歡喜,乃至一念,至心迴向,願生彼國,即得往生,住不退轉

da 大無量壽經

db 至心迴向

dc 諸有衆生

dd 淨土文類聚鈔

de 一念多念證文

df 教行信證

dg 日下無倫

dh 坂東眞本教行信證

di 廣池千九郎

dj 支那文典

dk 正法眼藏

dl 三界唯心

dm 答問書 下

dn 日本倫理彙編

do 井上哲次郎

dp 蟹江義丸

dq 入學問答

dr 平田篤胤全集

ds 平田盛胤

dt 三木五百枝

du 道昆靈

dv 本居宣長全集

dw 本居精造

dx 生死

dy 大正新修大藏經

dz 夢中問答錄

ea うひまなぶみ

eb 宇井伯壽

ec 佛教論理學

ed 山田孝雄

ee 藝林

ef 無體

eg 癡空

eh 因明大三支

ei 現々別轉所量之境

ej 因明入正理論明燈抄

ek 了此境與餘境分,有同相故,不明現量

el 望不加言名有法自相,若加言已,則名為法。

em 明本抄

en 佛書刊行會

eo 大日本佛教全書

ep 因明瑞源記

eq 性理問答

er 三枝博音

es 三浦梅園の哲學

et 日本之唯物論者

HAROLD E. McCARTHY

# *Knowledge, Skepticism, and the Individual*

## I

VERY BROADLY SPEAKING, it can be said that philosophers in the West have been concerned with a range of diverse problems bearing upon (1) the ultimate nature of the universe, multiverse, or totality of reality, in which man finds himself, whether he likes it or not, in some manner caught up and with respect to which he may regard himself a part, but perhaps a part apart from other parts; (2) the ultimate nature of man, that apparently paradoxical creature which, from one point of view, exists in the sense in which a tree or a stone exists, and which, from another point of view, exists, unlike any tree or stone, or so we would suppose, in such a way as to be capable of becoming aware of itself as an existing thing; and (3) the nature of the good life and the good society for man, man being the kind of creature that he is and caught up in the kind of universe, multiverse, or totality of reality in which he is apparently caught up. Although this tripartite division is arbitrary and, therefore, not imposed by the nature of logic or by the nature of things, most of the basic philosophical questions can be brought under one or another of these three generic problems.

Epistemology, as a division of the field of philosophy, is concerned with man as a knowing or would-be knowing creature. If men did not wish to know, if men did not make cognitive claims of one kind or another, or if men were not aware of cognitive wishes or cognitive claims, then for philosophers there would be no epistemological problems. Not only do men exist, but men are capable of making cognitive claims, or so it would appear; and thus the epistemologist finds himself with a subject-matter. The epistemologist raises, with respect to this whole matter of actual or possible cognition, at least three fundamental questions: (1) Is human knowledge possible, or is what we call knowledge indistinguishable, in principle, from what we would otherwise call opinion, belief, or conviction? (2) If human knowledge is possible, what are its sources and by what marks, standards, criteria, or methods do we distinguish between what we call knowledge and what we do not or should not call knowledge? (3) If human knowledge is possible, what are its limits, if

any—that is, can we say that whatever is, whatever exists, whatever is real, is knowable, at least in principle, whether it is actually known or not; or must we say, or have we any significant justification for saying, that there are things, or entities, or realities which *are* but which must be spoken of as unknowable, at least from the point of view of man and whatever faculties of knowing he may have, either by nature or by the grace of God?

At the core of epistemology there is a very basic problem, a problem which may be felt by some though probably not by all thinkers—and that problem is this: how is it possible, if it is, for an individual self to reach out beyond the individuality of itself and to relate itself cognitively to something which is not itself at all, but an *other?* There are both a paradox and a mystery here, and not a mystery to be resolved by way of a single analogy. It is simply not enough to say that the problem of the self knowing the non-self is no more mysterious than the problem as to how it is possible for a man, who is not an apple, to eat an apple. Even if we were to grant that the process of eating goes on and that when one eats one does not necessarily eat oneself, the process of eating and the process of knowing have, at first glance, so much in common that we can start with both processes as indubitably going on and on all fours with one another. No doubt, an individual self may have, as modifications of itself, beliefs, opinions, persuasions, convictions, some of which may be held quite lightly, some of which may be held quite tenaciously. But having beliefs is not the same as knowing. I may believe that the moon is made of green cheese; and I may be convinced inside of myself that this is so and must be. But the cognitive question is whether my belief, however tenaciously held, reflects, in some sense, the actual constitution of what I call the moon, the moon being something other than my individual self. Seldom do we say, at least on the level of non-psychotic common sense, "I am the moon." On the other hand, we may say, or want to say, or feel like saying, *"La lune est grande ce soir,"* or something else equally pointless, idiotic, or romantic. Knowledge, it would appear, is both knowledge by and knowledge of—knowledge, that is, by or on the part of a human self or individual, and knowledge of, at least in part, something that in some manner lies beyond the so-called knowing self. The paradox, in short, is that of one part of the totality of reality being itself and yet knowing other parts.

The basic question as to whether knowledge by a finite human individual is possible or whether an individual, by his very nature, is limited to beliefs and opinions with respect to which he cannot distinguish between truth and falsity has been answered differently by different philosophers in the West. Those philosophers whom I would call epistemological skeptics do not deny the possibility, indeed the actuality (past or present), of beliefs. On the other

hand, and *qua* skeptics, they are concerned with denying the possibility of knowledge by asserting that nothing can be known, objectively and with certainty, by the human individual, or, if anything can be known, the individual cannot properly distinguish between what he knows and what he does not know. Extreme, absolute, or utter skepticism, if logically possible at all, has been relatively rare in the history of Western thought. We are told that Protagoras held that "man is the measure of all things, of those that are that they are, of those that are not that they are not."[1] And, if by "man" Protagoras meant each and every individual man, then it would appear that what Protagoras was pronouncing was an epistemological doctrine of *right you are if you think you are, there is no disputing about beliefs, and what you believe to be true is true for you,* a doctrine that would automatically reduce knowledge to its opposite: diverse and shifting opinion, belief, conviction, or persuasion. In short, beliefs are many, and men may agree or disagree with respect to their beliefs. For the complete skeptic, this is the end of the story.

However, perhaps not even Protagoras can be significantly spoken of as a complete or unconditioned skeptic. Most skeptics in the West have been limited or conditioned skeptics rather than absolute or total skeptics. And here, in contrast to complete skepticism, I would like to distinguish three kinds or modes of limited skepticism: philosophical skepticism, theological skepticism, and scientific skepticism.

As for philosophical skepticism, the philosophical skeptic would hold that nothing can be known by way of any natural human faculty (be it reason, sense-perception, or intuition) concerning the ultimate nature of the universe, the ultimate nature of man, and the ultimate nature of the good life for man. In short, if philosophy is concerned with understanding things as they are in themselves, then the philosophical skeptic would hold that nothing, really, can be understood, nothing can be known, concerning things as they are in themselves. The philosophical skeptic is not without his allegedly justifying reasons, be his reasons good or bad, adequate or inadequate, relative to the support of his contention; and the reasons have sometimes been divided into the epistemological and the historical.

As for the epistemological reasons, they are, in principle, simple enough. Those, it is argued, who claim to have philosophical knowledge claim to have such knowledge by way of sense-perception, reason, and/or intuition. But sense-perception is shot through and through with relativity (what is sweet to one individual may be sour to another individual, etc.) and hence subjectivity, and such that what we call sense-perceptions are subjective sensations, modi-

[1] Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism,* Vol. I, 216, quoted by Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy,* Vol. I, Part I (New York: Image Books, 1962), p. 108.

fications of the self; and, since no two selves are identical, we are left with the multiple sensations of multiple selves, which sensations, *qua* sensations, give us no assured knowledge of anything that lies objectively beyond them. In short, even if it is argued that our senations must have causes which lie beyond them, we are never in a position to say that our sensations somehow correspond (or do not correspond, for that matter) to objective realities beyond them, since, on the level of sense-perception, we are never able to compare our sensations with non-sensed realities, if any. Sensations are human sensations, sensations within the context of human beings, and their particular, individual, and finite sensory equipment. But, if sense-perception is shot through and through with subjectivity, so also are reason and intuition. It is always human, organically conditioned reason that reasons, and always finite subjects conditioned by human reason and human sense-experience that have and interpret intuitions. An intuition is always, for human beings, a human intuition; and, although the individual may be convinced that by way of intuition he transcends the subjectivity of the finite self or individual, he is, at best, transcending only the subjectivity of reason and sense-experience. Indeed, one man's intuition may be another man's psychosis, just as one man's self-evident truth may be another man's absurdity. Subjectively conditioned and operating faculties, even if called cognitive, are not necessarily reliable sources of objective and certain knowledge.

As for the historical argument for philosophical skepticism, this is simple enough also. Claims to philosophical knowledge in the form of a system of philosophical, or metaphysical, interpretation have been many, diverse, and mutually incompatible. By their fruits ye shall know them. On the basis of the historical, philosophical fruits we cannot speak of philosophical knowledge, not because we have no claims to such knowledge, but because we have too many: many men, many manners, many philosophies—materialistic, idealistic, dualistic, monistic, theistic, mystical, diremptive, non-diremptive—different ways of talking, but not different ways of saying the same thing. Philosophers may communicate, perhaps, what they believe; but apparently no philosopher has been able to show that what he believes is true any more than any philosopher has been able to show that what some other philosopher believes is false. Philosophers may keep up with their patter in defense of endless chatter, but chatter, however endless, is not knowledge of man, his world, and the good life.

The position of philosophical skepticism is not, in the West, an artificial position. In general, though much qualification is necessary here, it would appear to be the position of Kant, who, for good or for bad, seems to assert, for instance, that there "exists" an objective world in itself, or a world of things

in themselves, or something, but who then appears to assert that the nature of that world cannot be known by way of human reason, human sense-perception, or anything to be called a non-sensory, non-rational faculty of intuition possessed by man. What is knowable for Kant is knowable within the context of human reason and human sense-experience; what lies outside and beyond this context is not nothing but is beyond the possibility of human knowledge, individual or collective. Interestingly enough, the position that Kant appears to take with respect to the "objective world" is at least akin to the position taken by Thomas with respect to God: namely, its existence, in some sense, must be asserted or postulated, but nothing can be known about the essence or nature of this reality by way of the natural faculties—at least, Thomas would add, in this life. Readers of the *Summa Theologica* may feel that Thomas does not really stick to his guns with respect to the unknowability of God's essence, but perhaps Kant does not, either, with respect to his noumenal world. For Kant seems to argue that, if the phenomenal world is temporal, the noumenal world must be non-temporal, and so forth.[2] But can we know nothing about X and yet know what X is not?

As for theological skepticism, the theological skeptic by definition holds that, quite apart from the possibility or impossibility of either philosophical or scientific knowledge, nothing can be known theologically, that is—again by definition—on the grounds, alone, of divine revelation. The medieval philosopher in the West was pretty generally of the opinion that the knowing individual had at his disposal, thanks, perhaps, to the fact that he is created, maintained, and loved by God, two sources of knowledge: a natural source (reason and sense-experience) and a supernatural source (revelation as embodied in scripture and as interpreted, officially or by tradition, by the Church of Rome). Post-medieval, non-Catholic philosophers tended to be of divided opinion with respect to revelation as a source of valid and objective knowledge. David Hume was probably a theological skeptic, committing to the flames all claims to knowledge based upon divine revelation, in short, all divinity volumes, for they contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.[3] The theological skeptic is not without his reasons, one of which may well be this:

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[2] Kant is not always completely clear or completely consistent, and this statement can most certainly be challenged. What I have in mind is such statements as the following: "What we have meant to say is that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things which we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them as being, nor their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us, and that if the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, be removed, the whole constitution and all the relations of objects in space and time, nay, space and time themselves, would vanish." Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* Norman Kemp Smith, trans. (abridged ed.; London: Macmillan and Co., 1934), p. 54.

[3] David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (La Salle: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1949), p. 184.

that revelation, *qua* noetic, presupposes a knowing revealer, the existence of which cannot, significantly, be established by revelation (the revealer revealing his own existence and nature) or by way of anything other than revelation. Interestingly enough, Thomas, who is as sharp as a whip about most things anyway, had the wit to recognize that it is useless, if one is concerned with justifying revelation as a source of knowledge, to claim that the existence of God is known by revelation. Thus, the existence of God is, for Thomas, not an article of faith, but a preamble to the articles of faith, to be demonstrated on the basis of natural as opposed to revealed knowledge. This was both sensible and courageous, particularly when Thomas' natural arguments for the existence of God are (as Ockham sees so clearly) as open to criticism as they are. Ockham was a believer, but by and large he could not accept Thomas' arguments for the existence of God as establishing what they claimed to establish. But, quite apart from the problem of the revealer revealing his own revealing, it is quite clear to the theological skeptic that claims to revelation, from the point of view of content, are as diverse as the traditions in which the claims are made; and, even if one set of revelations could be recognized as somehow unique, the mode of revelation (as, say, embodied in scriptures) is such that it is open, as Thomas well knew, to diverse interpretations. So that, even if, somehow, one knows that what is revealed is truly revealed, one does not know what has been revealed until one has hit upon the true interpretation. We are left, then, with multitudinous theological beliefs and convictions (personal, individual, or collective) but not knowledge, not the truth that ought to be "common to all."

As for scientific skepticism, this is the position that what is called scientific knowledge, *qua* mediated by experimental or controlled observation, logico-mathematical analysis, and empirical verification, is not fit to be called knowledge at all in the sense of bearing the marks of objective and certain truth. Scientific skepticism is sometimes combined with either theological or philosophico-metaphysical fideism. The combination of scientific skepticism and theological fideism is beautifully exemplified in Osiander's non-commissioned preface ("To the Reader Concerning the Hypotheses of this Work") to Copernicus' *De Revolutionibus Orbium Caelestium.* Osiander's argument is simple enough. Nothing can be known by any finite creature—known absolutely, known with certainty—unless it has been revealed by God. But God has not revealed the true system of the world, astronomically speaking, and no astronomer can give us such truth. Thus the duty of the astronomer is

> to compose the history of the celestial motions through careful and skillful observation. Then turning to the causes of these motions or hypotheses about them, he must conceive and devise, since he cannot in any way attain to the true causes, such

hypotheses as, being assumed, enable the motions to be calculated correctly from the principles of geometry, for the future as well as for the past. . . . But these hypotheses need not be true nor even probable; if they provide a calculus consistent with the observations, that alone is sufficient. . . . And if any causes are devised by the imagination, as indeed very many are, they are not put forward to convince anyone that they are true, but merely to provide a correct basis for calculation. Now when from time to time there are offered for one and the same motion different hypotheses . . . , the astronomer will accept above all others the one which is the easiest to grasp. The philosopher will perhaps rather seek the semblance of the truth. But neither of them will understand or state anything certain, unless it has been divinely revealed to him.[4]

Osiander was speaking in the immediate context of astronomy; but, if generalized, his claim would be that what we call science, empirical science, does not give us knowledge in the sense of objective truth with respect to the inherent structure of things, but at best only a set of convenient and conventional human, conceptual instruments constructed by the imagination and functioning as instruments of systematic prediction with respect to the data of observation. Of two sets of conceptual instruments, both of which "work," the simpler is to be preferred, not because Nature loves simplicity, but because scientists do. Science, instrumentally interpreted, provides us with human tools to be used by human individuals for getting around in the flux of the data of observation. Science, in this sense, is not a substitute for metaphysics; and, whether or not metaphysics gives us truth, science, for the scientific skeptic, does not.

But, if scientific skepticism may be combined, as with Osiander, with theological fideism, it may also be combined with philosophical or metaphysical fideism. Bergson was of the opinion that what is called scientific knowledge, however useful, was at best only relative knowledge in the sense that the conceptual nets constructed by the scientist are, at best, useful tools for systematization and prediction, but, at the same time, are nets which, if they are supposed to catch absolute reality, are receipts for deceit.[5] Beyond the empirical-analytical methods of science there is, for Bergson, the method of intuition. Intuition seizes upon reality, but—it would appear—in such a way that the intuiter can say nothing at all; metaphysics, Bergson tells us, is the science (*scientia?*) which claims to dispense with symbols.[6] And, reaching outside the Western tradition into the Eastern traditions, what

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[4] Copernicus, *Three Copernican Treatises,* E. Rosen, trans. and ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), p. 24 f.

[5] "Had they deceived us/Or deceived themselves, the quiet-voiced elders,/Bequeathing us merely a receipt for deceit?" T. S. Eliot, *Four Quartets* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1943), p. 13.

[6] Henri Bergson, *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912), p. 9.

Bergson is saying is not too remote from what the Advaitist and Zenist are saying. For the Advaitist, if I understand him at all, if it is truth and reality that one longs to possess, then the methods of science are irrelevant, however relevant they are to getting around practically in *saṁsāra*. The method that is relevant to truth is the method of concentration and meditation, whereby, by transcending reason and sense-experience, we achieve union with *Nirguṇa Brahman,* the One without a second, with respect to which nothing can be said, strictly speaking, except *"neti, neti."* For the Advaitist, the condition of achieving such truth or reality is not that of the finite self, the finite individual, somehow gazing upon or even becoming *Nirguṇa Brahman,* but that of the true self realizing spiritually, that it is, eternally, *Nirguṇa Brahman* and that finitude belongs to the realm of relativity and illusion and must be abandoned. In the Zen tradition, science is not scorned, but scientific knowing, if I understand Suzuki at all, is not true or absolute knowing. True knowing is absolute knowing and is achieved only within the context of that mode of enlightenment called *satori* and is such that it cannot be formulated in anything even approximating denotative, or scientific, language. But when *satori* is achieved, when true knowing is had, we are no longer involved with a self knowing a non-self. The distinction between the self and the non-self evaporates and exhibits itself for what it is: one more conventional distinction which, however useful in one context, is obstructive to truth in another. Zen combines very nicely with an instrumental theory of science, but not with a realistic or metaphysical theory of science according to which the function of scientific theory is to articulate the inherent structures of Nature or reality.

## II

Although complete or absolute skepticism has been relatively rare in the Western tradition, more limited forms of skepticism, be they philosophical, scientific, or theological, have not been as rare as one might suppose. But the other side of limited skepticism is limited non-skepticism or fideism; and thus, historically speaking, it has been generally held in the West that, paradox or no paradox, some kind of objective knowledge is open to the individual self, knowledge which transcends the subjective opinions or beliefs of the individual. A complete historical survey at this point is impossible. I shall, therefore, limit myself to hitting a few high points with respect to knowledge and the individual.

Plato, it would appear, admitted the relativity of individual sense-experience and seems to argue that no genuine knowledge of the sensorily perceived particular is possible. Knowledge, however, of the rational or intelligible

universal or form is possible by way of intellection, and the sensed particular may operate as the functional occasion of, though not the cause of, such intellection, if, indeed, we take seriously Plato's so-called doctrine of recollection. One may say that Plato did recognize a distinction between reason and sense-experience, but metaphysically he turned this distinction into a distinction between appearance and reality, the temporal and the eternal. Man, being in part an intellecting creature, can grasp, and thus know, eternal truths, forms, or principles. Such knowledge must be distinguished from mere sensory awareness, which is not knowledge, properly speaking, at all—such is the import of Plato's image of the divided line which has its counterpart in Spinoza's four modes of perception or knowledge as set forth in his *Improvement of the Understanding*. In either case, however, the answer to Protagoras is by way of an epistemological rationalism which finds a place for knowledge and leaves a place for belief.

As for Aristotle, he not only tells us that all men by nature desire to know, but in general is of the opinion that, the universe being what it is, and man having the faculties that he has, knowing is, in principle, as natural to man as talking or, for that matter, constructing dramas that have the power to evoke in human individuals, though not in sticks and stones, the emotions of pity and fear. Knowledge at its most certain, systematic, and refined is theoretical or speculative knowledge, to be distinguished from both dialectic and sophistry, and is itself divided into first philosophy, mathematics, and physics. Theoretical knowledge (as we are informed in the *Posterior Analytics*) begins in sense-perception ("the loss of any one of the senses entails the loss of a corresponding portion of knowledge"[7]) and eventually culminates, as an acorn eventually culminates in a full-grown oak tree (if all goes well), in the form of a deductive system. There seems to be no question but that the *Posterior Analytics* was written by Aristotle with one eye on geometry in its historical development; and it may be true enough to say that Euclid constructed his *Elements* with one eye on the *Posterior Analytics* of Aristotle. Be that as it may, Aristotle recognized very clearly that in such a deductive system not all propositions could be derived without moving into an infinite regress, in one direction, or into the fallacy of circular demonstration, in the other. Thus, a closed or complete deductive system presupposes underived propositions, or first principles, which, because underived, must be known to be true (and they must be true, otherwise we fall into dialectic) other than by way of logical demonstration, that is, derivation. When Aristotle raises the question as to how the first principles of any demonstrative science are

[7] Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics,* Bk. I, chap. 18, 81a, 38-40. In G. R. G. Mure, trans., *The Basic Works of Aristotle,* Richard McKeon, ed. (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 135.

known to be true, he is raising a very crucial and a very serious question. With a slap at Plato, he contends that first principles are not innate in us; and it is clear that Aristotle is of the opinion that there are no principles which, taken in themselves alone, come stamped *true, true, true.* Aristotle remains naturalistic at this juncture, however inadequate his account. Out of sense-perception develops memory; out of memory develops experience; out of experience develops rudimentary universals; and out of rudimentary universals (within the total context of the progressive construction of a deductive system) develop the true universals, which are known, not by derivation, but by way of rational intuition. "The soul," Aristotle writes, "is so constituted as to be capable of this process."[8] There is a catch, however; for, if the soul has the power to form universals which, at a later date and in a wider context, turn out to be rudimentary as opposed to true universals (thus Newton's principles give way, eventually, to Einstein's), one is, in principle, never in a position to know, with any kind of certainty, when one is dealing with rudimentary and when one is dealing with true first principles. And here it is fair to say that, in spite of his wealth of analysis, Aristotle deliberately strikes a skeptical note: "It is hard to be sure whether one knows or not; for it is hard to be sure whether one's knowledge is based on the basic truths appropriate to each attribute—the differentia of true knowledge. We think that we have scientific knowledge if we have reasoned from true and primary premises. But that is not so; the conclusion must be homogeneous with the basic facts of the science."[9] The best one can say is that Aristotle feels sure that he knows what demonstrative knowledge should be; but whether such knowledge can be achieved by the finite self working progressively in time in the midst of accumulating data of observation which cannot be denied is something else again. If Aristotle was of the opinion that he knew how the celestial bodies operated (via spheres within spheres), later thinkers were certainly of the opinion that Aristotle opined but did not know; and still later thinkers, such as Kepler, were apparently pretty sure that not only Aristotle, but also Ptolemy, had been led astray by a rudimentary first principle, that is, the principle of celestial motion. This principle was regarded by astronomers as absolute (with various modifications or adaptations) down to the time of Kepler; from the time of Newton on, the principle was regarded as false or inadequate. It would appear, then, that if the human soul is so constituted that it can regard true first principles as true, it is also so constituted that it can regard false principles as true also.

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[8] Aristotle, *op. cit.,* Bk. II, chap. 19, 100a, 13-14.

[9] Aristotle, *op. cit.,* Bk. I, chap. 9, 76a, 27-31.

Turning from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas, one can say that, while Thomas accepts completely, in his own way, the Aristotelian contention that the individual self may achieve theoretical knowledge, he also contends that in addition to such natural knowledge there is also supernatural knowledge open to man by way of divine revelation. The distinction between reason and revelation as sources of true and objective knowledge that transcends mere individual belief is, obviously, not unique to Thomas; it was common to all medieval Christian thinkers, in one way or another. But the precise form in which this distinction emerges in the opening pages of the *Summa Theologica* seems to breathe the very spirit of Thomism. Thus, Thomas' contention is that physics, say, is not only a science (*scientia*) in the Aristotelian sense of the term, but also sacred doctrine, the argument being that both are derived from first principles. However, sacred doctrine, as a science, is more certain than any natural science, since the natural sciences "derive their certitude from the natural light of human reason, which can err, whereas this derives its certitude from the light of the divine science, which cannot err."[10] One might note in passing that the suggestion that natural reason can err is, for Thomas, a rather dangerous admission, but an admission that he does not follow up. In general, it would appear that his contention is that reason is certain, so far as it goes, but is still less certain than revelation, though what anyone can make out of degrees of certainty is difficult to say. Be that as it may, the Thomistic position is that man, the individual man, is so constructed by God that natural knowledge is possible by way of the human faculties of reason and sense-perception; and that, in addition to natural knowledge, there is an avenue of more than natural knowledge by way of revelation. Revelation, the source of which is God and not the natural faculties of the individual, is not a substitute for natural knowledge. But, since revelation is more certain than the light of human reason, which can err, any proposition in natural science that is logically incompatible with a corresponding proposition of revelation is false—provided revelation has been properly interpreted.[11] Thus, revelation functions as a negative guide to natural knowledge. The existence

[10] Thomas Aquinas, *The Summa Theologica,* Part I, Q. 1, Art. 5. In *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas,* Vol. I, Anton C. Pegis, ed. (New York: Random House, 1945), p. 9.

[11] Thomas was completely aware of the fact that a conflict between natural knowledge and revealed knowledge could be a conflict between natural knowledge and an inadequate interpretation of a revealed statement. As he points out: "In discussing questions of this kind, two rules are to be observed, as Augustine teaches. The first is, to hold the truth of Scripture without wavering. The second is that, since Holy Scripture can be explained in a multiplicity of senses, one should adhere to a particular explanation only in such measure as to be ready to abandon it, if it be proved with certainty to be false; lest Holy Scripture be exposed to the ridicule of unbelievers, and obstacles be placed to their believing. *The Summa Theologica,* Part I, Q. LXVIII, Art. 1.

of God, or at least the existence of a necessary Being, Thomas believes can be established on the basis of rational argument; but the essence of God (God not being an object of sense-perception) is unknown and unknowable to man in this life. That God, whatever his essence, is a trinity of persons we know on the basis of revelation only, and can accept, therefore, only on the grounds of faith, true faith presupposing grace, as Thomas makes quite clear. The individual, for Thomas, can know, via a twofold source of knowledge. But the individual, in this life, cannot know all things. What cannot be perceived, or significantly inferred from what is perceived, cannot be known. After all, Thomas does his best to hold to the principle: *Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu fuerit.*

Descartes, undoubtedly writing with one eye on Thomas, one eye on Euclid, and one eye on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, held that knowledge is, in principle, possible to the human, individual soul on the basis of natural reason, both intuitive and deductive, provided that reason itself, when properly employed, is absolutely reliable. But the reliability of reason Descartes is unable to take for granted. More explicitly than Thomas, he attempts to ground the reliability of reason in a supernatural source, a deity who is infinitely good, infinitely wise, and infinitely powerful and who, therefore, cannot be a deceiver. But, apart from a demonstration of the existence of God, there are no adequate grounds, so far as Descartes is concerned, either for asserting the validity of reason (which for Thomas could err) or even for asserting the existence of an objective and independent materio-extended world as the immediate source of our sensations. But Descartes had cut the ground out from under himself by way of his skeptical doubts, and therefore his proof for the existence of God (even granting that he really does find within his personal self an idea of God) is specious. With one blow, so to speak, Descartes, however inadvertently, raises questions which haunt the rest of modern philosophy; namely, whether the existence, not only of a transcendent deity, but also of an independent and objective world, can be known by man, by the individual, on the basis of natural, allegedly cognitive faculties. One might even say that, while the traditional, medieval philosopher was quite confident that there was a God who had created the contingent world (after all, revelation asserts that in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth), the disappearance of God as an object of rational demonstration was all too soon followed by doubts and problems with respect to the existence of an objective world, as if God and the objective world were two sides of the same coin, a possibility that Spinoza took quite seriously and all too literally from a traditional Christian-Hebraic point of view. Descartes, with respect to knowledge, was in no sense a clear-cut rationalist. His rationalism rested on a metaphysical

theism which he attempted to justify in terms of his rationalism. Nor did he, for that matter, consistently attempt to challenge the reliability of revelation. Indeed, he seems to out-Thomas Thomas when he writes in his *Principles of Philosophy*, "Above all we should impress on our memory as an infallible rule that what God has revealed to us is incomparably more certain than anything else; and that we ought to submit to the Divine authority rather than to our own judgment even though the light of reason may seem to us to suggest, with the utmost clearness and evidence, something opposite."[12] And yet, he seems quite capable of playing both sides against the middle, as when he writes at the termination of his *Principles*, "At the same time, recalling my insignificance, I affirm nothing, but submit all these opinions to the authority of the Catholic Church, and to the judgment of the more sage; and I wish no one to believe anything I have written, unless he is personally persuaded by the force and evidence of reason."[13] That the light of reason was common to all individuals Descartes did not really doubt. The real problem for Descartes was that of tracing the light of reason to its universal source. Since he failed in this, reason itself is open to challenge, plus both God and the objective world. Protagoras maintained a skepticism with respect to the gods. In the modern world, skepticism shifts to the existence of an objective world after centuries of more or less taking it for granted. This problem of knowing the existence of the objective world is a curious and delightful one. In the middle of the twentieth century, a philosopher who doubts or denies the existence of a transcendent deity may still be regarded by his academic colleagues as normal, however mistaken. A philosopher who doubts or denies the existence of an objective and independent world would probably be regarded by his academic colleagues as a psychotic.

If Descartes wrote with one eye on Aristotle, one eye on Euclid, and one eye on Thomas, Newton may well have constructed his *Principia Mathematica* with one eye on Descartes and one eye on the British empirical tradition, i.e., squintingly. His goal was still the Aristotelian goal of constructing a demonstrative science (in this case, of bodies in motion) in the form of a deductive system. However, while Aristotle was of the opinion that the first principles of such a science could be known by way of rational, inductive intuition, and, while Descartes was apparently of the opinion that such first principles revealed themselves as true (granting God) by virtue of their special clarity and distinctness, Newton attempted to understand the first principles of his *Principia* as inductive generalizations. As Newton wrote, "In this philosophy

[12] René Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy,* First Part, Principle LXXVIII, in *Descartes Selections,* Ralph M. Eaton, ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927), p. 288.

[13] *Ibid.,* Second Part, Principle CCVII, p. 311.

particular propositions are inferred from the phenomena, and afterwards rendered general by induction. Thus it was that the impenetrability, the mobility, and the impulsive force of bodies, and the laws of motion and of gravitation, were discovered . . . and I frame no hypotheses; for whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy."[14] And, in Rule IV of his "Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy," Newton wrote, "In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions inferred by general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, until such time as other phenomena occur, by which they may either be made more accurate, or liable to exceptions."[15] There is irony here, if it is objective and certain knowledge that Newton is seeking, and he certainly is. For, if his first principles are set up on the basis of inductive generalization, they are no more than rudimentary as opposed to true universals and therefore could be false, that is, if they also could be true. And, what is more, it is almost impossible to believe that Newton really could have regarded his laws of motion as inductive generalizations, because, if inductive generalizations, Newton must have observed what surely he never observed, say, a body remaining in uniform rectilinear motion, apparently in absolute as opposed to relative space. Whatever they may be, it would appear that Newton's laws of motion are not inductive generalizations; and, even if they were, or particularly if they were, they would not function as an adequate bridge from Newton's empirically observed phenomena to Newton's world of absolute space, absolute time, and absolute motion, a world which was most certainly never observed by Newton and which was never got at by way of simple, inductive generalization. To make matters even worse, his principle of gravitation was not only not an inductive generalization from observation, but made, as Newton recognized, practically no sense at all, that is, no physical or mechanical sense within his system, since it involved action at a distance, the whole notion of which so disturbed Newton that he was willing to complete his General Scholium by the addition of a hypothesis the statement of which violated his methodological precepts. Finally, it is well to note that Newton was not immune to theological speculation even in the midst, so to speak, of his demonstrative science of mechanics. He sets up a proof for the existence of God based upon the argument that the most beautiful system of the sun, planets, and comets could proceed only from the counsel and dominion of an

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[14] Sir Isaac Newton, *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947), p. 547.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 400.

intelligent and powerful Being, though part of the beauty Newton pretended to observe was somewhat cheatingly projected by Newton himself. He tells us that the six primary planets revolve about the sun in circles concentric with the sun. He knew very well that the planets do no such thing; they move, for Newton, in ellipses. But, apparently, circles for Newton were more beautiful than ellipses and thus provided more evidence for the otherwise invisible hand of God, "to discourse of whom from the appearances of things does certainly belong to Natural Philosophy."[16] I would not say that Newton did not distinguish between theology and mechanics within the *Principia.* Statements about God are not, for Newton, statements that follow from his definitions and axioms, nor do his definitions and axioms somehow presuppose (in the sense of following from) his statements about God. But, considered as a professed empiricist in matters of method who would permit only observation and inductive generalization, he certainly makes some rather odd claims, both within and outside of natural philosophy.

Hume, playing Newton's empiricism against Newton himself, but with one eye on Locke, insists that by no argument can the existence of God be established to a significant degree of probability; and, as for the so-called objective world of Locke and Newton (granted the differences), this can be established by neither reason nor sense-experience. There is, however, a crucial difference for Hume. The belief in the existence of an independent and objective world is, in its way, universal and unavoidable, at least in the long run; the belief in a single Supreme Deity is neither universal nor unavoidable. Knowledge does not extend beyond the sequences of sensations, inner and fleeting, and even here what is called scientific knowledge is supplemented by or mediated by a-rational, empirically non-justified hopes and expectations which belong to the realm of individual belief, however widely they may be shared by individuals. And thus Hume writes that it is "not solely in poetry and music, we must follow our taste and sentiment, but likewise in philosophy."[17]

The history of Western epistemological concern most certainly does not stop with Hume. However, one can say, very briefly indeed, that during the last 150 years there has been a growing tendency in the general area of what Thomas would call natural knowledge to distinguish, or attempt to distinguish, between science and philosophy, *qua* cognitive or would-be cognitive disciplines. Thanks in part to the emergence of non-Euclidean geometries and the critical work of Mach, Poincaré, Dewey, and Einstein, there has been a movement in the direction of an instrumentalism akin to the instrumentalism of

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[16] *Ibid.*, p. 546.

[17] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature,* Vol. I (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1911), p. 105.

Osiander but without Osiander's underlying theological fideism. Scientific knowledge, shot through and through with convention, is, it would now appear, less a beholding of things as they are in themselves than a complex set of rules for systematization and prediction within the sphere of the data of observation; and, it would also appear, there are as many ways of expressing what the facts are in theoretic terms as man's ingenuity allows him to devise within the context of the data of observation, on the one hand, and principles which are to be understood as Einstein has suggested, as free inventions of the human intellect or imagination, on the other: First principles, in this sense, are not imposed, but have their roots in the ingenuity, the mathematical imagination, of the individual creative scientist who, of course, always works within the context of other individual scientists, past and present, of greater or lesser scientific imagination. As for philosophy, some would allow us only critical philosophy in the form of philosophy of science (often reduced to statements about statements); some would allow us speculative philosophy, so long as speculative philosophy is understood as made up of individual visions for which consistency, scope, ingenuity, but not truth can be claimed; and some would appear to seek a way of knowing by which the instrumentalism and relativism of scientific knowledge can be transcended, such that the individual can achieve a contemplative beholding of non-conditioned truth and reality.

At the core of all of these endeavors there remains the problem as to how the individual self can transcend subjective belief and behold, or incorporate into itself, something to be called objective truth. I am not convinced that this problem has been solved or even, in the history of Western thought, adequately understood and formulated.

## III

In the West, individuals, both individually and collectively, have sought knowledge—scientific, philosophical, and theological—that would reflect in the cognitive consciousness of the individual objective realities as they are apart from being known, apart from being reflected, apart from being an object to a subject. The West has produced diverse patterns of shifting and changing belief and conviction which function as mythologies, albeit abstract mythologies, that at best attempt to come to terms with, come to some kind of peace with, an unknown and mysterious order or disorder[18] (the distinction is human; a lobster couldn't make it) that we attempt to cultivate, to domesticate, by calling

[18] "So they build up hypotheses that collapse on top of one another, it's human, a lobster couldn't do it. Ah a nice mess we're in, the whole pack of us, is it possible we're all in the same boat, no, we're in a nice mess each one in his own peculiar way." Samuel Beckett, *The Unnameable* (New York: Grove Press, 1958), p. 119.

it *reality* in hopes that this term, together with the delineation of what we mean by "reality," will introduce a modicum of clarity into what, perhaps, could just as well be spoken of as absurdity or absolute ambiguity. History goes on, and the questions remain: "Where now? Who now? When now? I, say I. Unbelieving. Questions, hypotheses, call them that. Keep going, going on, call that going, call that on. . . . It, say it, not knowing what . . . you must go on, I can't go on, I'll go on."[19]

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[19] Beckett, *op. cit.*, pp. 3, 179.

# *Book Reviews*

Books reviewed here are limited to those in the field of Oriental and comparative philosophy. Authors and publishers are encouraged to send review copies of appropriate books to the Editor.

YATĪNDRAMATADĪPIKĀ. By *Śrīnivāsadāsa.* Foreword by *P. S. Srinivasachari.* English Translation and Notes by *Svāmī Ādidevānanda.* Published by The President, Sri Ramakrishna Math—Mylapore, Madras, India, 1949. Pp. xliii + 212. Rs 5/—.

Although this book has been available for over ten years, it is still no less indispensable a work on Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy than it was when first published. The *Yatīndramatadīpikā* (A Guide to the Thought of Rāmānuja) itself marks the achievement of several centuries of active and creative development in this important school of the Vedānta. And this edition, translated and annotated by Svāmī Ādidevānanda, then of the Ramakrishna Math in Madras, stands out as a work of clarity, precision, and usefulness.

Śrīnivāsadāsa, the author of the *Yatīndramatadīpikā,* lived during the seventeenth century, following a long period of philosophical controversy which he traces back to Dramiḍācārya and through the Vaḍagaḷai following of Rāmānuja to Vedānta Deśika and Mahācārya, his own teacher. His work stands as both a summary of and a tribute to the cumulative genius of this tradition. For he has gathered together in an extremely well-ordered and precise form the essential structure of Viśiṣṭādvaita thought, and has supported it with only enough discussion and argument to make this structure clear.

He begins by distinguishing between the ways of knowing (*pramāṇa*) and what is to be known (*prameya*). And, once having given a complete and precise definition of the three ways which are accepted by this school (perception, inference, and verbal authority), he goes on to divide the objects of knowledge into two classes, the substantial (*dravya*) and the non-substantial (*adravya*). The substantial objects he again divides into the material (*jaḍa*) and the non-material (*ajaḍa*), the former composed of matter and time, the latter of pure spirit, consciousness, the individual soul, and God. Thus the whole of reality is accounted for in a small compass. But what is truly remarkable is that he has overlooked few essentials of his tradition. Such was the refinement which it had attained in his day, and such was his ability to penetrate to the root of it. He wisely remarks, at the end of the First Avatāra, when questioned about his rejection of some ideas from another philosophical tradition, that he accepts only what is of value, "like the subsistence derived from the [water] tank built by others, but not the mire in it." His appraisal is an accurate insight into the character of his own summary of Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy.

He has written this work "for the instruction of beginners." That is to say, he recognizes that there is much more that could be said. His condensation does not

take the place of Rāmānuja's *Śrībhāṣya,* or Vedānta Deśika's *Nyāyapariśuddhi* and *Nyāyasiddhāñjana,* which it follows most closely. Nor does it give any idea of the significant development which took place from one to the other. Its very brevity makes the tradition look far more systematic, austere, and dogmatic than it actually is. But, as an introduction to these larger works, because of its high degree of order and its precision, it is invaluable.

These virtues of the text are well communicated in this edition. Svāmī Ādidevānanda's translation is a model of clarity, free enough to express a sense of English style and sentence structure without losing any of its accuracy. Voluminous footnotes, equally relevant and concise, augment the translation, and do much to overcome the austere character of the text itself. And the Introduction, in its very short span, expresses very precisely and clearly the essential tenets of the work. For the philosopher who would like a succinct account of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, for the student who wishes to pursue the teaching of this school in simple but accurate Sanskrit, for the scholar who is anxious to explore one of the many different expressions of the manifold wisdom of India in its original form, this edition of the *Yatīndramatadīpikā* is highly recommended. Its value as a primary source and reference work in a college course in Indian philosophy also ought to be considered.

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RESURGENT INDIA. By *Sisirkumar Mitra.* Bombay: Allied Publishers Private Limited, 1963. Also, New York: Paragon Book Gallery. Pp. 432. Rs. 26.00.

Professor Sisirkumar Mitra's *Resurgent India* is a notable contribution to the history and significance of India's spiritual re-awakening in modern times.

Mitra is a historian with remarkable fidelity to fact and an objective grasp of the procession of events. But he is also a philosopher of history with a vision of the future and a deep insight into the significance of the past. His philosophic understanding of the meaning of history is based largely upon the world-historical perspective of his great *guru,* Sri Aurobindo. It is in the light of that understanding that he has tried to bring out the significance for the world today of the resurgence of modern India.

For Mitra, history is not a mere chronicle of brute happenings. Nor is it the unfoldment of a humanly preconceived idea. We have today many theological, sociological, and idealistic interpretations of history. Attempts are made to fit history into the Procrustean bed of a fixed ideology or value system. For example, Hegel tried to interpret history in the light of his dialectical idealism. Marx tried to interpret history in terms of his dialectical materialism. And theologians see the meaning of history in their own particular creed and aim at the establishment of that creed as the ruling power of human society.

Mitra takes his stand upon what may be called the integral view of history. The dynamics of history is provided, not by the conflict of ideas, nor by the conflict of

class interests. Nor is it provided by a particular system of ethico-religious value. All of these no doubt play a vital role in determining the course of history. But they are all, in the ultimate analysis, subservient to a deeper dynamism. That is the creative dynamism of the Supreme Being (*Brahman-Śakti*). History is the unfoldment of the superconscient creative energy of Being. Different value systems, different ideologies, represent different modes of expression of that fundamental creativity, which is not to be identified with any one of them. Different nations have each to play a significant role in the march of history, each making its own unique contribution. (See pp. 5-8.)

After a brief survey of her glorious past, Mitra's book tells the story of India's renaissance movement surging forward toward a great future. There is a fascinating account of such unifying and modernizing socio-religious movements as the Brāhmo Samāj, the Ārya Samāj, the Theosophical Society, the Vedānta Movement, etc. The great pioneers of modern India are introduced in all the grandeur of their creative genius and the colorfulness of their personalities. The reader gets to know how Raja Ram Mohan Roy (1772-1833) accomplishes much-needed social reforms in Hindu society and opens the doors of a fruitful dialogue between India and the modern West. Sri Ramakrishna (1836-1886) shows the way to the reconciliation of the world's great religions. Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902) represents the Vedānta as the philosophy of universal religion and carries its message to the West. The seer-scientist Jagadischandra Basu (1858-1937) scientifically demonstrates the ancient Hindu sages' vision of one universal life-force (*prāṇa*) pulsating through the entire universe. The great poet Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941) sings the song of a new dawn of civilization. The vision comes to him of the future cosmic man emerging from the harmonious blending of the world's various cultural systems.

Mitra holds that the renaissance movement of India receives its most complete expression in the integral truth-vision of Sri Aurobindo. Sri Aurobindo looks upon history as an integral part of cosmic evolution. The driving force in evolution is a superconscient creative urge in the structure of Being. Man's destiny lies in overcoming himself into a higher level of consciousness and creative self-expression. India, with her message of dynamic spirituality, has a vital role to play in the spiritual unification and higher self-fulfillment of the human race.

The book concludes with a brief account of the widespread spiritual re-awakening taking place in different parts of the world today. All signs point to the possibility of "a new age of the sovereign reign of the Spirit" (p. 420).

A searching critic may find flaws in the book. The most noteworthy is perhaps the omission of such builders of modern India as Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. But it seems that the author purposely set before himself a limited task. He has been concerned mainly with the pioneers of India's spiritual renaissance, leaving out of account social and political movements that took place in India after 1920.

The reviewer has no hesitation in recommending the book to all those who are interested in an illuminating account of India's re-discovery of her own great spiritual tradition.

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INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES. By *Professor M. Hiriyanna.* Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers, 1957. Pp. 149. $2.50.

Many have long respected Professor Hiriyanna as an outstanding exponent of Indian philosophy, and this book well illustrates the source of this respect. It is one of a series of collected essays, the fifth of seven, this one containing nineteen articles, many of which were published during the late '20s and '30s in philosophical journals and books. They thus deal with a wide variety of subjects, beginning with studies in epistemology and leading into historical and analytical essays on the categories (*padarthas*) of various classical schools. We find here in no way a consistent exposition of his thought or of its vast scope. But the book does reveal to us his penetrating understanding of the long tradition of Indian thought and the clarity of his style as a philosopher, in his ability both to comprehend a school of thought in its integrity and to communicate its values and its relevance. His analyses are always sparkling in their clarity and their precision, and are thus excellent introductions into some important issues. His essay on the meaning of *samavāya*—"What is Samavāya" (pp. 107-120)—is a good case in point. But what is even more important about this collection is that it reveals to us something of the personality of this great scholar himself.

His deep respect for and involvement in the classical period of Indian philosophy is nowhere in doubt, but is particularly illustrated by the sequence of the opening essays. The first article, reprinted from *Contemporary Indian Philosophy* (edited by Radhakrishnan and Muirhead), deals with the epistemological problem of the nature of truth, and, although he discusses the question in contemporary terms, it soon becomes evident that his discussion is structured according to the more classical pattern. This suspicion is quickly verified in the essays which immediately follow. These discuss, in turn, the problem of truth and error according to the Nyāya, the Sāṁkhya, the Mīmāṁsā, and other systems. These articles, although familiar to students of Professor Hiriyanna's *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, here make very clear the source of his insight into the study of all philosophy. Perhaps there is no clearer illustration than in his short essay "An Indian View of 'Present Time'" (pp. 121-126), in which he responds to Professor Whitehead's assertion that the present is better conceived as a duration than as an instant by translating and explaining a portion of Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtra* which bears out, in classical terms, this analysis. No matter how modern the thought, it is his comprehensive and lively insight into the tradition which informs his analysis and judgment.

The tradition to which he was alive was a broad one, for he was as gifted in his appreciation of Sanskrit literature as he was of classical philosophy. This combination is rare among students of Indian philosophy, and it alone would make his work worthy of notice. But he had a further virtue which is also illustrated in this collection of essays. He had a sense of historical perspective, not only toward the classical world with which he was so fully acquainted, but also toward the world in which he lived. Indian thought was not to him a sequence of ideas, nor sporadic revelations of eternal truth. Rather, it was an interrelated series of experiments with knowledge, which gave a sense of continuity and development in the works which he studied and in his relationship to them. His essay on the meaning of the word

*"pramāṇa"* (pp. 65-71), for example, adds a great deal to an understanding of this vital term because it is an important historical as well as analytical study.

In these several ways, these essays, although uneven in philosophical value, all reveal something of the character of Hiriyanna as a scholar and as a teacher. They thus provide an opportunity for a serious student of Indian thought to become alive to his exemplary style and to know him as one of the great Sanskrit scholars of our time.

By this somewhat restricted evaluation, this reviewer does not want to give the impression that the series which the Kavyalaya Publishers is doing is not important. Professor Hiriyanna spent most of his later years working on the Indian conception of values, and it is a regrettable loss that he was not sufficiently satisfied with his last book to allow it to be published before his death. Thus the articles contained in *Art Experience* and *The Quest After Perfection* are our only readily available sources to this later part of his life. The publishers are thus doing us a great service; but not, however, in this one volume. A more selective editing of just the most important articles in a single volume might have been of greater service than their present attempt to publish everything in a series of volumes.

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THE CONCEPT OF MĀYĀ FROM THE VEDAS TO THE 20TH CENTURY. By *Ruth Reyna.* Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962. Pp. xiv + 120; Rs. 10.50.

The concept of *māyā* has played, and continues to play, a most important role in the development of Indian philosophy. The word *"māyā"* first appears in some of the early hymns of the *Ṛg-veda,* begins to assume greater prominence in the Upaniṣads, becomes molded into the key tenet of the Advaita philosophy by Śaṁkara, and still influences Indian thinkers in our own age. What this concept means, Western minds often find difficult to comprehend. Several books have been written, attempting to explain the concept, most of them confining themselves to Śaṁkara's use of the term. This little book sets out to show the development of the concept, not only during the period of classical Indian philosophy, but more especially during contemporary times.

Starting with the realization that "*māyā* means different things to different men in the respective eras of Indian history" (p. ix), Miss Reyna seeks to illustrate this statement by explicating the meaning of the concept as it occurs in these eras. Thus, she treats the use of *māyā* in the *Ṛg-veda,* Upaniṣads, etc., in her Introduction, then moves to a consideration of Sri Aurobindo's and Radhakrishnan's use in Chapters One and Two, respectively, and finally ends with a chapter that seeks to compare the theories of modern science with "the postulates of *māyā-vāda*" (p. 89). This is an ambitious undertaking. Unfortunately—for those of us who would like to know about this important concept—it fails utterly.

The book is full of many errors and misconceptions, but the basic flaw is its

complete lack of any analysis of the concepts with which it is concerned. The author purports to have written the work with the express intention of clarifying "the erroneous notion held by Western and by some Eastern writers that *māyā* means 'illusion' in the sense of 'imagination,' or 'hallucination'" (pp. ix-x). Unfortunately, (1) this "notion" is not erroneous, and (2) the book has in it absolutely no clarification of any kind.

The two points are connected. Reyna was apparently satisfied about the truth-value of the above proposition, so never really bothered to analyze the meaning of its key terms. Although she denies that *"māyā"* means "illusion," she frequently cites it as meaning precisely that. Thus, she has a section on "Māyā as Educative Illusion" in the Introduction and lists a series of quotes from the principal Upaniṣads in the Appendix under the entry "[*māyā*] as cosmic illusion," which, she has previously stated, is the meaning of the term "in one of its earliest appearances" (p. 7). Apparently, she feels that "educative" illusion or "cosmic" illusion is somehow different from "imagination" or "hallucination." And it is easy to understand why. An illusion that is cosmic in its scope must have a kind of objectivity—and, furthermore, must be an illusion for all alike (except, obviously, for the *jñānī*), i.e., must have an intersubjective character. In other words, a cosmic illusion is "out there," whereas an hallucination has a purely subjective character, just as does imagination. It is this objectivity of *māyā* that she—following other apologists for the concept—is trying to emphasize. And yet, a moment's reflection ought to convince her that many things we call "illusions" have such an objective character—and are far from "cosmic" in scope. Ordinary optical illusions like the "bent stick" or perception of "depth" in a mirror or the apparent meeting of parallel lines at the horizon confront us daily. In fact, we have even framed natural laws (refraction, reflection, perspective) that refer to these facts. (Perhaps this is part of the "educative" aspect of illusion, though the author does not make that claim.)

What is the relationship between these everyday, garden variety illusions and the so-called "cosmic" illusion, which is one meaning of the term *"māyā"*? Reyna does not attempt to grapple with this question. Perhaps the answer may be found by drawing a distinction between "illusion" and "delusion." That is to say, that the world exists, no one denies—certainly not Śaṁkara. What is denied, however, is that the world is real (*sat*). Without going into a detailed defense of this thesis, it can be at least suggested here that "knowledge of the real" simply means "knowledge of the thing for what it is" (cf. Śaṁkara's *Bhāṣya* on *Taittirīya Upaniṣad,* II.1: *yad rūpeṇa yan niścitaṁ tat tad rūpaṁ na vyabhicarati, tat satyam*). Although this requires a great deal more elaboration than a review permits, one can see how *māyā* can be linked with both the objective and the subjective character of illusion: seeing the cosmos (cosmic illusion) or any individual part of it (particular illusion) for what it is is seeing the illusory nature of it; while accepting the illusion at face value is being deluded by it. Much, if not all, of purely subjective *māyā* (erroneously judging the rope to be a snake, the post to be a man, the stretch of saltish sand to be a pool of water—stock examples of Advaita) is delusion, hence that is what *"māyā"* means in such a context. Much, if not all, of objective *māyā* (bent stick, mirror image, etc.) is illusion (unless, of course, we really believe the stick to be bent, the image to have independent existence, etc.), hence that is what *"māyā"* means in

those contexts. And much—though in this case not all—of what is called the "power" (*śakti*) of *māyā* is simply the characteristic nature of some people to be fooled by these illusions.

There are numerous hints in Śaṁkara's *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* (*BSB*) and elsewhere to show that this is so. And, further, subjective *māyā* is related to objective *māyā* even in the stock examples of delusion, for, as Śaṁkara states in *BSB,* I.ii.2, "It is not really knowledge [= judgment] to say of what is only a post 'It is either a post or a man or something else' " (*na hi sthāṇāv ekasmin sthāṇur vā puruṣo 'nyo veti tattvajñānaṁ bhavati*). That is, one is not deluded if he suspends judgment—which is what the quoted proposition amounts to.

All this is neatly tied into Advaita's theory of error, which Reyna discusses, along with several other theories, in Chapter Three. She must have intuited that the theory of error ought somehow to be connected to the doctrine of *māyā,* but there is nothing in this chapter to suggest that she grasped the connection. In fact, Chapter Three is a needless addition to the book. Not only does she fail to relate her exposition to the subject-matter of the book, but that exposition is on the whole unclear and in part erroneous (e.g., her discussion of *ātmakhyātivāda*). Much better and more accurate discussions of this subject exist.

Starting with the basic flaw of a completely unanalytical approach to her subject, she can hardly hope to do justice to it. The author drops hints here and there as to several of the "different things" the concept of *māyā* is held to mean by "different men," but there is no conscious attempt to bring these differences out or to draw any inferences from them. The word *"māyā,"* she says, "denotes a kind of magic" (p. 5) in its Ṛg-vedic use. This meaning of the term is one that also appears in later writings—e.g., the Upaniṣads, Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā,* Śaṁkara's works, etc., etc. How is this related to its several other uses? And how, if the *Ṛg-veda* contains the "germs of the later Upaniṣadic development of the word in the sphere of metaphysics" (p. 5), does this development take place? Such questions the author does not even attempt to answer in the section of the Introduction on "The Idea of Māyā in the Ṛg Veda" or its following section on "Māyā in the Upaniṣads." Both are very brief and wander from quote to quote without really establishing anything much. She does, however, cite a significant passage from the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (IV.x.1) in the latter section, which equates *māyā* with *prakṛti.* This use appears also in Śaṁkara, and ought to have received some careful discussion. However, the only discussion of this meaning occurs in the section entitled *"Māyā* in the Sāṁkhya Philosophy." Since there is no concept of *māyā* in the Sāṁkhya, it must mean that the author was misled by that Upaniṣadic quote into thinking Śaṁkara and the Sāṁkhya deal with *prakṛti* alike in that respect. It betrays a very superficial study of this point.

Her treatment of "Māyā in the Philosophy of Rāmānuja" will surprise some. She believes that "the meaning and application of *māyā* in the teaching of Rāmānuja differs from that of the Saṅkaran school only in its particular aspect or emphasis" (p. 18). What is this "particular aspect or emphasis"? Reyna does not make this clear. Actually, Rāmānuja's change of emphasis comes about through his change of definition of the word "real." While Śaṁkara took "real" to mean "independent and unchanging," Rāmānuja refused to accept this somewhat limited definition.

Thus, while Śaṁkara had to maintain that only *Brahman* was "real" and all apparent attributes illusory (*māyā*), for Rāmānuja both the substratum (*Brahman*) and its attributes are real. In the former instance there is need for an answer to the question: Then how is it that we perceive plurality if there really is none? The doctrine of *māyā* is the answer. In the latter case no such problem arises. Hence it is that Rāmānuja is one of the more outspoken critics of the doctrine of *māyā;* and hence it is a bit odd to be told he held such a doctrine himself.

The *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* and the *śūnya* (void) doctrine of Nāgārjuna form the basis for Reyna's discussion of "The Idea of *Māyā* in Buddhism." The notion that the world is *māyā* is certainly to be found here, yet subtle differences exist between the Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrine of *māyā* and that of the Advaita. These differences are not brought out. Nor is the relation between *māyā* and *śūnyavāda* at all clearly established. The whole section is rather nebulous.

Closely connected in the author's mind to "The Idea of *Māyā* in Buddhism," and immediately following it in the Introduction, is a brief section on "*Māyā* in the Philosophy of Gauḍapāda." Here, at last, the author is on firm Advaita ground. Yet, she fails to make capital of the fact. The section suffers (as, of course, does the rest of the book) from being shallow and unanalytical. But, in addition, it suffers from relying too heavily on Vidhushekhara Bhattacharyya's distorted translation of and commentary on the *Kārikā* (or *Āgamaśāstra,* as Bhattacharyya prefers to call it). She follows him in making Gauḍapāda out to be a Vijñānavāda Buddhist in Advaitin disguise, which he certainly is not. Although she did her research for this book at Poona, she seems unaware of R. D. Karmarkar's views on the subject (see Introduction to his translation of *Gauḍapāda Kārikā*), nor does it appear that she has read T. M. P. Mahadevan's book, *Gauḍapāda: A Study in Early Advaita,* where the whole question is carefully analyzed and all of Bhattacharyya's arguments refuted.

The Introduction closes with a section on "*Māyā* as Educative Illusion," a notion that would be worthwhile developing at some length. What she has here does not do it—in fact, it does not even support the thesis implied in the section heading.

Since the name of Śaṁkara, more than that of anyone else, is associated with the doctrine of *māyā,* one would rather expect at least the kind of "cursory survey" (p. ix) of his philosophy which is given others in the Introduction. That none is there—or anywhere else in the book—is explained thus: "Śaṁkara is accorded the position of honour, in that his view is interwoven throughout this entire work . . ." (p. x). It is a dubious "honour" indeed! Because the views of Aurobindo and Radhakrishnan are frequently compared with those of Śaṁkara, it would seem much more sensible at least to sketch out the latter's views so that the reader could make a more intelligent comparison.

Chapter One deals with the concept of *māyā* in the philosophy of Aurobindo. He is, at best, a difficult person to understand. One would like to have a careful analysis of the meaning of such terms as "poise of being" or "multi-poised unity," both of which figure in Reyna's discussion of his use of the term "*māyā.*" Or, barring that, at least some delineation of the distinction he makes between a "higher" *māyā* and a "lower" *māyā,* since an explication of the concept of *māyā* is the concern of the book. The author fails to do any of this—and these terms remain as mysterious after her discussion as they were before.

Chapter Two, though a generally confused presentation of Radhakrishnan's use of the term *"māyā,"* has a good insight in the section entitled "Has Radhakrishnan Reinterpreted the *Māyā* of Traditional Vedānta?" Her answer to the question is in the negative, and she concludes that the argument Radhakrishnan has with Śaṁkara "is merely a quibble over words" (p. 66). This certainly seems a correct appraisal and should be worked out more systematically and elaborately than it is. Still, it is the one genuine contribution of the book.

At the other end of the scale is the chapter on "Māyāvāda in the 20th Century." Herein the author claims that "science is demonstrating most lucidly the postulates of *māyāvāda"* (p. 89). She, of course, recognizes that this is a startling proposition to put forward, for she says, "The modern physicist may be surprised to learn that he is resolving his science upon the same postulates as those of *māyāvāda,* but no other construction can be placed upon the present and anticipated notions of science" (p. 90). He would be even more surprised to learn that "at the rate of progress that modern man is making in physical science, the 21st Century may well witness his successful dissolution of the veil of *avidyā* . . ." (p. 94). It is a pity that this chapter was ever written, since the author betrays her ignorance of modern physics —or, as she variously terms it, "neo-modern science" (p. 88), "particle physics" (p. 89), "modern particle science" (p. 90), or "particle mechanics" (p. 115, footnote 445)—throughout its ten pages. Her thesis may be briefly stated as follows: modern science has "dematerialized" the world (p. 89) to such an extent, as a result of its inability to determine "the basic particle that composes all phenomena as existent or nonexistent" (p. 89), that "the multiple individuality that we have long thought to constitute the world . . . is trickling back into Undifferentiated Unity" (p. 93). Apart from the poetic phraseology involved, the cognitive significance of this thesis seems to rest on two assumptions: (1) that what we mean by "atomic matter" is a sort of very small billiard ball, and (2) that the modern physicist's concept of "energy" or "force" is what Śaṁkara had in mind when he spoke of a "seminal" (*bīja,* lit., "seed") condition of the universe (pp. 89 and 93: she cites *Chāndogya-bhāṣya,* VIII.xiv.1, and *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya,* I.iv.3, in defense of this, though neither of these passages contains any reference to *bīja*; however, this is a minor point, as several others do). The latter point is highly dubious; the former point is just plain wrong. To say, "Particle physics has declared the substratum of phenomena to be an inexplicable energy or *force"* (p. 89) may be correct, but to conclude from this that "modern particle mechanics has been unable [to] isolate and posit the atom as a material entity" (footnote 445, p. 115) and that therefore "no physical entity remains" (p. 89) is surely a travesty of reason. The point is not that modern physics denies the existence of physical matter, but, rather, that modern physics has redefined what we mean by that phrase. Her kind of analysis would be like arguing that the Greek word from which we get our English word "atom" means "uncuttable," and therefore nuclear fission is impossible.

Part of her conclusion that modern physics is "demonstrating" (=validating?) the doctrine of *māyā* also rests on an incredible interpretation of Relativity Theory, as the following quotation aptly illustrates:

> In addition, modern relativity theory teaches that outside our universe a system prevails where none of our conceptions apply, where there is no gravitational point, no "up" and

"down," no "east" and "west," no "right" and "left," no "time," no "space," no "causality," —and so to all our physical laws.

Thus it is that science posits upon formal grounds, the reality of a cosmic observational point where all our differentiations merge into a unified cosmic Oneness. It posits upon scientific grounds, what Vedic scripture has already validated—that Universal Consciousness is other than our physical world system, where simultaneity replaces time and motion, where non-duality replaces multiplicity, and where all our known physical laws are seen to be the product of ignorance (p. 91).

She also fails to comprehend the operationalistic interpretation of theoretical physical concepts. Thus she states, "The atom is generally held by science to be a mental construct for the explanation of phenomenal event[s]" (footnote 445, p. 115). From this she infers that the atom cannot be determined to be either existent or non-existent. We have seen that this is connected, in her mind, with the so-called "dematerialization" of the world. It is also connected with her belief that, since the universe is composed of atoms, we cannot "logically characterize the universe in terms of real or unreal," being at best able to say that it is "only pragmatically and conventionally existent," while admitting "its probable nonexistence from a cosmic point apart from the present physical system of the universe" (p. 89). Of course, Śaṁkara, as has already been observed, does not deny the existence of the world, as Reyna does here, hence the denial of existential determinability does not imply the denial of real determinability according to the doctrine of *māyā*. But, all this apart, it is questionable, to say the least, that this is what the operationalists have in mind. They would also be surprised to learn that "from this viewpoint science has had to discard the notion of empirical validation as a requisite for the declaration of the real, and looks to give an account of intuitive presentation" (p. 89).

But even granting the truth of all these misconceptions, we still would not be able to conclude that modern science is "demonstrating" the "postulates of *māyāvāda*"—for we do not yet know what those "postulates" are. She has hinted in the Preface that the doctrine of *māyā* functions as "the explanation of the phenomenal world and the relationship of existence to the real" (p. x). This certainly is correct. One wishes that she had given some attention to explicating that proposition, for, surely, had she done so, she would have realized that Chapter Four was entirely misconceived, and she would have expanded Chapters One and Two into something like a worthwhile contribution to our understanding of Indian philosophy.

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THE SELF IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. By *Troy Wilson Organ.* The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1964. Pp. 164 + Glossary and Bibliography, 22 guilders. Paper.

This well-conceived, modest introduction to Indian theories of the self continues a gathering trend toward studies intended to relate Indian philosophical ideas with Western ideas and preconceptions. Yet, unlike much previous work along these lines, the material is presented here in a way that locates ideas of the self in Indian contexts while making clear the implications of these ideas for the Western reader. The result is a book which should prove very useful for those beginning to make an acquaintance with Indian philosophy.

Professor Organ traces conceptions of the self through the *Ṛg-veda,* the Upaniṣads, the classical schools of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and the Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, and concludes his survey with an account of Aurobindo's conception of the self. The exposition is clear and unburdened with technical language, and is furbished with frequent quotations from Indian writers. The author of this book is clearly very much at home with contemporary accounts of Indian thought; this impression is confirmed by the excellent Bibliography appended.

It is not Organ's intent to analyze the conceptions presented here in any depth. Yet, quite a bit of what he says provides an excellent springboard for analyses. Foremost among such starting-points we must count the question as to what the expression "the self" covers in Indian philosophy, and whether the English expression which translates *"ātman"* is given consistent meaning throughout the various systems of Indian thought. In particular, it is important to try to clarify the distinction, if any, generally made between the *ātman* and the *jīva,* or, as Organ and many others have translated it, "the self." This book appears to be concerned primarily with the *ātman,* as the term "self" is capitalized in the title of the book and the titles of the various chapters; yet, a good deal of what is discussed concerns the *jīva,* or the empirical self.

Organ is mindful of this problem, and provides an account of the usages of *ātman* and *jīva* for each of his literary sources, beginning with the Vedas. Yet, this can but whet one's appetite for a more thorough treatment, and the place one should start should be with the self rather than with the Self, particularly in the light of the fact that most Indian accounts have come at the matter from the other side, operating, as they do, under the influence of Advaitic assumptions.

To illustrate: On page 81, Organ remarks that "the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika . . . denial of consciousness as a central element in their conception of the nature of the self . . . in the minds of many students of the system is the least satisfactory part of the theory, for it is not at all clear how a substance can be called spiritual in which consciousness is found only as an adventitious quality." On page 84, he quotes Hiriyanna to the same effect, that "when we remember that knowledge or experience here [Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika] only appears when certain external factors—none of which is spiritual—co-operate, it will be seen that the system is not far removed from materialism." However, the complaint that a conception of the self is not "spiritual" carries weight only if it is clear to all that the self must be spiritual and in what sense that term is to be understood. The writers of criticisms such as the above have too clearly in mind the Upaniṣadic conception of the self as that which is knower but not itself known. If the assumption is that only such a self can be properly denominated "spiritual" and that anything which is not spiritual is of secondary interest in philosophy, then the complaints voiced by Organ and Hiriyanna are understandable but not terribly exciting, for they beg the question as to whether the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception is less satisfactory than those of its rivals. Furthermore, they appear to require of the self what should be required only of the Self, which raises once again the question of the difference between self and Self, and raises it in a fashion which calls for an answer which is neutral as among the claims of the various systems.

The fact of the matter is that the term *"jīva"* does not necessarily have any relation to consciousness in itself. What it is clearly related to, etymologically and in general parlance, is life. The *jīva* is that which lives, which carries those qualities

which differentiate living from non-living things. The requirement that such an entity be conscious is an additional one, and, in the light of the complex metaphysics it ushers in, it is a requirement not to be made lightly. In view of modern developments in the life sciences, we are even less disposed to identify the seat of life with the seat of consciousness. We are far from knowing yet what carries life—if anything does—but many of us are ready to admit the possibility that some living things are not conscious. Furthermore, it may even be possible to give sound reasons for holding that the seat of one individual's life must antedate his bodily existence, indeed that it must have existed beginninglessly—although that is an argument which needs more space to be presented adequately than is available here. The argument alluded to, which reasons from the fact that we attribute responsibility to agents for their actions, since it does not require that an agent be conscious, does not thereby prove that an individual's consciousness must have continuous and beginningless existence. In this connection, one should keep in mind the devastating criticisms urged against the so-called "memory criterion" of personal identity which have been appearing in recent years in philosophical journals and books; this criterion proposes to identify the person with a stream of consciousness, but soon runs into grave difficulties. As to the question of whether only consciousness is "spiritual," the case is not at all clear, for "spirit" has as much to do with life as with consciousness, stemming from a Latin word meaning "breath." We should not place much weight on etymology, but considerations of etymology can be a healthy antidote to persuasive definitions set forth by metaphysicians eager to plead the cause of their particular theory.

While Organ's presentation is unusually clear and cogent, there are one or two glaring inconsistencies that should be cleared up so that they will not mislead readers who wish to carry on where this book leaves off. One of these occurs on page 62, where two varieties of the Sāṁkhya are distinguished, theistic Sāṁkhya and atheistic Sāṁkhya. The former is on this page identified as Kapila's Sāṁkhya, the latter as Patañjali's Sāṁkhya, usually called the Yoga system. But, as the reader goes on, it becomes clear that it is just the other way around: it is Patañjali who finds a place for God, and Kapila—i.e., the Sāṁkhya proper—which makes no mention of God. The passage on page 62 must be turned around, therefore. Again, on page 100 it is asserted that S. C. Chakravarti, in his book *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, voiced belief "that the Upanishads taught that the world was unreal, but he denied that Śaṅkara taught this doctrine." But on the next page he goes on: "it is Śaṁkara alone who says . . . that everything except Brahman is illusion. . . ." Once again, the initial sentence must be reversed.

There are a liberal number of minor misprints, several in names where an extra *-n-* has crept in ("Viṣṇunsvāmin" for "Viṣṇusvāmin" (p. 90) and "Śrinkantha" for "Śrīkaṇṭha" (p. 93). The transliteration procedures are inconsistent. There is no reason for writing the famous Upaniṣadic utterance *"nēti nēti"* rather than *"neti neti."* But these occasional errors will not bother those for whom the book is most likely to be useful, and they are balanced by several exceedingly illuminating passages of argument, particularly in the last few chapters on the Vedānta systems. The final chapter, on Aurobindo, is a modified version of an article originally published in this journal.

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THE TREASURY OF MATHEMATICS. Edited by *Henrietta O. Midonick.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1965. Pp. xxii + 820. $15.00.

This book is a collection of readings in the history of mathematics. It contains, for the most part, English translations of the writings of the great mathematicians. Where this is not practical, as in the case of the Rhind Mathematical Papyrus, the editor has included a scholarly article on the relevant source material. The amount of space devoted to Indian and Chinese mathematicians makes this book unusual and of interest to readers of this journal.

India is represented by selections from Aryabhata, the Elder (b. 476), the Bakhshali Manuscript (4th century), Brahmagupta (b. 598), and Bhascara Acharya (1114—*ca.* 1185). Wan Wang (12th century B.C.), Chou Kung (*ca.* 1100 B.C.), Chang Tsang (d. 152 B.C.), Liu Hui (3rd century), Sun-Tsu (*ca.* 3rd century), Hsia-hou Yang (6th century), Wang Hs'iao-t'ung (7th century), Li Yeh (*ca.* 1178—*ca.* 1265), Ch'in Chiu-Shao (*ca.* 1250), and Chu Chi-chieh (*ca.* 1300) represent China.

These selections will dispel the impression that there was a lack of mathematical and scientific ability among the ancient Chinese and Indians. Both peoples made significant contributions to mathematics and even anticipated some of the sophisticated discoveries of the Greeks. Among the more elementary of these, the Indian use of zero and the Chinese use of negative numbers should be mentioned.

Three general points should be mentioned here. First, with the exception of Wan Wang's the *Yi King*, none of the Oriental mathematical works seems to relate to the concerns of Oriental philosophers. Second, Oriental mathematics lacks the great variety found in Greek mathematics. Although both Indian and Chinese mathematics cover geometry, number theory, and algebra, one does not observe in them the independence of spirit found in the Greeks. Rather, one finds advances coupled to refinements of old problems and results. Third—this should interest philosophers—unlike Greek mathematical works, those of the Indians and Chinese hardly ever contain proofs of the results stated in them.

Helpful introductions precede each selection, but some of the Oriental texts are still very hard to read. Commentaries by the editor would have been desirable. Because the book lacks an introductory survey, the non-specialist will find it difficult to compare Oriental and Western mathematicians. The arrangement of the selections seems almost at random: they are not ordered by topic, by nationality, or by chronology.

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# *Books Received*

Books listed are not limited to those in the field of Oriental and comparative philosophy. The style for each listing conforms to that used in the book itself. Readers who wish to review any of the books should communicate with the Editor.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE. The Lindley Lecture. By *Richard B. Brandt.* Lawrence, Kansas: Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 1963. Pp. 24. (No price.) Paper.

LOVE, HATE, FEAR, ANGER AND THE OTHER LIVELY EMOTIONS. By *June Callwood.* Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964. Pp. xxii + 168. $3.95.

MATHEMATICS AND LOGIC IN HISTORY AND IN CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT. By *Ettore Carruccio.* Translated by *Isabel Quigly.* Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1964. Pp. 398. $8.75.

INTEGRAL YOGA. THE CONCEPT OF HARMONIOUS AND CREATIVE LIVING. By *Haridas Chaudhuri.* London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1965. Pp. 160. 25s net.

BUDDHISM IN CHINA. A HISTORICAL SURVEY. By *Kenneth K. S. Ch'en.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. Pp. xii + 560. $12.50.

SELECTIONS FROM HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY. By *Gordon H. Clark.* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964. Pp. ix + 267. $2.95. Paper.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND BELIEF IN GOD. By *Gordon H. Clark.* University Series, Philosophical Studies. Nutley, N. J.: The Craig Press, 1964. Pp. 95. (No price.) Paper.

DR. S. RADHAKRISHNAN SOUVENIR VOLUME. 76 ARTICLES BY EMINENT WRITERS OF THE WORLD. Presented by *The Darshana International.* Moradabad: Darshana Printers, 1964. Pp. 600. Rs. 30.00, $8.00, f. 2.10. Contents: B. L. Atreya, "Omni-blessed Radhakrishnan." S. P. Adinarayan, "The Happiest Years of our Life." Roberto Assagioli, "Psychosynthesis." Albert E. Avey, "How Exact is Our Knowledge of Early Greek Thought?" Archie J. Bahm, "Radhakrishnan: From An American Perspective." Charles K. Bliss, "Life and Indian Thought." David Baumgardt, "The Nature of Mystical Experience According to Hildegard Von Bingen (1098-1178)." Joseph H. Bunzel, "Immortality Through Art." G. E. Cairns, "Unity of Ethical Values in Three Signi-

ficant Twentieth Century Philosophies of East and West." F. H. Donnell, "Other Minds and Images." Blodwen Davies, "Richard Maurice Bucke and the Sources of Genius." Brian Ellis, "Is Number a Quantity." D. Luther Evans, "Methodologies of Control in Ideological Conflict." A. C. Ewing, "The Individual and the State." K. Fantl and M. A. Paul, "Extrasensory Perception and Psychiatry." Alfred Farau, "The Heritage of Alfred Adler." J. K. Feibleman, "Human Nature and Institutions." Nandor Fodor, "Inscriptions and Epitaphs." A. B. Gibson, "On Imputing Responsibility." A. J. Gregor, "A 'Fascist' System of Ethics: Personality in the Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile." Charles Hartshorne, "Negative Facts and the Analogical Inference to 'Other Mind.'" W. E. Hocking, "The Moral Meeting of East and West." W. Horosz, "The Concept of Self-Transcendence in Radhakrishnan and Niebuhr." N. P. Jacobson, "The Buddha and David Hume." Hari Mohan Jha, "Paramartha Darshana: A Revolutionary Trend in Contemporary Indian Thought." Humayun Kabir, "Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan." T. G. Kalghatgi, "Synoptic Philosophy." S. P. Kanal, "Naturalism in Recent Indian Philosophy." Donald B. Kuspit, "Is Existentialism a Psychology." G. R. Malkani, "The Self as Intelligent Substance." Y. Masih, "The Reality of God." C. Miller, "Science and the Deocentric Predicament." B. Mollenhauer, "Spinoza's Quest for Certainty." Charles A. Moore, "The Spirituality of Western 'Humanism.'" H. Motoyama, "Psychology of Religion." F. J. Mott, "The Nature and Mechanisms of Mind." D. N. Morgan, "Painted Women." G. E. Mueller, "Creation, Evolution and Emanation: A Philosophical Interpretation of the First Chapter of Genesis." Prem Nath, "Philosophy and Social Change." J. O. Nelson, "A Re-examination of Ethical Realism." W. D. Nietmann, "Language and Ontology." T. W. Organ, "Radhakrishnan and Teleology." L. Rodriguez, "Peace on Earth." H. L. Parsons, "Man East and West." R. L. Perkins, "Ethics and Existence: A Kierkegaardian Theme." Oliver L. Reiser, "An Archetype for a World Philosophy." P. N. Rao, "Radhakrishnan: The Man and His Message." Dale Riepe, "Reflections on Comparative Philosophy." N. Rescher, "Generalization in Historical Explanation and Prediction in History." D. D. Runes, "Fearful Justice." H. Sanborn, "Individuality and Reality." A. K. Sarkar, "Nāgārjuna: On Causation and Nirvāṇa." Paul A. Schilpp, "On a Visit with the President of India." G. A. Schrader, "Natural and Assigned Meaning: A False Dichotomy." Ninian Smart, "Indian Arguments about the Existence of God." A. Sengupta, "Madhu Sudan Saraswati: The Great Advaita Scholar." W. A. Shimer, "Dr. Radhakrishnan, Man and the Universe." H. L. Silverman, "Psychological Implications of College Administration: A Commentary." R. P. Singh, "Śankara and Radhakrishnan." John Somerville, "Philosophy and the Peace Problem." B. G. Tewari, "Fundamentalism in Scientific Inquiry." Hans Thomae, "Adolescence in a Changing Society." D. D. Vadekar, "A Philosophical Outlook in Life." S. Vahiduddin, "The Meaning of Philosophy in an Age of Crisis." K. C. Varadachari, "Philosophical Studies in India During the Period of Crisis." A. U. Vasavada, "Does Prof. Radhakrishnan Propound any Philosophy?" S. J. Velinsky, "Why is Philosophy Psychologically Needed?" A. R. Wadia, "Indian Ethics." Gerda Walther, "The Importance of a Phenomenological Approach to Religion and Parapsychology." R. B. Winn, "One Source of Religion." Henry Winthrop, "Indian Thought and Humanistic Psychology." C. T. K. Chari, "The

Mystical Horizons of Personality." L. Lachance, "Actualite de la Declaration des droits de l'homme." K. S. Row, "Radhakrishnan and Hinduism." J. P. Atreya, "The Concept of Mind in Indian Psychology." C. B. Hills, "Imagination—The New Fuel."

MARXISM AND FREEDOM. . . FROM 1776 UNTIL TODAY. This edition includes a new chapter on Mao Tse-tung and the Sino-Soviet Rift. 2d ed. By *Raya Dunayevskaya.* Preface by *Herbert Marcuse.* New York: Twayne Publishers, 1964. Pp. 363. $6.00.

A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF RELIGION. By *David Hugh Freeman* in collaboration with *David Freeman.* Nutley, N.J.: The Craig Press, 1964. Pp. vii + 270. (No price.) Paper.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE. By *Kenneth T. Gallagher.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1964. Pp. xi + 305. $4.50.

THE CHRIST. AN EPIC IN HEROIC VERSE. By *Arthur Garrett.* Elms Court: Stockwell, Ltd., 1964. Pp. 315. (No price.)

METHODOLOGY OF THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES. PROBLEMS AND CONTROVERSIES. By *Rollo Handy.* American Lecture Series. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1964. Pp. xi + 182. (No price.)

FACETS OF INDIAN THOUGHT. By *Betty Heimann.* Foreword by *R. N. Dandekar.* New York: Schocken Books Inc., 1964. Pp. 177. $4.95.

CEYLONESE WRITING. SOME PERSPECTIVES. Edited by *C. R. Hensman.* Colombo: Community Institute, n.d. Pp. 104. (No price.) Paper.

RELATIONS AMONG RELIGIONS TODAY. A HANDBOOK OF POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES. Edited by *Moses Jung, Swami Nikhilananda, Herbert W. Schneider.* Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1963. Pp. xii + 178. (No price.) Paper.

ETHICS AND SCIENCE. By *Henry Margenau.* Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964. Pp. xi + 302. $7.50.

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF EDUCATION IN NEW YORK STATE. By *Ward Morehouse.* Albany: University of the State of New York, 1963. Pp. vii + 48. (No price.) Paper.

MESON AND CHUNG-YUNG. A comparative study of the Mean, Greek and Chinese, and some related problems. By *M. Motegi.* Yokohama: No publisher listed. 1963. Pp. 41. (No price.) Paper.

SELECTIONS FROM EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY. By *Milton C. Nahm.* 4th ed. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964. Pp. xii + 302. $2.95. Paper.

WAYS OF THINKING OF EASTERN PEOPLES. INDIA, CHINA, TIBET, JAPAN. By *Hajime Nakamura*. Revised English Translation. Edited by *Philip P. Wiener*. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1964. Pp. xx + 712. $9.50.

GANDHI'S DISCOVERY OF RELIGION. A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY. By *N. A. Nikam*. Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1963. Pp. 78. Re. 1.00; Sh. 2/-; $0.50. Paper.

GOD AND EVIL. READINGS ON THE THEOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF EVIL. Contemporary Perspectives in Philosophy Series. Edited by *Nelson Pike*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. viii + 114. (No price.) Paper.

TRUTH. Contemporary Perspectives in Philosophy Series. Edited by *George Pitcher*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. vii + 118 (No price.) Paper.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE DELHI PHILOSOPHICAL COLLOQIUM, OCTOBER 10-19, 1962. Under the Auspices of India International Centre and University of Delhi. President, C. D. Deshmukh; Chairman, Max Black; In Charge of Organization, N. V. Banerjee. New Delhi: India International Centre, 1963. Pp. 131. (No price.) Paper.

THE LIFE OF SRI AUROBINDO. A SOURCE BOOK. By *A. B. Purani*. Revised ed. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1964. Pp. vi + 335. (No price.)

AN ANTHOLOGY OF MODERN INDONESIAN POETRY. Edited by *Burton Raffel*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964. Pp. xiv + 158. $4.00.

ONTOLOGY OF ADVAITA. WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MĀYĀ. By *K. B. Ramakrishna Rao*. Mulki: Vijaya College, 1964. Pp. ix + 34. Rs. 5/- or $1/- or Sh. 7/-.

THEORY OF MAN. By *Francisco Romero*. Translated by *William F. Cooper*, with an Introduction by *William J. Kilgore*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964. Pp. xxxiv + 324. $8.00.

F. A. TRENDELENBURG: FORERUNNER TO JOHN DEWEY. By *Gershon George Rosenstock*. Foreword by *George Kimball Plochmann*. Philosophical Explorations. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1964. Pp. xvi + 172. $5.50.

DEL SOLILOQUIO O CONSEJOS AL ESCRITOR. By *Shaftesbury*. Textos Y Traducciones. Traducción par *Delia A. Sampietro*. La Plata: Universidad Nacional, n.d. Pp. 163. (No price.) Paper.

STUDIES IN MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY. By *M. Saeed Sheikh.* Foreword by *M. M. Sharif.* Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1962. Pp. xi + 235. Rs. 7.80.

MAN, REALITY AND VALUES. By *R. A. Siddiqi.* New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964. Pp. ix + 91. $5.00.

NON-VIOLENCE AS AN ETHICAL PRINCIPLE. WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE VIEWS OF MAHATMA GANDHI. By *Unto Tähtinen.* Turku: Turun Ylippisto, 1964. Pp. 192. (No price.) Paper.

SCIENCE AND CULTURE. By *M. S. Thacker.* Delhi: Ministry of Scientific Research & Cultural Affairs, Government of India, 1963. Pp. 32. (No price.) Paper.

THE CASE FOR CALVINISM. By *Cornelius Van Til.* Nutley, N.J.: The Craig Press, 1964. Pp. xxiv + 153. $3.75.

PHILOSOPHY IN PROCESS. FASCICLE 5. By *Paul Weiss.* Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1964. Pp. 249-312. $1.25. Paper.

ASIAN MIGRATION TO AUSTRALIA. THE BACKGROUND TO EXCLUSION 1896-1923. By *A. T. Yarwood.* London and New York: Cambridge University Press, Melbourne University Press, 1964. Pp. 210. $9.50.

# *Current Periodicals*

Articles listed here are specifically within the field of Oriental and comparative philosophy except, occasionally, when a full table of contents is published to indicate the scope of a particular journal. Titles in Chinese and and Japanese journals have been translated. The style for each listing conforms to that used in the publication itself. Editors and authors are requested to submit suitable material.

THE ADVENT (Pondicherry), XXI (3), August, 1964: SRI AUROBINDO, Yoga and Human Evolution.

THE ARYAN PATH (Bombay), XXXV (7), July, 1964.

XXXV (8), August, 1964: F. H. ANGOLD, The Divine-Human Relationship. M. A. VENKATA RAO, An Indian Philosophy of History.

XXXV (9), September, 1964: ARTHUR L. HERMAN, Value Theory: East and West: I.

ASIA (A Selection of Papers Delivered Before the Asia Society). (New York), 1, Spring, 1964: MICHAEL MOERMAN, Western Culture and the Thai Way of Life.

ASIATISCHE STUDIEN/ÉTUDES ASIATIQUES (Bern), 1-2, 1964: W. RAU, Versuch einer deutschen Übersetzung der Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad.

BIGAKU [Aesthetics] (Tokyo), 15 (2), September, 1964.

BIJDRAGEN (Utrecht), (2-3), 1964.

BULLETIN OF THE INSTITUTE OF HISTORY AND PHILOLOGY, ACADEMIA SINICA (In Memory of the late Dr. Chu Chia-Hua) (Taipei), XXXV, 1964: YUAN-REN CHAO, Two Examples of Diagrammatic Representations in Chinese Grammar.

BULLETIN OF THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION INSTITUTE OF CULTURE (Calcutta), XV (7), July, 1964: JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, Modern Problems Demand a Spiritual Approach.

XV (8), August, 1964.

XV (9), September, 1964.

BULLETIN SIGNALÉTIQUE (Paris), XVIII (3), 1964.

BUNGAKU [Literature] (Tokyo), 32 (7), July, 1964.

32 (8), August, 1964.

32 (9), September, 1964: SHISHŌ KOBAYASHI, Tales of Genji and Buddhism.

BUNKA [Culture], 28 (2), Summer, 1964: T. YAMAZAKI, On the Concept of Social Consciousness.

FRANCE-ASIA (Tokyo), XIX (182), January-March, 1964: MAURICE PINGUET, Digression sur l'Art du Japon.

THE INDIAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY REVIEW (New Delhi), I (3), January-March, 1964: A. M. SHAH, Basic Terms and Concepts in the Study of the Family in India. H. VENKATASUBBIAH, B. Datta—The Evolution of Economic Thinking in India. S. GOPAL, S. Natarajan—A Century of Social Reform in India.

THE INDO-ASIAN CULTURE (New Delhi), XIII (1), July, 1964: JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, Culture and One World. JUSTICE S. K. DAS, Secularism in Modern India. REV. MARTIN LUTHER KING, Non-Violence the Only Way.

IQBAL (Lahore), 13 (1), July, 1964: K. BADAR, Development of Religious Thought in India.

THE JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM (Cleveland), XXIII (1), Fall, 1964.

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ORIENTAL SOCIETY (Baltimore), 84 (1), January-March, 1964: HANS H. FRANKEL, Fifteen Poems by Ts'ao Chih: An Attempt at a New Approach. D. D. KOSAMBI, The Autochthonous Element in the Mahābhārata.

THE JOURNAL OF ASIAN STUDIES (Ann Arbor), XXIII (4), August, 1964: J. K. GALBRAITH, Reflection on the Asian Scene. NO AUTHOR, Symposium on Chinese Studies and Disciplines. JOSEPH R. LEVENSON, The Humanistic Disciplines: Will Sinology Do?

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (New York), XXV (3), July-September, 1964: CRAUFURD D. GOODWIN, Evolution in Australian Social Thought. CONSTANCE I. SMITH, Jean Bodin and Comparative Law.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY (New York), LXI (16), September 3, 1964: BERNARD BEROFSKY, Determinism and the Concept of a Person.

LXI (17), September 17, 1964.

JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS IN JAPAN (Tokyo), II (1), April, 1964: CHIE NAKANE, Characteristics of Japanese Intellectuals. MASAO MARUYAMA, Japanese Thought. SHUNSUKE TSURUMI, Cooperative Research on Ideological Transformation. TŌRU MIYAKAWA, The Japan Cultural Forum: Its Logic and Psychology.

II (2), August, 1964: YŪJI AIDA, The Limitations of Western European Humanism. HIDETOSHI KATŌ, The Logic of a Non-Purposive Society.

THE MAHA BODHI (Calcutta), 72 (7), July, 1964.

THE MIDDLE WAY (London), XXXIX (2), August, 1964: WALPOLA RAHULA, Ālayavijñāna. CHRISTMAS HUMPHREYS, Basic Buddhism II.

THE MUSLIM WORLD (Hartford), LIV (3), July, 1964: JOSEPH POLITELLA, Al-Ghazali & Meister Eckhart—Two Giants of The Spirit (I).

PACIFIC PHILOSOPHY FORUM (Special Issue on the meeting of the subject: Tolerance, its foundations and limits in theory and practice) (Stockton) (2), September, 1963: CORNELIUS KRUSÉ, History of the Concept of Tolerance. ALFRED STERN, Tolerance: An Historical Introduction. CHAIM PERELMAN, The Foundations and Limits of Tolerance. JOHN WISDOM, Some Forms of Intolerance. JEAN WAHL, Limitations on Freedom of Expression. KLAUS ZWEILING, The Basis and Limits of Tolerance. GUIDO CALOGERO, Tolerance and Social Order. N. A. NIKAM, Prejudice and the Limits of Tolerance. JOSÉ FERRATER MORA, On Diversity of Views. EURYLAO CANNABRAVA, Coercion and Cooperation. A. CORNELIUS BENJAMIN, Science and Tolerance. RICHARD P. MCKEON, Synthesis of the Conference. THADDEUS KOTARBINSKI, The Importance of Free Expression: Some Closing Remarks.

THE PAKISTAN PHILOSOPHICAL JOURNAL (Lahore), VIII (1), July, 1964: MUHAMMAD YUSUF ALI, The Role of Synthetic Outlook in Philosophy. SAIYID ABDUL HAI, Good Life in a Society. SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR, Islamic Philosophy—Re-orientation or Re-understanding. B. H. SIDDIQI, Re-orientation of Muslim Philosophy. D. M. AZRAF, Re-orientation of Muslim Philosophy.

THE PERSONALIST (Los Angeles), XLV (3), July, 1964: C. R. METZGER and RICHARD F. S. YANG, trans., Seven Songs from the Yüan: Poetry.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY (Amalner), XXXVII (2), July, 1964: JOHN DE LUCCA, Science and Philosophy. G. R. MALKANI, Spirituality—Eastern and Western. J. DE MARNEFFE, The Metaphysics of F. H. Bradley. SHRI CHANDRA, Does the Verification Principle Eliminate the Possibility of Transcendental Objects? R. L. SINGH, Buddhism and Vedanta.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW (Ithaca), LXXIII (3), July, 1964: MICHAEL DUMMETT, Bringing About the Past. SAMUEL GOROVITZ, Leaving the Past Alone.

PRABUDDHA BHARATA [Awakened India] (Calcutta), LXIX, July, 1964: SWAMI VIVEKANANDA, Buddhistic India—2. K. KRISHNAMOORTHY, Vaiṣṅavism and Advaitism.

LXIX, August, 1964: ANIMA SEN GUPTA, Kaṭha Upaniṣad: Sāṅkhya Point of View.

LXIX, September, 1964: EDITORIAL, Is Ethics a Substitute for Religion and Spirituality?

QUADERNI (Bologna), VIII, 1962-1963. A. BACCARANI, Contribution to the Jain Philosophical Language.

REVUE ROUMAINE DES SCIENCES SOCIALES (Bucarest), VIII (1), 1964.

TAMIL CULTURE (Madras), I (2), April-June, 1964.

TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR FILOSOFIE (Utrecht), 26 (3), September, 1964.

UNITED ASIA (Bombay), 16 (3), May-June, 1964.

16 (4), July-August, 1964.

THE VEDANTA KESARI (Madras), LI (3), July, 1964: BRAJ BIHARI NIGAM, A Retrospect and Value of the Four Yogas. P. NAGARAJA RAO, The Nature and Function of Philosophy.

LI (4), August, 1964: SWAMI GNANESWARANANDA, Nature of the Soul. ANIMA SEN GUPTA, Some Important Concepts of Ramanuja's Philosophy Clarified. BRAJ BIHARI NIGAM, A Retrospect and Value of the Four Yogas.

LI (5), September, 1964: SWAMI GNANESWARANANDA, What is Real Freedom? V. MADHUSUDAN REDDY, Maya and Mayavada: A Critical Retrospect. BRAJ BIHARI NIGAM, A Retrospect and Value of the Four Yogas.

THE VISVABHARATI QUARTERLY (Calcutta), 28 (1), 1963-1964: HARRIET SMITH, Walt Whitman and Rabindranath Tagore: Precursors of Universal Man. D. P. SEN GUPTA, Laughter in Sacred Literature. PRAFULLA KUMAR DAS, Lila As the Creation of Love.

# *News and Notes*

The purpose of this department is to keep readers informed of developments throughout the world in the field of Oriental and comparative philosophy. Appropriate news items should be sent to the Editor.

Johnson Reprint Corporation, 111 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y., 10003, and Johnson Reprint Company, Ltd., Berkeley Square House, London W.1, England, has announced the publication of back issues of *Philosophy East and West*. This publication is of special interest to those whose requests for past volumes and issues could not be met. It is hoped that this reprint edition will encourage individuals and institutions in both East and West to take advantage of the renewed availability of the Journal.

"In appreciation of the outstanding contribution toward the promotion of international understanding and friendship between peoples of different countries by Jawaharlal Nehru," the governing body of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations has established a Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding.

"The award is proposed to be given every year to a person of pre-eminence who has contributed most particularly during the preceding year to the ideal of world peace and brotherhood of man by dedicated service in the field of promotion of international understanding and friendship between peoples of different countries."

At the 174th Meeting of the American Oriental Society held in New York early in April, 1964, the following papers of special interest to readers of this Journal were presented:

R. M. Frank, Catholic University of America: "The Ontology of Abu l-Hudhayl al-'Allaf."

W. N. Brown, "Theories of creation in the Rig Veda."

D. Riepe, "The Logical Consistency of Ethical Non-attachment with Reference to Swami Abhedananda."

K. Sivaraman, "Māṇikka Vācagar and Meister Eckhart."

O. H. de A. Wijesekera, "The Concept of Viññāna in Theravāda Buddhism."

N. Heer, " 'Abd-al-Raḥām nal-Jāmī's argument for the existence of existence."

The following short statement appeared in the latest issue of *Soviet Periodical Abstracts:*

Pomerants, G. S. ON A DISCUSSION IN PAGES OF THE JOURNAL PHILOSOPHY EAST AND WEST. NarAia, No. 6, 1963, 196-200. Mainly a criticism of an article by L. J. Rosan in the No. 4, 1962, issue of the Journal, on the definition of the terms "East and West" in philosophy. Pomerants concludes that it is impossible to speak of "Indian" or "Chinese" philosophy as an uninterrupted current; the stadial development of society must be kept in mind.

The University of Hawaii has announced the establishment of a doctoral program in philosophy involving work in the Western, Asian, and East-West comparative fields. This program has been made possible by the appointment of three full-time professors in the Asian fields along with continuing work in the comparative areas.

Professor S. K. Saksena (Ph.D., University of London), formerly University Professor of Philosophy at Saugar University, handles Indian philosophy. Professor Kenneth K. Inada (Ph.D., Tokyo University) is in charge of Buddhist philosophy and Japanese thought. Professor Chung-ying Cheng (Ph.D., Harvard University) handles Chinese philosophy. Professor Charles A. Moore teaches undergraduate and graduate courses in East-West philosophy.

Work for the doctorate with specialization in any area of Asian philosophy requires special preparation, course work, and language proficiency beyond the requirements for the degree specializing in Western philosophy.

Information may be obtained by writing to Professor Winfield E. Nagley, Chairman, Department of Philosophy, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822.

Among the courses available in Asian and comparative fields are the following:

Philosophical Foundation of Indian Culture
Indian Philosophy
Contemporary Indian Philosophy
Indian Social Philosophy
Indian Logic
Buddhist Philosophy
Theravāda Philosophy
Mahāyāna Philosophy
Zen Philosophy
Chinese Philosophy
Confucianism
Neo-Confucianism
Taoism
Philosophy East and West
Seminar in Buddhist Philosophy
Seminar in Chinese Philosophy
Seminar in Comparative Philosophy
Seminar in Indian Philosophy

Professor N. A. Nikam, formerly Vice-Chancellor of Mysore University and Secretary of the Indian Philosophical Congress for many years, was Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Macalester College, St. Paul, Minnesota, as Barclay Acheson Professor of Philosophy and International Studies for 1963-1964. He delivered the Barclay Acheson lectures at Macalester College on "Contemporary India: Ideas and Men, a Perspective." He also delivered the opening address of the Canadian-American Conference held annually between Macalester College and the United College at Winnipeg, Canada, and the major address of the Thirteenth Minnesota Conference on Christianity in Higher Education, held at Hamline University; that address was entitled "The Images of Man—East and West."

Dr. Nikam is Visiting Professor at the California State College at Hayward for 1964-1965; he is President-Elect of the 1965 Indian Philosophical Congress in India.

Dr. T. V. Venkateswaran, of the University of Madras, was Visiting Professor at the University of Denver during 1963-1964. After a visit to India, he will return for 1964-1965.

Professor Francis W. Brush and Professor Venkateswaran are collaborating in offering a senior course on the relation of classical and contemporary Indian thought to the thought of the West.

Swami Chinmayananda, internationally known swami and scholar from Bombay, who recently took a world tour, lectured under the auspices of the Conference on Science and Religion at California State College at Los Angeles in March on the subject "Science and Spirituality, East and West." A spiritual leader in his own country, founder of the Academy of Knowledge in Bombay, and author of some 20 books in the area of Hindu philosophy and religion, Swami Chinmayananda lectured on and discussed primarily the question, "Can the increasing linkage of science and the human spirit provide the basis of a new and adequate ideology for modern man?"

The Academy of Knowledge, in Bombay, offers courses in the comparative study of Eastern and Western philosophies.

Mr. Paul Weiss retired as Editor of *The Review of Metaphysics* in June, 1964. Mr. Richard J. Bernstein became the Editor, beginning with the September, 1964, issue. Mr. Walter G. Emge, as Manager, is now in charge of the *Summaries and Comments* section of the *Review*.

Dr. Sengaku Mayeda is now Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania and is teaching two courses in the field of Indian Philosophy—Introduction to Indian Philosophy and Seminar in Indian Philosophy. He had previously taught these same courses as an Instructor in 1961-1962, before taking a leave from 1962-1964 for research in India and Germany. The same courses were given by Professor J. F. Staal, now at University of Amsterdam, in 1960-1961 and, during Professor Mayeda's absence in 1962-1964, by Professor Royal W. Weiler.

Dr. Eliot Deutsch, who teaches Oriental Philosophy and Philosophy of Religion at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York, was recently selected as a New York State Faculty Scholar in Oriental Studies by the State Education Department. The appointment includes the privilege of participating in the Columbia University Faculty Seminar in Oriental Thought and Religion, and of using the Columbia University Libraries for carrying out research in Indian philosophy. Dr. Deutsch recently returned from India, where he did research in Vedānta under the sponsorship of The American Institute of Indian Studies.

Professor Anil Kumar Sarkar was Visiting Professor of Philosophy at the University of New Mexico during the spring and summer terms of 1964. He participated in the Seminar on Aesthetics at Taos, New Mexico, in June. Professor Sarkar was

former Head of the Department of Philosophy at Rajendra College at Patna University and has been Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Ceylon University since 1944. He is now preparing a revised second edition of his *An Outline of Whitehead's Philosophy* for early publication.

The following papers in philosophy were presented at the twenty-sixth International Congress of Orientalists, held in New Delhi, in January, 1964:

Devkanya Arya, "A Note on the Term Acintya Bhedābheda."
Biswanath Banerjee, "Place of karuṇā (compassion) in Buddhism."
Asoke Chatterjee, "Sin as Personified in Early Sanskrit Texts."
B. K. Chattopadhyaya, "Upaniṣads and Vedic Rituals."
C. Chattopadhyaya, "Significance of bhakti in the Philosophy of Madhva."
Binayendra Chaudhury, "Sati (mindfulness) in Buddhism."
N. N. Choudhuri, "The Philosophy of Durgā." (in Sanskrit)
Sukomal Choudhuri, "Maitreya Buddha as Depicted in the *Anāgatavaṃsa* and the Maitreya-Avadānam."
Y. K. Deshpande, "Place of Mahānubhāva Philosophy amongst the Branches of the Vedānta Philosophy Derived from the texts of the Vedas."
R. C. Dwivedi, "Kashmir Saivism and Tantric Buddhism."
Ratnam Ganesan, "Prakṛti and Puruṣa in the Bhagavadgītā."
T. Gelblum and S. Pines, "Some observations on the presumable sources of al-Bīrūni's translation of Patañjali's Yogasūtra and some traits of his method of translation."
Brahmananda Gupta, "On the Common Source of Jayanta and Vyomaśiva."
Aruna Haldar, "Buddhist Conception of Personality."
S. K. Handa, "Freedom Through Karma."
Shrinath S. Hasurkar, "The Scheme of Finite Universe—as Evolved in Vedānta-Sarva-Saṃgraha."
T. K. Gopalaswamy Iyengar, "New Light Shed by the *Nyāya-Sūtra* Text as Commented on by Gosvāmi Bhaṭṭācārya."
K. A. Subrahmania Iyer, "Bhartṛhari on Vyākaraṇa as a Means of Attaining *Mokṣa.*"
Hem Chandra Joshi, "Iśvara as the Author of the Vedas."
Rasik Vihari Joshi, "A Study of the Three Qualities of Sāṃkhya System."
Munishri Mahendra Kumar, "Reality and Relativity of Space and Time in Jain Metaphysics and Modern Physics."
T. G. Mainkar, "Gauḍapāda: His Life."
V. I. Mannadiar, "The Origin of Śākteya Mārga in Kerala."
P. M. Modi, "The Method of Interpreting the *Bhagavadgītā.*"
Majid Movaghar, "My Experience with Yoga."
Ramaranjan Mukherji, "The Role of Abhidhāmūla-Vyañjanā."
Sita Krishna Nambiar, "A Fresh Approach to the *Gītā.*"
Munishri Nathmal, "Philosophy of Soul is the Gift of Kṣatriyas to Indian Thought."
Swami Nikhilananda, "Social Values in Hinduism."
W. Nolle, "Permanence of the Soul—Further Light on the Buddhist Theory."

W. Pachow, "A Buddhist Discourse on Meditation from Tun-Huang."
G. C. Pande, "The Origin of Mahāyāna."
K. C. Pandey, "Dualism-*cum*-Monism (Bhedābhedavāda)."
R. C. Pandeya, "The Mādhyamika Philosophy:—A New Approach."
G. J. Pandya, "The Concept of Rasa and the Part Played by Suggestion in It."
M. D. Paradkar, "Similes in Śaṃkara's Bhāṣya on the *Mūṇḍakopaniṣad*."
K. Kunjunni Raja, "A So-called View of Maṇḍana on Word-Meaning Discussed by the Navya-nyāya School."
Munishri Rakesh Kumar, "The Theory of Syādvāda."
N. H. Samtani, "The Noble-Eightfold Path of Buddha in the *Arthaviniścaya-Sūtra*."
E. R. Srikrishna Sarma, "Mahāvidyā Syllogism."
V. Anjaneya Sarma, "The Concept of Adhyāsa in Śaṃkara's Commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*."
Genjun H. Sasaki, "The Time Concept in Abhidharma."
Anima Sengupta, "Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja: A Comparative Study."
Mukunda Madhava Sharma, "Some Observations on the Sphoṭa Theory."
Dinesh Chandra Shastri, "Concept of Mind in Ancient India."
Malati J. Shendge, "Buddhist Tantric Yoga and Psychoanalysis."
Karunesha Shukla, "*Ātman* in Buddhist Philosophy: View-point of the Buddha."
Kamal Chand Sogani, "Fundamentals of Jaina Mysticism."
V. Subba Rao, "The Philosophy Behind the Formation of Word Classes."
Shashi Synghal, "Colour Scheme in Indian Aesthetics."
Nathmal Tatia, "Negation in Indian Philosophy."
J. B. Bhattacharyya, "Vācaspati Misra's Misinterpretation of the Saṃkhya Theory of Perception."
D. G. Joshi, "Refutation of the Mādhvamata by Appayya Dīkṣita."
C. Regamey, "The Origin of the Activistic Trends in the doctrine of Svāmī Dayānand Sarasvatī."
J. S. Zaveri, "Non-Absolutist Realism of the Jainas."

(The foregoing have summaries printed in the Supplement to the volume referred to above.)

J. A. B. Van Buitenen, "The Place of Bhāskara in Vedānta."
T. A. V. Dikshitar, "Some Aspects of Indian Philosophy."
V. V. Gokhale, "The Heart of the Madhyamaka Philosophy by Bhavya."
G. C. Jain, "Vidyānanda's *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā*."
J. S. Jetly, "Inexpressibility of Knowledge According to the Nyāya System."
R. N. Kalia, "Mistakes of Max Müller."
M. G. Khajanchi, "Krishna and Kant."
Dalsukh Malvania, "Mānasa-pratyakṣa in Buddhist Logic."
K. S. Murthy, "Indology and Oriental Philosophy."
M. V. Krishna Murthy, "Yoga as Understood in East and West."
Nagendra, "Some Aspects of Rasa-siddhānta."

(The foregoing titles are printed as an appendix to the volume, *Summaries of Papers*.)

Below are listed some papers of philosophical interest in some of the other sections:

H. C. Paul, "Umar Khayyām as a philosopher-linguist."

Miguel Alonzo Romero, "Loftiness of the Oriental Soul: A Study about Iran."

Kojun Fukuki, "Japanese Buddhism and Confucianism."

Yasataka Fumoto, "Characteristic Features of Confucianism in Japan."

D. Leslie, "Argument by Contradiction in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Reasoning."

Sunitikumar Pathak, "An Analysis of Ālayavijñāna (Store Consciousness) By Tson-Kha-Pa in Tibet (14th cent. A.D.)."

Ki-Yong Rhi, "Arguments on the Disparition of True Law (Saddharma)."

N. Aiyaswami Sastri, "The Satya-Siddhi's Contributions to Buddhist Philosophy."

M. Abdul Haq Ansari, "The Conception of the Ultimate Happiness in Muslim Philosophy."

Yusuf Husain Khan, "Shah Muhibb Uullah of Allahabad and his Mystical Thought."